In reference to moral uncertainty? In this article i’m saying two things which i think have a fairly similar basis. Firstly, that we need to give consideration to different value systems or we risk gravitating to a single value system by default, which is what i argue has generally happened in EAA. So i outline some ways this could be addressed.
In terms of how the issues are negotiated, if referenced to this article, i’m not in favour of normative externalism which in my view represents the main situation of EAA at present (welfare / reducetarianism). My favourite theory probably wouldn’t work either because other theories are marginalised in EAA, so it would be disproportionate in such a way that different theories likely wouldn’t be heard. Maximising choice worthiness could work better if frameworks for intervention were more thoroughly applied and there was an improvement in cross movement communication. The parliamentary model could be a possibility, but again there is an issue of representation, and part of the reason certain moral theories aren’t represented is because there isn’t space for their inclusion, or they aren’t well understood / the drive toward normative externalism has obfuscated them.
There is an issue in relation to how i’m talking about two seemingly different issues of inclusion concurrently, but in my view the idea of ‘inclusion’ is fairly broad in EA and there are a number of commonalities which can be applied to being inclusive of different value systems and of people who are marginalised by mainstream society (indeed sometimes both considerations need to be applied at the same time). This isn’t to say we need to include everyone, or all value systems, though i am saying more consideration needs to be given to systems compatible with Effective Altruism so that it can better inform the work we do, and that more consideration needs to be given to people who have less privilege. If we are merely truth seeking within our own value systems, i think this isn’t going to be so worthwhile, and i am less certain this really represents what Effective Altruism is about.
As i view it, there is at least some concern around these issues that is often expressed within Effective Altruism, but not so much agreement in terms of what needs to happen, or indeed, of the consequences of the present situation. However, i think there are some things that many EAs could be persuaded, and that could include the utility of meta-evaluation, and I think this would also provide a stronger foundation for making suggestions about potential changes to address issues of inclusion. This could be grounded in moral uncertainty, but as i suggested i think there could be some steps before reaching that stage, such as how value systems are represented.
As a quick comment, because now I’m busy. I’m not sure that any of those accounts of moral uncertainty are mutually exclusive, with the exceptions of MEC-MFT and Parliament-MFT. Parliamentary model is vaguely defined and MEC is the theoretically best way to construe the parliamentary model, IMO.
I think there’s a rigid distinction between values systems and utility functions on one hand, and empirical questions of cause effectiveness on the other, and the former can’t directly inform the latter—it’s like a reverse is-ought gap.
An availability cascade of a moral theory—people assume it’s right because other people believe it, and so on—is definitely bad and ought to be avoided.
In reference to moral uncertainty? In this article i’m saying two things which i think have a fairly similar basis. Firstly, that we need to give consideration to different value systems or we risk gravitating to a single value system by default, which is what i argue has generally happened in EAA. So i outline some ways this could be addressed.
In terms of how the issues are negotiated, if referenced to this article, i’m not in favour of normative externalism which in my view represents the main situation of EAA at present (welfare / reducetarianism). My favourite theory probably wouldn’t work either because other theories are marginalised in EAA, so it would be disproportionate in such a way that different theories likely wouldn’t be heard. Maximising choice worthiness could work better if frameworks for intervention were more thoroughly applied and there was an improvement in cross movement communication. The parliamentary model could be a possibility, but again there is an issue of representation, and part of the reason certain moral theories aren’t represented is because there isn’t space for their inclusion, or they aren’t well understood / the drive toward normative externalism has obfuscated them.
There is an issue in relation to how i’m talking about two seemingly different issues of inclusion concurrently, but in my view the idea of ‘inclusion’ is fairly broad in EA and there are a number of commonalities which can be applied to being inclusive of different value systems and of people who are marginalised by mainstream society (indeed sometimes both considerations need to be applied at the same time). This isn’t to say we need to include everyone, or all value systems, though i am saying more consideration needs to be given to systems compatible with Effective Altruism so that it can better inform the work we do, and that more consideration needs to be given to people who have less privilege. If we are merely truth seeking within our own value systems, i think this isn’t going to be so worthwhile, and i am less certain this really represents what Effective Altruism is about.
As i view it, there is at least some concern around these issues that is often expressed within Effective Altruism, but not so much agreement in terms of what needs to happen, or indeed, of the consequences of the present situation. However, i think there are some things that many EAs could be persuaded, and that could include the utility of meta-evaluation, and I think this would also provide a stronger foundation for making suggestions about potential changes to address issues of inclusion. This could be grounded in moral uncertainty, but as i suggested i think there could be some steps before reaching that stage, such as how value systems are represented.
As a quick comment, because now I’m busy. I’m not sure that any of those accounts of moral uncertainty are mutually exclusive, with the exceptions of MEC-MFT and Parliament-MFT. Parliamentary model is vaguely defined and MEC is the theoretically best way to construe the parliamentary model, IMO.
I think there’s a rigid distinction between values systems and utility functions on one hand, and empirical questions of cause effectiveness on the other, and the former can’t directly inform the latter—it’s like a reverse is-ought gap.
An availability cascade of a moral theory—people assume it’s right because other people believe it, and so on—is definitely bad and ought to be avoided.