As a quick comment, because now I’m busy. I’m not sure that any of those accounts of moral uncertainty are mutually exclusive, with the exceptions of MEC-MFT and Parliament-MFT. Parliamentary model is vaguely defined and MEC is the theoretically best way to construe the parliamentary model, IMO.
I think there’s a rigid distinction between values systems and utility functions on one hand, and empirical questions of cause effectiveness on the other, and the former can’t directly inform the latter—it’s like a reverse is-ought gap.
An availability cascade of a moral theory—people assume it’s right because other people believe it, and so on—is definitely bad and ought to be avoided.
As a quick comment, because now I’m busy. I’m not sure that any of those accounts of moral uncertainty are mutually exclusive, with the exceptions of MEC-MFT and Parliament-MFT. Parliamentary model is vaguely defined and MEC is the theoretically best way to construe the parliamentary model, IMO.
I think there’s a rigid distinction between values systems and utility functions on one hand, and empirical questions of cause effectiveness on the other, and the former can’t directly inform the latter—it’s like a reverse is-ought gap.
An availability cascade of a moral theory—people assume it’s right because other people believe it, and so on—is definitely bad and ought to be avoided.