Do analgesics also reduce reflexive responses to noxious stimuli in humans? If so, this might be an argument against them merely reducing responses to noxious stimuli at all being good evidence for conscious pain (effects on learning strengthens the argument somewhat, though). Weâd want something that selectively targets the (consciously experienced) negative affect of pain in humans, but as far as I know, reflexive responses may be possible without negative affect (in humans and nonhumans).
Thatâs an excellent point. If analgesics also reduce reflex responses towards noxious stimuli, then in some cases analgesics could be diminishing nociceptive responses while not inhibiting conscious (reportable) pain.
I donât know much about how analgesics affect nociceptive reflexive responses in humans. According to the abstract of this study on non-human primates (havenât looked into the study in detail), âdepending on the dose, nociceptive reflexes [are] facilitated or inhibitedâ by morphine. So this possibility might prevent us from updating too much to âanalgesics are preventing pain when they inhibit nociceptionâ to the extent that the analgesics are inhibiting reflexive nociceptive responses.
One way this might not be an issue is if someone thinks consciousness is âsmeared spatially and temporallyâ or if they think nested minds are possible. For them, through analogies in function, they might think the reflexive responses themselves could be in pain. But then again, there are probably fewer people who think like this than people who think invertebrates feel pain.
Some humans are much less sensitive to physical pain.
1. Could an observer correctly differentiate between those with normal and abnormally low sensitivity to pain?
2. For humans whoâre relatively insensitive to pain, but still exhibit the appropriate response to harm signals (assuming they exist), would analgesics diminish the âappropriatenessâ of their response to a harm signal?
Do analgesics also reduce reflexive responses to noxious stimuli in humans? If so, this might be an argument against them merely reducing responses to noxious stimuli at all being good evidence for conscious pain (effects on learning strengthens the argument somewhat, though). Weâd want something that selectively targets the (consciously experienced) negative affect of pain in humans, but as far as I know, reflexive responses may be possible without negative affect (in humans and nonhumans).
Thatâs an excellent point. If analgesics also reduce reflex responses towards noxious stimuli, then in some cases analgesics could be diminishing nociceptive responses while not inhibiting conscious (reportable) pain.
I donât know much about how analgesics affect nociceptive reflexive responses in humans. According to the abstract of this study on non-human primates (havenât looked into the study in detail), âdepending on the dose, nociceptive reflexes [are] facilitated or inhibitedâ by morphine. So this possibility might prevent us from updating too much to âanalgesics are preventing pain when they inhibit nociceptionâ to the extent that the analgesics are inhibiting reflexive nociceptive responses.
One way this might not be an issue is if someone thinks consciousness is âsmeared spatially and temporallyâ or if they think nested minds are possible. For them, through analogies in function, they might think the reflexive responses themselves could be in pain. But then again, there are probably fewer people who think like this than people who think invertebrates feel pain.
A related thought:
Some humans are much less sensitive to physical pain.
1. Could an observer correctly differentiate between those with normal and abnormally low sensitivity to pain?
2. For humans whoâre relatively insensitive to pain, but still exhibit the appropriate response to harm signals (assuming they exist), would analgesics diminish the âappropriatenessâ of their response to a harm signal?