“A potentially lower-risk example might be the warble fly (Hypoderma), which burrows under the skin of cattle and deer, causing great discomfort, yet rarely kills its host. The warble fly is small in biomass, host-specific (so doesn’t greatly affect other species), and has more limited interactions beyond its host-parasite relationship. Although it does reduce the grazing and reproductive activity of hosts, these effects are comparatively minor and could be offset with non-invasive fertility control”
Remember that it’s not uncontroversial that it is preferable to have less animals at higher welfare level, rather than more animals at lower welfare level. Where welfare is net positive either way, some population ethicists are going to say having more animals at a lower level of welfare can be better than less at a higher level of welfare. See for example: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/what-should-we-agree-on-about-the-repugnant-conclusion/EB52C686BAFEF490CE37043A0A3DD075 But also, even on critical level views designed to BLOCK the repugnant conclusion, it can sometimes be better to have more welfare subjects at a lower but still positive level of welfare, then less subjects at a higher level of welfare. So maybe it’s better to have more deer even when some of them have warble fly, than to have less deer, but none of them have warble fly.
...if you think welfare is net positive either way, yes. This seems like a tough case to make. I see how one can opt for agnosticism over believing net negative but I doubt there exists anything remotely close to a good case that WAW currently is net positive (and not just highly uncertain).
You’re right that this is philosophically controversial. I find the debate interesting, and don’t mean to dismiss it—but I also find it incredibly difficult.
The challenge I see is whether such philosophical debates, ones that are totally unresolved, should inform our practical thinking and policy recommendations. Because within ordinary, day-to-day thinking, the idea that “it’s preferable to have more beings with lower welfare” is controversial. If you were committed to this view, and thought insects have positive welfare (I agree with @Jim Buhler that this isn’t clear), then it seems you would also have to say that the Against Malaria Foundation is doing overall bad work. Maybe you’re willing to bite that bullet—but my own inclination is to assume a more common-sense view, even if philosophically incoherent, until there is something closer to a consensus on this topic.
Those are fair point in themselves, but I don’t think “less deer is fine, so long as they have a higher standard of living” has anything like the same commonsense standing as “we should protect people from malaria with insecticide even if the insecticide hurts insects”.
And it’s not clear to me that assuming less deer is fine in itself even if their lives are good is avoiding taking a stance on the intractable philosophical debate, rather than just implicitly taking one side of it.
Oh I see I’d misunderstood your point. I thought you were concerned about lowering the number of warble flies. This policy wouldn’t lower the number of deer—it would maintain the population at the same level. This is for the sake of avoiding unwanted ecological effects. If you think it’s better to have more deer, fair enough—but then you’ve got to weigh that against the very uncertain ecological consequences of having more deer (probably something like what happened in Yellowstone Nationa Park: fewer young trees, more open fields, fewer animals that depend on those trees, more erosion etc)
Also, it’s certainly not common sense that it is always better to have less beings with higher welfare. It’s not common sense that a world with 10 incredibly happy people is better than one with a billion very slightly less happy people.
And not every theory that avoids the repugnant conclusion delivers this result, either.
No—and I wasn’t meaning to say that less beings with higher welfare is always better. Like I said, I don’t think the common sense view will be philosophically satisfying.
But a second common sense view is: if there are some beings whose existence depends on harming others, then them not coming into existence is preferable.
I expect you can find some counter-example to that, but I think most people will believe this in most situations (and certainly those involving parasites).
“A potentially lower-risk example might be the warble fly (Hypoderma), which burrows under the skin of cattle and deer, causing great discomfort, yet rarely kills its host. The warble fly is small in biomass, host-specific (so doesn’t greatly affect other species), and has more limited interactions beyond its host-parasite relationship. Although it does reduce the grazing and reproductive activity of hosts, these effects are comparatively minor and could be offset with non-invasive fertility control”
Remember that it’s not uncontroversial that it is preferable to have less animals at higher welfare level, rather than more animals at lower welfare level. Where welfare is net positive either way, some population ethicists are going to say having more animals at a lower level of welfare can be better than less at a higher level of welfare. See for example: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/what-should-we-agree-on-about-the-repugnant-conclusion/EB52C686BAFEF490CE37043A0A3DD075 But also, even on critical level views designed to BLOCK the repugnant conclusion, it can sometimes be better to have more welfare subjects at a lower but still positive level of welfare, then less subjects at a higher level of welfare. So maybe it’s better to have more deer even when some of them have warble fly, than to have less deer, but none of them have warble fly.
...if you think welfare is net positive either way, yes. This seems like a tough case to make. I see how one can opt for agnosticism over believing net negative but I doubt there exists anything remotely close to a good case that WAW currently is net positive (and not just highly uncertain).
I agree, it is unclear whether welfare is actually positive.
You’re right that this is philosophically controversial. I find the debate interesting, and don’t mean to dismiss it—but I also find it incredibly difficult.
The challenge I see is whether such philosophical debates, ones that are totally unresolved, should inform our practical thinking and policy recommendations. Because within ordinary, day-to-day thinking, the idea that “it’s preferable to have more beings with lower welfare” is controversial. If you were committed to this view, and thought insects have positive welfare (I agree with @Jim Buhler that this isn’t clear), then it seems you would also have to say that the Against Malaria Foundation is doing overall bad work. Maybe you’re willing to bite that bullet—but my own inclination is to assume a more common-sense view, even if philosophically incoherent, until there is something closer to a consensus on this topic.
Those are fair point in themselves, but I don’t think “less deer is fine, so long as they have a higher standard of living” has anything like the same commonsense standing as “we should protect people from malaria with insecticide even if the insecticide hurts insects”.
And it’s not clear to me that assuming less deer is fine in itself even if their lives are good is avoiding taking a stance on the intractable philosophical debate, rather than just implicitly taking one side of it.
Oh I see I’d misunderstood your point. I thought you were concerned about lowering the number of warble flies. This policy wouldn’t lower the number of deer—it would maintain the population at the same level. This is for the sake of avoiding unwanted ecological effects. If you think it’s better to have more deer, fair enough—but then you’ve got to weigh that against the very uncertain ecological consequences of having more deer (probably something like what happened in Yellowstone Nationa Park: fewer young trees, more open fields, fewer animals that depend on those trees, more erosion etc)
Oh, ok, I agree, if the number of deer is the same after as counterfactually, it seems plausibly net positive yes.
Also, it’s certainly not common sense that it is always better to have less beings with higher welfare. It’s not common sense that a world with 10 incredibly happy people is better than one with a billion very slightly less happy people.
And not every theory that avoids the repugnant conclusion delivers this result, either.
No—and I wasn’t meaning to say that less beings with higher welfare is always better. Like I said, I don’t think the common sense view will be philosophically satisfying.
But a second common sense view is: if there are some beings whose existence depends on harming others, then them not coming into existence is preferable.
I expect you can find some counter-example to that, but I think most people will believe this in most situations (and certainly those involving parasites).