Why would it matter what âmost peopleâ think? Arguments are invitations; if the premises donât speak to you, youâre free to decline the invitation. But that no more makes it a âbad argumentâ than does failing to appeal to you (or even a majority of people) mean that a party is a âbad partyâ. The better test of argumentative quality is whether it is surprising, illuminating, or helpful to (some or enough of) the target audienceâthose who antecedently agree with the premises, and must thus grapple with the choice of whether to revise those beliefs or come to accept the conclusion.
I am tempted to write an even lengthier explanation for why I think it matters, but Iâll try to keep it shorter. The sense in which I am talking about what most people think is with respect to what they mean by what they say when they make moral claims. And I take what people mean by what they say to be relevant to the assessment of the meaning of ordinary moral language. So, if, for instance, most people speak, think, or act like moral antirealists, or at least not like realists, this would be relevant to the respective plausibility of realism and antirealism in various ways.
At least one way this would be relevant is that it would undercut claims from moral realists that moral realism is a âcommon senseâ view. Many moral realists appeal to the presumptively realist features of moral discourse. If they are mistaken about this, then this undercuts at least some appeals to a presumption in favor of moral realism. Others claim that people generally experience morality in ways more in line with realism. If this isnât true, this would undercut such claims as well.
Generally speaking, then, realists often appeal to a presumption in favor of realism predicated on the allegedly realist-features of ordinary moral discourse, realist features of ordinary moral experience, and so on. This is sometimes leveraged to shift the burden of proof onto antirealists. Antirealists are described as having âradically skepticalâ views, for instance.
If it turns out that realist inclinations and realist construals of moral claims are idiosyncratic, not representative of ordinary thought and language, and largely parochial features of the way academic philosophers are inclined to speak and think, this would undercut these sorts of appeals.
I donât think moral realism relies on presumptive arguments, but they fairly common. A couple quick comments related to this:
First, I think the most plausible interpretation of Benthamâs remarks about how things seem, whatâs counterintuitive, and especially the claim that views contrary to his are âcrazyâ hints at least a bit in the direction that Bentham doesnât merely mean to report how things seem to him, or that heâs simply reporting his own proprietary use of moral language. The notion that those who disagree are âcrazyâ carries connotations that anyone who doesnât react the way he does is making an error of some kind. But if he is just reporting how things seem, I do wonder why he so often opts to describe contrary views or intuitions as âcrazy.â
Second, realists may dispute whether what people âthinkâ is relevant to what those people mean, or relevant to the armchair analysis of the meaning of moral sentences. In that case, Iâd likely disagree with whatever account of language and/âor whatever methodological approach theyâre taking to addressing these questions, in which case any positions they take that are downstream of this disagreement rely on contested views about language, meaning, and methods. In that case, what people think is indirectly relevant insofar as its relevant to my views, at least, and if they donât agree that what people think is relevant then we disagree on a more fundamental matter.
Thereâs a lot more I could say, e.g., about the descriptive metaethics project of the 20th century and the seemingly close historical connection between ordinary moral language and judgment and the typical construal of metaethical positions, but Iâll leave it there for now. Iâd be happy to discuss the matter more with you any time!
> Arguments are invitations; if the premises donât speak to you, youâre free to decline the invitation. But that no more makes it a âbad argumentâ than does failing to appeal to you (or even a majority of people) mean that a party is a âbad partyâ.
My reasons for thinking Benthamâs arguments are bad are not exclusively based on the fact that appeals to how things seem may or may not reflect how they seem to me or to people in general. I present a variety of other objections in the post I referenced, and it is this set of objections taken together that are the basis for my claim that Benthamâs arguments are not good.
As far as them not being sophisticated: I stand by that. Bentham does not present well-developed arguments as far as cases for moral realism go. His arguments arenât very clear or well-organized, he doesnât unpack what he means by much of what he says, he doesnât bring up many of the standard or some of the more obscure arguments one might bring up in favor of moral realism (so we donât get much of a cumulative case that appeals to multiple independent arguments), and he doesnât do much to anticipate or respond to the kinds of objections one might receive from antirealists. In short, his arguments are narrow and underdeveloped. I say this as someone who regularly reads his blog and has seen him present far more compelling arguments on other topics (even though I frequently disagree with him). So I know Bentham is more than capable of making a stronger case than he has here.
Why would it matter what âmost peopleâ think? Arguments are invitations; if the premises donât speak to you, youâre free to decline the invitation. But that no more makes it a âbad argumentâ than does failing to appeal to you (or even a majority of people) mean that a party is a âbad partyâ. The better test of argumentative quality is whether it is surprising, illuminating, or helpful to (some or enough of) the target audienceâthose who antecedently agree with the premises, and must thus grapple with the choice of whether to revise those beliefs or come to accept the conclusion.
I am tempted to write an even lengthier explanation for why I think it matters, but Iâll try to keep it shorter. The sense in which I am talking about what most people think is with respect to what they mean by what they say when they make moral claims. And I take what people mean by what they say to be relevant to the assessment of the meaning of ordinary moral language. So, if, for instance, most people speak, think, or act like moral antirealists, or at least not like realists, this would be relevant to the respective plausibility of realism and antirealism in various ways.
At least one way this would be relevant is that it would undercut claims from moral realists that moral realism is a âcommon senseâ view. Many moral realists appeal to the presumptively realist features of moral discourse. If they are mistaken about this, then this undercuts at least some appeals to a presumption in favor of moral realism. Others claim that people generally experience morality in ways more in line with realism. If this isnât true, this would undercut such claims as well.
Generally speaking, then, realists often appeal to a presumption in favor of realism predicated on the allegedly realist-features of ordinary moral discourse, realist features of ordinary moral experience, and so on. This is sometimes leveraged to shift the burden of proof onto antirealists. Antirealists are described as having âradically skepticalâ views, for instance.
If it turns out that realist inclinations and realist construals of moral claims are idiosyncratic, not representative of ordinary thought and language, and largely parochial features of the way academic philosophers are inclined to speak and think, this would undercut these sorts of appeals.
I donât think moral realism relies on presumptive arguments, but they fairly common. A couple quick comments related to this:
First, I think the most plausible interpretation of Benthamâs remarks about how things seem, whatâs counterintuitive, and especially the claim that views contrary to his are âcrazyâ hints at least a bit in the direction that Bentham doesnât merely mean to report how things seem to him, or that heâs simply reporting his own proprietary use of moral language. The notion that those who disagree are âcrazyâ carries connotations that anyone who doesnât react the way he does is making an error of some kind. But if he is just reporting how things seem, I do wonder why he so often opts to describe contrary views or intuitions as âcrazy.â
Second, realists may dispute whether what people âthinkâ is relevant to what those people mean, or relevant to the armchair analysis of the meaning of moral sentences. In that case, Iâd likely disagree with whatever account of language and/âor whatever methodological approach theyâre taking to addressing these questions, in which case any positions they take that are downstream of this disagreement rely on contested views about language, meaning, and methods. In that case, what people think is indirectly relevant insofar as its relevant to my views, at least, and if they donât agree that what people think is relevant then we disagree on a more fundamental matter.
Thereâs a lot more I could say, e.g., about the descriptive metaethics project of the 20th century and the seemingly close historical connection between ordinary moral language and judgment and the typical construal of metaethical positions, but Iâll leave it there for now. Iâd be happy to discuss the matter more with you any time!
My reasons for thinking Benthamâs arguments are bad are not exclusively based on the fact that appeals to how things seem may or may not reflect how they seem to me or to people in general. I present a variety of other objections in the post I referenced, and it is this set of objections taken together that are the basis for my claim that Benthamâs arguments are not good.
As far as them not being sophisticated: I stand by that. Bentham does not present well-developed arguments as far as cases for moral realism go. His arguments arenât very clear or well-organized, he doesnât unpack what he means by much of what he says, he doesnât bring up many of the standard or some of the more obscure arguments one might bring up in favor of moral realism (so we donât get much of a cumulative case that appeals to multiple independent arguments), and he doesnât do much to anticipate or respond to the kinds of objections one might receive from antirealists. In short, his arguments are narrow and underdeveloped. I say this as someone who regularly reads his blog and has seen him present far more compelling arguments on other topics (even though I frequently disagree with him). So I know Bentham is more than capable of making a stronger case than he has here.