I fully endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, so I only consider other moral theories as useful heuristics, and only care about empirical uncertainty. However, uncertainty about the welfare of different beings still makes me very uncertain about which interventions are the most cost-effective at the margin. I think all of the following are plausible candidates. Interventions:
Targeting humans to increase (decrease) agricultural land if the welfare ranges I derived for soil nematodes, mites, and springtails, based on Rethink Priorities’ (RP’s) mainline welfare ranges, are roughly right, and these soil animals have negative (positive) lives.
Targeting humans to increase human welfare if the welfare ranges of animals are much smaller than RP’s mainline welfare ranges.
Targeting invertebrates if the welfara ranges of the soil animals I mentioned just above are much smaller than I estimated, and RP’s mainline welfare ranges are roughly right.
Targeting non-human vertebrates if the welfare ranges of invertebrates are much smaller than RP’s mainline welfare ranges of intervebrates, but their mainline welfare ranges of vertebrates are roughly right.
It’s relatively easy to argue, all else equal, that it’s better to save 100 lives rather than 10
I worry you are underestimating the uncertainty here. I think interventions saving human lives at a low cost are among the most cost-effective, but it is still unclear to me whether they are beneficial or harmful. I estimate GiveWell’s top charities increase the welfare of soil nematodes, mites, and springtails 87.6 k times as much as they increase the welfare of humans based on Rethink Priorities’ (RP’s) mainline welfare ranges, and my best guess than those soil animals have negative lives. However, I believe they could roughly as easily have positive lives[1], in which case I would consider saving human lives harmful.
But how certain are you about hedonic utilitariansm (maybe give a percentage?). If you’re not completely sure then even considering another theory a little might make you almost disregard nematodes just because of the extreme uncertainty? One major point of this article seems to me that it is very hard to have much certainty about our prevailing moral compass which I completely agree with
Also your probability of negative lives for those animals is so close to 50%, I would have thought that the calculation (Probability of sentience x positive life percentage) would get most humans close to considering Ye Auld Pascall’s Mug
But I know you don’t mind a little bit of a mugging ;).
Thanks for the follow-up, Nick. I put 100 % weight on expectationaltotalhedonisticutilitarianism as I understand it. However, l am still more uncertain about at least some aspects of cause prioritisation than Marcus, like whether saving human lives is benefial or harmful.
Thanks for the post, Marcus!
I fully endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, so I only consider other moral theories as useful heuristics, and only care about empirical uncertainty. However, uncertainty about the welfare of different beings still makes me very uncertain about which interventions are the most cost-effective at the margin. I think all of the following are plausible candidates. Interventions:
Targeting humans to increase (decrease) agricultural land if the welfare ranges I derived for soil nematodes, mites, and springtails, based on Rethink Priorities’ (RP’s) mainline welfare ranges, are roughly right, and these soil animals have negative (positive) lives.
Targeting humans to increase human welfare if the welfare ranges of animals are much smaller than RP’s mainline welfare ranges.
Targeting invertebrates if the welfara ranges of the soil animals I mentioned just above are much smaller than I estimated, and RP’s mainline welfare ranges are roughly right.
Targeting non-human vertebrates if the welfare ranges of invertebrates are much smaller than RP’s mainline welfare ranges of intervebrates, but their mainline welfare ranges of vertebrates are roughly right.
I worry you are underestimating the uncertainty here. I think interventions saving human lives at a low cost are among the most cost-effective, but it is still unclear to me whether they are beneficial or harmful. I estimate GiveWell’s top charities increase the welfare of soil nematodes, mites, and springtails 87.6 k times as much as they increase the welfare of humans based on Rethink Priorities’ (RP’s) mainline welfare ranges, and my best guess than those soil animals have negative lives. However, I believe they could roughly as easily have positive lives[1], in which case I would consider saving human lives harmful.
I calculate those soil animals have negative lives with a probability of 58.7 %, 55.8 %, and 55.0 %.
But how certain are you about hedonic utilitariansm (maybe give a percentage?). If you’re not completely sure then even considering another theory a little might make you almost disregard nematodes just because of the extreme uncertainty? One major point of this article seems to me that it is very hard to have much certainty about our prevailing moral compass which I completely agree with
Also your probability of negative lives for those animals is so close to 50%, I would have thought that the calculation (Probability of sentience x positive life percentage) would get most humans close to considering Ye Auld Pascall’s Mug
But I know you don’t mind a little bit of a mugging ;).
Thanks for the follow-up, Nick. I put 100 % weight on expectationaltotal hedonistic utilitarianism as I understand it. However, l am still more uncertain about at least some aspects of cause prioritisation than Marcus, like whether saving human lives is benefial or harmful.