Regarding “But hold on: you think X, so your view entails Y and that’s ridiculous! You can’t possibly think that.”
I agree that being haughty is typically bad. But the argument “X implies Y, and you claim to believe X. Do you also accept the natural conclusion, Y?” when Y is ridiculous is a legitimate argument to make. At that point, the other person either can accept the implication, change his mind on X, or argue that X does not imply Y. It seems like the thing you have most of a problem with is the tone though. Is that correct?
I’ve noticed this before, and I think it’s a wrong truth-seeking device on a technical level.
Basically, I’m really leery of reductio ad absurdums with statements that are inherently probabilistic in general, but especially when it comes to ethics.
A straightforward reductio ad absurdum goes:
Say we believe in P
P implies Q
Q is clearly wrong
Therefore, not P.
However, in philosophical ethics it’s more like
Say we believe in P
A seems reasonable
B seems reasonable
C seems kind of reasonable.
D seems almost reasonable if you squint a little, at least it’s more reasonable than P
E has a >50% chance of being right.
P and A and B and C and D and E implies Q
Q is an absurd/unintuitive conclusion.
Therefore, not P
The issue here is that most of the heavy lifting is done by appeals to conjunctions, and conflating >50% probabilities with absolute truths.
A method I’ve found useful for generating lots of ideas is to assume that reductio ad absurdum is not valid. This might be useful here too, for slightly different reasons.
I’m not sure we’re in disagreement. I think that’s what I said in the following paragraph:
“To be clear, I don’t object at all to arguing about things and getting down to what people’s base intuitions are. Particularly if they haven’t thought about them before, this is really useful. People should understand what those intuitions commit them to and whether they are consistent so they can decide if they like the consequences or want to revise their views. My objection is that, once you’ve worked you way down to someone’s base intuitions, you shouldn’t mock them just because their intuitions are different from yours. It’s the jousting aspect I think is wrong”
Regarding “But hold on: you think X, so your view entails Y and that’s ridiculous! You can’t possibly think that.”
I agree that being haughty is typically bad. But the argument “X implies Y, and you claim to believe X. Do you also accept the natural conclusion, Y?” when Y is ridiculous is a legitimate argument to make. At that point, the other person either can accept the implication, change his mind on X, or argue that X does not imply Y. It seems like the thing you have most of a problem with is the tone though. Is that correct?
I’ve noticed this before, and I think it’s a wrong truth-seeking device on a technical level.
Basically, I’m really leery of reductio ad absurdums with statements that are inherently probabilistic in general, but especially when it comes to ethics.
A straightforward reductio ad absurdum goes:
Say we believe in P
P implies Q
Q is clearly wrong
Therefore, not P.
However, in philosophical ethics it’s more like
Say we believe in P
A seems reasonable
B seems reasonable
C seems kind of reasonable.
D seems almost reasonable if you squint a little, at least it’s more reasonable than P
E has a >50% chance of being right.
P and A and B and C and D and E implies Q
Q is an absurd/unintuitive conclusion.
Therefore, not P
The issue here is that most of the heavy lifting is done by appeals to conjunctions, and conflating >50% probabilities with absolute truths.
A method I’ve found useful for generating lots of ideas is to assume that reductio ad absurdum is not valid. This might be useful here too, for slightly different reasons.
I’m not sure we’re in disagreement. I think that’s what I said in the following paragraph:
“To be clear, I don’t object at all to arguing about things and getting down to what people’s base intuitions are. Particularly if they haven’t thought about them before, this is really useful. People should understand what those intuitions commit them to and whether they are consistent so they can decide if they like the consequences or want to revise their views. My objection is that, once you’ve worked you way down to someone’s base intuitions, you shouldn’t mock them just because their intuitions are different from yours. It’s the jousting aspect I think is wrong”