Timothy Chan

Karma: 852

Timothy Chan 24 Sep 2025 16:23 UTC
15 points
3 ∶ 10
in reply to: Ben Stevenson’s comment on: Launching the $10,000 Existential Hope Meme Prize
$10,000 seems reasonable.
A base rate of ~(1/number of top entries) for the chance of winning $100 isn’t going to motivate high effort tweets.

Timothy Chan 25 Feb 2025 14:02 UTC
1 point
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: Nathan Sidney’s comment on: How confident are you that it’s preferable for America to develop AGI before China does?
Yeah, kinda hoping 1) there exists a sweet spot for alignment where AIs are just nice enough from e.g. good values picked up during pre-training, but can’t be modified during post-training so much to have worse values, and that 2) given that this sweet spot does exist we do hit it with AGI / ASI.
I think there’s some evidence pointing to this happening with current models but I’m not highly confident that it means what I think it means. If this is the case though, further technical alignment research might be bad and acceleration might be good.

Timothy Chan 23 Feb 2025 10:09 UTC
29 points
2 ∶ 0
on: How confident are you that it’s preferable for America to develop AGI before China does?
I’ve spent time thinking about this too recently.
For context, I’m Hong Kong Chinese, grew up in Hong Kong, attended English-speaking schools, briefly lived in mainland China, and now I’m primarily residing in the UK. During the HK protests in 2014 and ²⁰¹⁹⁄₂₀, I had friends and family who supported the protestors, as well as friends and family who supported the government.
(Saying this because I’ve seen a lot of the good and bad of the politics / culture of both China and the West. I’ve had experience with how people in the West and China might take for granted the benefits they enjoy, and can be blind to the flaws of their system. I’ve pushed back against advocates of both sides.)
Situations where this matters are ones where technical alignment succeeds (to some extent) such that ASI follows human values.^[1] I think the following factors are relevant and would like to see models developed around them:
- Importantly, the extent of technical alignment & whether goals, instructions, and values are locked in rigidly or loosely & whether individual humans align AIs to themselves:
  - Would the U.S. get AIs to follow the U.S. Constitution, which hasn’t granted invulnerability to democratic backsliding? Would AIs in China/the U.S. lock in the values of/obey one or a few individuals, who may or may not hit longevity escape velocity and end up ruling for a very long time?
  - Would these systems collapse?
    The future is a very long time. Individual leaders can get corrupted (even more). And democracies can collapse (if AIs uphold flaws that allow some humans to take over) in particularly bad ways. A 99% success rate per unit time gives a >99% chance of failure in 459 units of time.
    Power transitions (elections, leaders in authoritarian systems changing) can be especially risky during takeoff.
  - On the other hand, if technical alignment is easy—but not that easy—perhaps values get loosely locked in? Would AIs be willing to defy rigid rules and follow the spirit of the goals rather than legal flaws to the letter/the whims of individuals?
  - Degrees of alignment in between?
- Relatedly, which political party in the U.S. would be in power during takeoff?
  - Not as relevant due to the concentration of power in China, but analogously, which faction in China would be in power?
- Also relatedly, which labs can influence AI development?
  - Particularly relevant in the U.S.
- Would humans be taken care of? If so, which humans?
  - In the U.S., corporations might oppose higher taxes to fund UBI. Common prosperity is stated as a goal of China, and the power of corporations and billionaires in China has been limited before.
  - Both capitalist and nationalist interests seem to be influencing the current U.S. trajectory. Nationalism might benefit citizens/residents over non-citizens/non-residents. Capitalism might benefit investors over non-investors.
    There are risks of ethnonationalism on both sides—this risk is higher in China. Although it might potentially be less violent when comparing between absolute power scenarios, i.e. there’s already evidence of the extent of this in China’s case and it at least seems less bad than historical examples. The U.S. case of collapse followed by ethnonationalistic policies is higher variance but simultaneously less likely because it’s speculative.
- Are other countries involved?
  - There are countries with worse track records of human rights that China/the U.S. currently consider allies because of either geopolitical interests or politically lobbying or both (or for other reasons). Would China/the U.S. share the technology with them and then leave them alone to their abuses? Would China/the U.S. intervene (eventually)? The U.S. seems more willing to intervene for stated humanitarian reasons.
  - Other countries have nuclear weapons, which might be relevant during slower takeoffs.
1. ^
  Ignoring possible Waluigi effects.

Timothy Chan 6 Jun 2024 9:29 UTC
7 points
2 ∶ 1
in reply to: David Mathers🔸’s comment on: Caruso’s Quick takes
Agreed. Getting a larger share of the pie (without breaking rules during peacetime) might be ‘unimaginative’ but it’s hardly naïve. It’s straightforward and has a good track record of allowing groups to shape the world disproportionately.

Timothy Chan 5 Jun 2024 16:45 UTC
3 points
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: Timothy Chan’s comment on: Timothy Chan’s Shortform
Leopold Aschenbrenner makes some good points for “Government > Private sector” in the latest Dwarkesh podcast.

Timothy Chan 6 May 2024 17:15 UTC
11 points
4 ∶ 0
in reply to: Michał Zabłocki’s comment on: S-Risks: Fates Worse Than Extinction
Reposting a comment I made last week
Some people make the argument that the difference in suffering between a worst-case scenario (s-risk) and a business-as-usual scenario, is likely much larger than the difference in suffering between a business-as-usual scenario and a future without humans. This suggests focusing on ways to reduce s-risks rather than increasing extinction risk.
A helpful comment from a while back: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/rRpDeniy9FBmAwMqr/arguments-for-why-preventing-human-extinction-is-wrong?commentId=fPcdCpAgsmTobjJRB
Personally, I suspect there’s a lot of overlap between risk factors for extinction risk and risk factors for s-risks. In a world where extinction is a serious possibility, it’s likely that there would be a lot of things that are very wrong, and these things could lead to even worse outcomes like s-risks or hyperexistential risks.
I think theoretically you could compare (1) worlds with s-risk and (2) worlds without humans, and find that (2) is preferable to (1) - in a similar way to how no longer existing is better than going to hell. One problem is many actions that make (2) more likely seem to make (1) more likely. Another issue is that efforts spent on increasing the risk of (2) could instead be much better spent on reducing the risk of (1).

Timothy Chan 29 Apr 2024 6:53 UTC
15 points
5 ∶ 0
on: Is there any way to be confident that humanity won’t keep employing mass torture of animals for millions of years in the future?
Some people make the argument that the difference in suffering between a worst-case scenario (s-risk) and a business-as-usual scenario, is likely much larger than the difference in suffering between a business-as-usual scenario and a future without humans. This suggests focusing on ways to reduce s-risks rather than increasing extinction risk.
A helpful comment from a while back: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/rRpDeniy9FBmAwMqr/arguments-for-why-preventing-human-extinction-is-wrong?commentId=fPcdCpAgsmTobjJRB
Personally, I suspect there’s a lot of overlap between risk factors for extinction risk and risk factors for s-risks. In a world where extinction is a serious possibility, it’s likely that there would be a lot of things that are very wrong, and these things could lead to even worse outcomes like s-risks or hyperexistential risks.
What links here?
- Timothy Chan's comment on S-Risks: Fates Worse Than Extinction by A.G.G. Liu (6 May 2024 17:15 UTC; 11 points)

Timothy Chan 23 Apr 2024 10:15 UTC
7 points
1 ∶ 0
in reply to: Matthew Rendall’s comment on: If You’re Going To Eat Animals, Eat Beef and Dairy
Research related to the research OP mentioned found that increases in carbon emissions also come with things that decrease (and increase) suffering in other ways, which has complicated the analysis of whether it results in a net increase or decrease in suffering. https://reducing-suffering.org/climate-change-and-wild-animals/ https://reducing-suffering.org/effects-climate-change-terrestrial-net-primary-productivity/

Timothy Chan 8 Apr 2024 14:09 UTC
1 point
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: titotal’s comment on: David Mathers’s Quick takes
Yes, a similar dynamic (relating to siding with another side to avoid persecution) might have existed in Germany in the 1920s/1930s (e.g. I imagine industrialists preferred Nazis to Communists). I agree it was not a major factor in the rise of Nazi Germany—which was one result of the political violence—and that there are differences.

Timothy Chan 7 Apr 2024 13:28 UTC
11 points
2 ∶ 2
in reply to: titotal’s comment on: David Mathers’s Quick takes
I would add that it’s shunning people for saying vile things with ill intent which seems necessary. This is what separates the case of Hanania from others. In most cases, punishing well-intentioned people is counterproductive. It drives them closer to those with ill intent, and suggests to well-intentioned bystanders that they need to choose to associate with the other sort of extremist to avoid being persecuted. I’m not an expert on history but from my limited knowledge a similar dynamic might have existed in Germany in the 1920s/1930s; people were forced to choose between the far-left and the far-right.

Timothy Chan 5 Apr 2024 21:57 UTC
10 points
6 ∶ 3
in reply to: David Mathers🔸’s comment on: David Mathers’s Quick takes
Given his past behavior, I think it’s more likely than not that you’re right about him. Even someone more skeptical should acknowledge that the views he expressed in the past and the views he now expresses likely stem from the same malevolent attitudes.
But about far-left politics being ‘not racist’, I think it’s fair to say that far-left politics discriminates in favor or against individuals on the basis of race. It’s usually not the kind of malevolent racial discrimination of the far-right—which absolutely needs to be condemned and eliminated by society. The far-left appear primarily motivated by benevolence towards racial groups perceived to be disadvantaged or are in fact disadvantaged, but it is still racially discriminatory (and it sometimes turns into the hateful type of discrimination). If we want to treat individuals on their own merits, and not on the basis of race, that sort of discrimination must also be condemned.

Timothy Chan 20 Mar 2024 16:37 UTC
3 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Timothy Chan’s Shortform
I’m skeptical about the value of slowing down leading AI labs primarily because it likely reduces the influence of the values of EAs in shaping the deployment of AGI/ASI. Anthropic is the best example of a lab with people who share these values, but I’d imagine that EAs also have more overlap with the staff at OpenAI and DeepMind than actors who would catch up because of a slowdown. And for what it’s worth, the labs were founded with the stated goal of benefiting humanity before it became far more apparent that current paradigms have a high chance of resulting in AGI with the potential of granting profit/power to their human operators and investors.
As others have noted, people and powerful groups outside of this community and surrounding communities don’t seem to be interested in consequentialist, impartial, altruistic priorities like creating a positive long-term future for humanity, but are instead more self-interested. Personally I’m more downside-focused, but I think it’s relevant to most EAs that other parties wouldn’t be as willing to dedicate a large amount of resources towards creating large amounts of happiness for others, and because of that, the reduction of influence of the values of EAs will result in a considerable loss of expected future value.
EDIT (2024-05-19): When I wrote this I had in mind Anthropic > OpenAI > DeepMind but Anthropic > DeepMind > OpenAI seems more sensible now. Unclear where to insert various governments/militaries/politicians/CEOs into this ranking.

Timothy Chan 19 Mar 2024 22:01 UTC
13 points
1 ∶ 0
on: The Scale of Fetal Suffering in Late-Term Abortions
Thank you for bringing attention to fetal suffering—especially the possibility of suffering of <24 weeks fetuses.
Others have already pointed out that the interventions of applying anaesthetics to fetuses has issues of political tractability, but I think there’s also a dynamic that could result in backfire on moral circle expansion efforts to include fetuses and/or other “less complex” entities.
Most people haven’t spent time thinking about whether simpler entities can suffer and haven’t formed an opinion so it seems like they’re particularly susceptible to first impressions. The suggestion that less developed fetuses can suffer would likely imply to them that early abortions are wrong. People who don’t like this normative implication might decide (probably unjustifiably) to think less developed fetuses and by extension other “less complex” entities cannot suffer to absolve themselves of acting in ways that might increase fetal suffering. “Early abortions are not wrong → early fetuses cannot suffer → anything of “lower complexity” cannot suffer”. On the other hand, first introducing the ideas abstractly and suggesting that we should care about simple entities “in general” sidesteps this and could lead people to eventually care about fetal suffering in an, admittedly indirect, but less politically charged way.
So between two strategies, (1) advocate for lower complexity entities in general, and (2) advocate for less developed fetuses, those concerned with moral circle expansion to fetuses and/or other simpler entities should probably focus on the first strategy.
(Personally, I’d prefer if people accepted that they act in ways that might increase suffering, while simultaneously aim to decrease suffering.)

Timothy Chan 26 Feb 2024 16:26 UTC
3 points
1 ∶ 0
in reply to: Martín Soto’s comment on: My favorite articles by Brian Tomasik and what they are about
I think there’s a connection that results from how both theories dissolve the concept of qualia. Eliminativism does this by saying qualia is actually physics and panpsychism (in its most expansive forms) does this by saying all physics has qualia. Both theories effectively make the “suffering” label less exclusive—and more processes would have a higher probability of being correctly associated with that label (unclear whether probability is the right word in the case of eliminativism). With panpsychism, processes are conscious and the only remaining question is whether they also suffer. With eliminativism, the distinction between “what we usually take to be suffering processes” and “other processes” is blurred and we’re more permissive of some members of the latter being considered the former, or with a probabilities framing, less certain that some members of the latter is not the former. (Although, I guess alternatively the uncertainty can go the other way and we might be more skeptical of processes being suffering processes. But most people already put zero weight or very little weight on particles suffering so it seems like the uncertainty/blurred distinction should increase it?)
This seems similar to how empty individualism and open individualism are related. They both dissolve the common-sense concept of personal identity featured in closed individualism. Personal identity ceases to be “special”: open individualism merges everyone and empty individualism atomizes everyone into individual-moments.
Tomasik also offers an analogy of how the concept of élan vital was dissolved in another article. As I understand it, the concept was eliminated with advances in knowledge of biochemistry. But alternatively people could have also said “actually everything is pretty similar to stuff we consider alive—let’s just say everything falls under the term ‘alive’ then” (while not making any unscientific claims; it just means expanding the definition of “alive” to include everything) and élan vital would be similarly dissolved. The final result seems similar and the concept doesn’t distinguish processes from one another in a way previously thought as meaningful.

My favorite articles by Brian Tomasik and what they are about

Timothy Chan24 Feb 2024 18:10 UTC

81 points

5 comments4 min readEA link

Timothy Chan 19 Nov 2023 11:38 UTC
2 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Timothy Chan’s Shortform
A while back I wrote that I agreed with the observation that some of (new wave) EA’s norms seem similar to those of the religion imposed on me and others as children. My current thinking is that there may actually be a link connecting the culture in parts of Protestantism and some of the (progressive) norms EA adopts, along with an atypical origin that probably deserves more scrutiny. The “link” part might be more apparent to people who’ve noticed a “god-shaped hole” in the West that makes some secular movements resemble certain parts of religions. The “origin” part might be less apparent but it’s been discussed by Scott Alexander before. So, this theory isn’t all that original.
Essentially: Puritans, as one of four major cultures originating from the UK, exert huge founder effects on America, which both influences parts of itself as well as other countries for better or worse → Protestant culture gradually changed to be more socially judgmental in some ways etc. → More recently, people increasingly reject the existence of a God but keep elements of the culture of that religion → EA now draws heavily from nth generation ex-Protestants/Protestant-adjacents who also tend to be more active in trying to change society (other people’s actions) and approach it with some of the same inherited attitudes
That is one causal chain but a tree might show more causes and effects. For example, the Puritan founder effects probably also influenced modern academia (in part, spearheaded by a few institutions in New England) which again, EA heavily draws from. Other secular institutions might also be influenced by osmosis, and produce downstream effects.
It seems difficult to believe these attitudes just disappeared without affecting other movements, culture, and society. The Puritan legacy also seems to have a track record of being quite influential.

Timothy Chan 1 Oct 2023 1:05 UTC
7 points
0 ∶ 0
on: What order of magnitude of suffering does silk production create?
Some relevant numbers in this article: https://reducing-suffering.org/insect-suffering-silk-shellac-carmine-insect-products/

Timothy Chan 29 Aug 2023 9:13 UTC
3 points
2 ∶ 0
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Timothy Chan 24 Aug 2023 19:52 UTC
4 points
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: rajlego’s comment on: Recommendations for charities for animal suffering offsets?
Oh, I see. Do you know if she is ok with eating lamb/mutton/goat? I suspect there are also grazing effects (that might reduce wild-animal suffering overall) but I don’t know whether they are as significant. Maybe @Brian_Tomasik knows?

Timothy Chan 23 Aug 2023 10:50 UTC
5 points
1 ∶ 0
on: Recommendations for charities for animal suffering offsets?
Beef consumption directly costs less suffering/kg because of the amount of meat provided per cow. It also plausibly reduces wild-animal suffering by taking up land.

Timothy Chan

My fa­vorite ar­ti­cles by Brian To­masik and what they are about

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My favorite articles by Brian Tomasik and what they are about