Also note that whereas Holden rejected the Charity Doomsday Argument, clarifying he was talking about relative standing of charities including all flow-through effects (where a big future increases the impact of most interventions astronomically, although some more than others), Dickens embraces it:
I don’t find it plausible that I should be indifferent between $1 to AI safety and $94,200,000,000,000,000 to GiveDirectly...This only considers GiveDirectly’s direct effects and not its flow-through effects, but I still find it implausible that GiveDirectly’s direct effects could matter so much less in expectation than [the flow-through effects of] AI safety work
The specific interventions are a red herring here, it’s saying the future won’t be big and subject to any effect of our actions (like asteroid defense, or speeding up colonization by 1 day).
Also note that whereas Holden rejected the Charity Doomsday Argument, clarifying he was talking about relative standing of charities including all flow-through effects (where a big future increases the impact of most interventions astronomically, although some more than others), Dickens embraces it:
The specific interventions are a red herring here, it’s saying the future won’t be big and subject to any effect of our actions (like asteroid defense, or speeding up colonization by 1 day).
This post is also relevant.