Assuming we’re not radically mistaken about our own subjective experience, it really seems like pleasure is good for the being experiencing it (aside from any function or causal effects it may have).
In fact, pleasure without goodness in some sense seems like an incoherent concept. If a person was to insist that they felt pleasure but in no sense was this a good thing, I would say that they are mistaken about something, whether it be the nature of their own experience or the usual meaning of words.
Some people, I think, concede the above but want to object that lower-case goodness in the sense described is distinct from some capital-G objective Goodness out there in the world.
But sentient beings are a perfectly valid element of the world/universe, and so goodness for a given being simply implies goodness at large (all else equal of course). There’s no spooky metaphysical sense in which it’s written into the stars; it is simply directly implied by the facts about what some things are like to some sentient beings.
I’d add that the above logic holds fine, and with even more rhetorical and ethical force, in the case of suffering.
Now if you accept the above, here’s a simple thought experiment: consider two states of the world, identical in every way except in world A you’re experiencing a terrible stomach ache and in world B you’re not.
The previous argument implies that there is simply more badness in world A, full stop.
Much more to be said ofc but I’ll leave it there :)
When you say “Assuming we’re not radically mistaken”...you’re using the term “we” as though you’re assuming I and others agree with you. But I don’t know if I agree with you, and there’s a good chance I don’t. What do you mean when you say that pleasure is good for the being experiencing it? For that matter, what do you mean by “pleasure”? If “pleasure” refers to any experience that an agent prefers, and for something to be good for something is for them to prefer it, then you’d be saying something I’d agree with: that any experiences an agent prefers are experiences that agent prefers. But if you’re not saying that, then I am not sure what you are saying.
I think there are facts about what is good according to different people’s stances. So my pleasure can be good according to my stance. But I do not think pleasure is stance-independently good
In fact, pleasure without goodness in some sense seems like an incoherent concept.
What do you mean by “goodness”?
But sentient beings are a perfectly valid element of the world/universe, and so goodness for a given being simply implies goodness at large (all else equal of course).
I’m perfectly fine with saying that there are facts about what individuals prefer and consider good, but the fact that something is good relative to someone’s preferences does not entail that it is good simpliciter, good relative to my preferences, intrinsically good, or anything like that. The fact that this person is a “valid element of the world/universe” doesn’t change that fact.
There’s no spooky metaphysical sense in which it’s written into the stars; it is simply directly implied by the facts about what some things are like to some sentient beings.
What you’re saying doesn’t strike me so much as metaphysically spooky but as conceptually underdeveloped. I don’t think it’s clear (at least, not to me) what you mean when you refer to goodness. For instance, I cannot tell if you are arguing for some kind of moral realism or normative realism.
Now if you accept the above, here’s a simple thought experiment: consider two states of the world, identical in every way except in world A you’re experiencing a terrible stomach ache and in world B you’re not.
The previous argument implies that there is simply more badness in world A, full stop.
What would it mean for there to be “more badness” in world A? Again, it’s just not clear to me what you mean by the terms you are using.
I think I concede that ‘pleasure is good for the being experiencing it’. I don’t think this leads to were you take it, though. It is good for me to eat meat, but probably it isn’t good for the animal. But in the thought experiment you make, I prefer world A where I’m eating bacon and the pig is dead than world B where the pig is feeling fine and I’m eating broccoli. You can’t jump from what’s good for one to what’s good for many. But besides, granting something is good for he who experiences is feels likes bit broad: the good for him doesn’t make it into some law that must be obeyed, even form him/her. There are trade-offs between other desires, you might also want to consider (or not) long-term effects, etc… It also has no ontological status as ‘the good’, just as there is no Platonic form of ‘the good’ floating in Platonic heaven.
Assuming we’re not radically mistaken about our own subjective experience, it really seems like pleasure is good for the being experiencing it (aside from any function or causal effects it may have).
In fact, pleasure without goodness in some sense seems like an incoherent concept. If a person was to insist that they felt pleasure but in no sense was this a good thing, I would say that they are mistaken about something, whether it be the nature of their own experience or the usual meaning of words.
Some people, I think, concede the above but want to object that lower-case goodness in the sense described is distinct from some capital-G objective Goodness out there in the world.
But sentient beings are a perfectly valid element of the world/universe, and so goodness for a given being simply implies goodness at large (all else equal of course). There’s no spooky metaphysical sense in which it’s written into the stars; it is simply directly implied by the facts about what some things are like to some sentient beings.
I’d add that the above logic holds fine, and with even more rhetorical and ethical force, in the case of suffering.
Now if you accept the above, here’s a simple thought experiment: consider two states of the world, identical in every way except in world A you’re experiencing a terrible stomach ache and in world B you’re not.
The previous argument implies that there is simply more badness in world A, full stop.
Much more to be said ofc but I’ll leave it there :)
When you say “Assuming we’re not radically mistaken”...you’re using the term “we” as though you’re assuming I and others agree with you. But I don’t know if I agree with you, and there’s a good chance I don’t. What do you mean when you say that pleasure is good for the being experiencing it? For that matter, what do you mean by “pleasure”? If “pleasure” refers to any experience that an agent prefers, and for something to be good for something is for them to prefer it, then you’d be saying something I’d agree with: that any experiences an agent prefers are experiences that agent prefers. But if you’re not saying that, then I am not sure what you are saying.
I think there are facts about what is good according to different people’s stances. So my pleasure can be good according to my stance. But I do not think pleasure is stance-independently good
What do you mean by “goodness”?
I’m perfectly fine with saying that there are facts about what individuals prefer and consider good, but the fact that something is good relative to someone’s preferences does not entail that it is good simpliciter, good relative to my preferences, intrinsically good, or anything like that. The fact that this person is a “valid element of the world/universe” doesn’t change that fact.
What you’re saying doesn’t strike me so much as metaphysically spooky but as conceptually underdeveloped. I don’t think it’s clear (at least, not to me) what you mean when you refer to goodness. For instance, I cannot tell if you are arguing for some kind of moral realism or normative realism.
What would it mean for there to be “more badness” in world A? Again, it’s just not clear to me what you mean by the terms you are using.
I think I concede that ‘pleasure is good for the being experiencing it’. I don’t think this leads to were you take it, though. It is good for me to eat meat, but probably it isn’t good for the animal. But in the thought experiment you make, I prefer world A where I’m eating bacon and the pig is dead than world B where the pig is feeling fine and I’m eating broccoli. You can’t jump from what’s good for one to what’s good for many. But besides, granting something is good for he who experiences is feels likes bit broad: the good for him doesn’t make it into some law that must be obeyed, even form him/her. There are trade-offs between other desires, you might also want to consider (or not) long-term effects, etc… It also has no ontological status as ‘the good’, just as there is no Platonic form of ‘the good’ floating in Platonic heaven.