Greaves and MacAskill also argue for ādeontic strong longtermismā in their paper. I.e. that we ought to be driven by far future effects.
Yeah, this is also what came to mind for me when I read weeatquinceās comment. Iād add that Greaves and MacAskill also discuss some possible decision-theoretic objections, including objections to the idea that one should simply make decisions based on what seems to have the highest expected value, and argue that the case for longtermism seems robust to these objections. (Iām not saying theyāre definitely right, but rather that they do seem to engage with those potential counterarguments.)
Yeah, this is also what came to mind for me when I read weeatquinceās comment. Iād add that Greaves and MacAskill also discuss some possible decision-theoretic objections, including objections to the idea that one should simply make decisions based on what seems to have the highest expected value, and argue that the case for longtermism seems robust to these objections. (Iām not saying theyāre definitely right, but rather that they do seem to engage with those potential counterarguments.)