Hm, okay I can grant that there can be less shallow reasons for not entering the machine than my caricature claimed. But those reasons still strike me as trivializing the suffering, and, in your words, âreifying intuitions they have about [the external world] as intrinsic components to [the external world].â It seems pretty clear that we would expect ourselves to have intuitions about âhollowâ experience machine relationships being bad even if we wouldnât endorse them upon reflection, because such intuitions are confounded so heavily by how hollow relationships work in reality. i.e., people have negative experiences when you try to force them into loving you.
and, in your words, âreifying intuitions they have about [the external world] as intrinsic components to [the external world].â
In the case of hedonist moral realists, I think they are treating their personal intuitions about pleasure as components of pleasure, in the sense that theyâre thinking everyone should value pleasure the same way they do.
When I say that some people may not want to enter the experience machine because they see their lifeâs meaning primarily in their closest interpersonal relationships, the claim is not that everyone should value relationships that way. People think about relationships in different ways. But those who value their relationships more than other things and place a lot of value on features related to âauthenticity/âContact with realityâ, those people may not want to enter the experience machine. Not because they have something against the machine per se, but because entering the experience machine would mean losing their existing relationships.
I made the last sentence bold because it seems like you shift to talking about people being put off by features of the experience machine, whereas the intuition I want to convey is one of losing something specific that one currently values. (Edit: My last comment didnât make this clear, I see now.) (Compare: Would people want go to the most awesome job imaginable if it meant moving to a different country where your girlfriend or boyfriend [or husband/âwife] canât follow? People can say no to this for reasons related to their relationship; it doesnât mean they dislike something about the job description or the country theyâd be moving to.)
If youâre in a point in life where you donât care about any of your ongoing relationships particularly much, then the experience machine becomes a lot more attractive!
Alternatively, if youâve internalized hedonist axiology, and so have your loved ones, you could all rejoice in finding new loved ones in your respective experience machines. So Iâm not saying that hedonists necessarily care less about the people theyâre in relationships with. It just gets awkward if one person in the relationship is a hedonist and the other person isnât.
When I say that some people may not want to enter the experience machine because they see their lifeâs meaning primarily in their closest interpersonal relationships, the claim is not that everyone should value relationships that way.
Sure, but I am expressing skepticism that such people really value authenticity or contact with reality intrinsically, or at least that they would endorse doing so if they engaged with the debunking argument. Which is that outside of Thought Experiment Land, there are obvious and strong hedonic disadvantages to âfakeness.â It feels really bad to realize someone never really loved you, for example, and was just using you for their own purposes. It feels bad to think of yourself as replaceable to your loved ones. And so on. Ditto for having contact with reality â and to the extent that delusions are blissful for the delusional person in the moment, almost always they are malign eventually to themselves or to others.
Thereâs a strong correlation between beliefs in authenticity and happiness in the real world with evolved brains, and that correlation breaks in the experience machine thought experiment. (I donât think every moral intuition people have can really be cashed out in terms of hedonism, to be clear â some of them I would explain as being naturally selected on a basis that has ~nothing to do with what people would care about pursuing upon reflection. Others I donât have a good explanation for at the moment, but to me the intuitions in favor of (suffering-focused) hedonism are more compelling.)
I donât think it matters if the machine per se is judged as especially bad here, or if the ârealâ relationships and such are judged as especially good. My debunking argument applies just as well either way, since itâs the relative evaluation that matters.
If youâre in a point in life where you donât care about any of your ongoing relationships particularly much, then the experience machine becomes a lot more attractive!
While you do later say, âIâm not saying that hedonists necessarily care less about the people theyâre in relationships with,â I think this quote is not accurately representing the hedonist position. I do care about my relationships plentyâthe point is that I care about them instrumentally. Not just for my own hedonics but for othersâ. Clearly when I spend time with loved ones, I donât frame it as something ultimately instrumental to hedonics, but thatâs not in tension with hedonism because the framing itself is hedonically unproductive in that context. (Well, itâs clearly unproductive if itâs framed as just about my hedonic good, but Iâm not so sure about the framing as something that is mutually hedonically beneficial. I find the idea of making my loved onesâ lives less painful while they do the same for me actually pretty inspiring.)
Hm, okay I can grant that there can be less shallow reasons for not entering the machine than my caricature claimed. But those reasons still strike me as trivializing the suffering, and, in your words, âreifying intuitions they have about [the external world] as intrinsic components to [the external world].â It seems pretty clear that we would expect ourselves to have intuitions about âhollowâ experience machine relationships being bad even if we wouldnât endorse them upon reflection, because such intuitions are confounded so heavily by how hollow relationships work in reality. i.e., people have negative experiences when you try to force them into loving you.
In the case of hedonist moral realists, I think they are treating their personal intuitions about pleasure as components of pleasure, in the sense that theyâre thinking everyone should value pleasure the same way they do.
When I say that some people may not want to enter the experience machine because they see their lifeâs meaning primarily in their closest interpersonal relationships, the claim is not that everyone should value relationships that way. People think about relationships in different ways. But those who value their relationships more than other things and place a lot of value on features related to âauthenticity/âContact with realityâ, those people may not want to enter the experience machine. Not because they have something against the machine per se, but because entering the experience machine would mean losing their existing relationships.
I made the last sentence bold because it seems like you shift to talking about people being put off by features of the experience machine, whereas the intuition I want to convey is one of losing something specific that one currently values. (Edit: My last comment didnât make this clear, I see now.) (Compare: Would people want go to the most awesome job imaginable if it meant moving to a different country where your girlfriend or boyfriend [or husband/âwife] canât follow? People can say no to this for reasons related to their relationship; it doesnât mean they dislike something about the job description or the country theyâd be moving to.)
If youâre in a point in life where you donât care about any of your ongoing relationships particularly much, then the experience machine becomes a lot more attractive!
Alternatively, if youâve internalized hedonist axiology, and so have your loved ones, you could all rejoice in finding new loved ones in your respective experience machines. So Iâm not saying that hedonists necessarily care less about the people theyâre in relationships with. It just gets awkward if one person in the relationship is a hedonist and the other person isnât.
Sure, but I am expressing skepticism that such people really value authenticity or contact with reality intrinsically, or at least that they would endorse doing so if they engaged with the debunking argument. Which is that outside of Thought Experiment Land, there are obvious and strong hedonic disadvantages to âfakeness.â It feels really bad to realize someone never really loved you, for example, and was just using you for their own purposes. It feels bad to think of yourself as replaceable to your loved ones. And so on. Ditto for having contact with reality â and to the extent that delusions are blissful for the delusional person in the moment, almost always they are malign eventually to themselves or to others.
Thereâs a strong correlation between beliefs in authenticity and happiness in the real world with evolved brains, and that correlation breaks in the experience machine thought experiment. (I donât think every moral intuition people have can really be cashed out in terms of hedonism, to be clear â some of them I would explain as being naturally selected on a basis that has ~nothing to do with what people would care about pursuing upon reflection. Others I donât have a good explanation for at the moment, but to me the intuitions in favor of (suffering-focused) hedonism are more compelling.)
I donât think it matters if the machine per se is judged as especially bad here, or if the ârealâ relationships and such are judged as especially good. My debunking argument applies just as well either way, since itâs the relative evaluation that matters.
While you do later say, âIâm not saying that hedonists necessarily care less about the people theyâre in relationships with,â I think this quote is not accurately representing the hedonist position. I do care about my relationships plentyâthe point is that I care about them instrumentally. Not just for my own hedonics but for othersâ. Clearly when I spend time with loved ones, I donât frame it as something ultimately instrumental to hedonics, but thatâs not in tension with hedonism because the framing itself is hedonically unproductive in that context. (Well, itâs clearly unproductive if itâs framed as just about my hedonic good, but Iâm not so sure about the framing as something that is mutually hedonically beneficial. I find the idea of making my loved onesâ lives less painful while they do the same for me actually pretty inspiring.)