I think I concede that ‘pleasure is good for the being experiencing it’. I don’t think this leads to were you take it, though. It is good for me to eat meat, but probably it isn’t good for the animal. But in the thought experiment you make, I prefer world A where I’m eating bacon and the pig is dead than world B where the pig is feeling fine and I’m eating broccoli. You can’t jump from what’s good for one to what’s good for many. But besides, granting something is good for he who experiences is feels likes bit broad: the good for him doesn’t make it into some law that must be obeyed, even form him/her. There are trade-offs between other desires, you might also want to consider (or not) long-term effects, etc… It also has no ontological status as ‘the good’, just as there is no Platonic form of ‘the good’ floating in Platonic heaven.
I think I concede that ‘pleasure is good for the being experiencing it’. I don’t think this leads to were you take it, though. It is good for me to eat meat, but probably it isn’t good for the animal. But in the thought experiment you make, I prefer world A where I’m eating bacon and the pig is dead than world B where the pig is feeling fine and I’m eating broccoli. You can’t jump from what’s good for one to what’s good for many. But besides, granting something is good for he who experiences is feels likes bit broad: the good for him doesn’t make it into some law that must be obeyed, even form him/her. There are trade-offs between other desires, you might also want to consider (or not) long-term effects, etc… It also has no ontological status as ‘the good’, just as there is no Platonic form of ‘the good’ floating in Platonic heaven.