In case anyone else wanted this sorted by topic and then by person, here you go:
Do you think that the world will handle future pandemics and bio risks better as a result of having gone through the current coronavirus pandemic?
Joan: Would like to be able to say that as humans, we will be able to adapt. But there’s not a lot of good evidence at the moment that we will take the right steps. We’re seeing states retreat, build high walls, and become less globalised. And signs of anti globalisation trends and anti science trends, are negative indicators when global cooperation is exactly what’s needed to handle these issues better in the future. Good Leadership is key to our future preparedness.
Catherine: Slightly pessimistic
Catherine: Probably not
Catherine: Depends when the next one hits
Catherine: If it happens within 5-10 years, we would have boosted ability
Catherine: In the scientific side, the huge rush to innovate probably leaves a legacy
Catherine: There’s about a 20% probability that we might get better, probably not going to get worse
Megan: We should expect organisational learning and prioritisation
Megan: But on balance we should likely expect over-indexing/over-fitting based on what’s happened previously, and not enough planning and preparation relating to biological risks that don’t look like what’s come most recently
Anita: In general yes, we should expect there to be some learning and improvement. Countries have often struggled with getting sufficient attention and resources to outbreak preparedness
Anita: There will probably be more money going into public health and maybe the military as well
Anita: Asian countries certainly seem better prepared as a result of their past experience
Do you think future bio risks will be more likely, less likely, or unchanged in likelihood after the current pandemic? (it may help to split between deliberate man-made risks, accidental man-made, and natural)
Joan: It is pretty clear that bio risks will become more likely. This is because of general trends that predated coronavirus such as technological developments, climate change, population growth, urbanisation and global travel. This is because of general trends that predated coronavirus. Already this century we’ve had four major global disease outbreaks (Swine Flu, MERS, Ebola, COVID-19) -- almost double the rate of previous centuries. In terms of whether COVID-19 actually causes future bio risks to be more likely, NTI preferred not to make a strong comment either way on this point.
Catherine: More likely, in that that was the trend already
Catherine: Unchanged by covid
Catherine: Our economies will go back to interconnectedness
Catherine: We will have more contact with wildlife as we encroach further into their habitats
Catherine: Deliberate bio risks could go two ways. Potential users of bio weapons might see that this is really disruptive, so might make it more appealing. Conversely might see that there is really no way of making sure that bio risks are contained and won’t affect your own people
Catherine: Increased research utilising dangerous pathogens is a source of risk requiring greater attention to biosafety
Megan: We should expect some organisational learning and prioritisation as a result of COVID-19
Megan: We need more work on understanding and modeling origins of biological risks, without which it’s hard to give definitive answers
Megan: We may well see extra work happening to increase our overall understanding of SARS-CoV-2 in particular and viruses in general as a result of the current pandemic. But does understanding viruses increase or decrease our risk? The extra knowledge may well be valuable, but accidents can happen as a result of people doing scientific work which is intended to tackle a pathogen, especially when the rush of people tackling the problem means that people without experience of working with infectious pathogens are involved.
Megan: There are state and non-state actors who may have not been interested in or otherwise discounted biological weapons who now may become interested. It’s still not fully understood how terrorists get inspired about ways to use biology as a weapon, and socialising threats can cause information hazards
Megan: Also as research develops, it makes it easier for low skilled or medium skilled actors to generate pathogens
Anita: Hard to say at this moment
Anita: Need to secure biosafety practices in labs; hopefully more people will appreciate that this is really important. Tentatively optimistic about this, however I don’t think I’ve seen as much as I’d like to see about the importance of this.
Anita: Could inspire those who want to do harm to see the power of a released pathogen in the community. E.g. an independent group or some state actors who have an interest in the development of bio weapons might feel encouraged. Hopefully, these groups will see that it’s hard to control a pandemic once it starts, so this may also act as a deterrent. But overall, we’re not expecting this pandemic will turn people away from bioweapons.
How do you think the willingness of key actors such as governments (but excluding donors) to tackle bio risks will change in light of the current pandemic?
Joan: In the near term, we’ll have a higher degree of attention on better preparing for pandemics
Joan: It’s unclear whether we will see the right levels of political competence and focused engagement to facilitate the right investments for enduring improvements and attention that last into the future but we have a unique opportunity to work for lasting change.
Catherine: Short window of opportunity in which things might change
Catherine: Might be c 3-5 years window, perhaps
Catherine: Huge economic damage means that the appetite for thinking further ahead might not be there because governments will be focusing on immediate economic recovery needs
Catherine: It’s not the case that the world didn’t know that pandemics could cause huge damage and coronavirus has now educated us. It was clear that this sort of event was going to happen. The world bank has been putting out warnings; see for example, the World Bank paper “From Panic to neglect”
Megan: People are now socialised to the risk, so will take the risks more seriously, but this will differ by risk types.
Megan: We have seen a long history of over-indexing on the most recent high profile incidents and environments, including before they are fully understood. For example there was over-indexing on outsider threats in the midst of the anthrax response. Based on past experience, it seems likely that there might be longer term neglect of certain types of risks.
Megan: We may see general build-up of capabilities around pandemic response, which will likely be helpful for naturally occurring infectious disease. But there may be less attention on deliberate and accidental bio risks that may look very different.
Anita: I expect there will be some additional investment in this area, although there could also be a funding fatigue once we get through this pandemic. A large and enduring investment in biosecurity may be difficult to achieve, especially at the moment when governments are spending so much on COVID
Anita: Standard public health budgets are different line items, and you could just up the budgets to, say, something similar or more than what it was in 2003, when it was much higher than today.
Anita: However it’s worrying that existential threats look likely to remain underinvested in
Have you seen signs that donor interest in tackling bio risks has changed or will change in light of the current pandemic?
Joan: There is now lots of attention on biological risks. And several donors such as Bill Gates and Jack Dorsey have been pledging substantial amounts.
Joan: The risk is that donors overly focus on naturally occurring biological risks like COVID, without considering that other things also constitute existential risks, like manmade pathogens or nuclear war that also deserve attention.
Catherine: Not seen much indication at the moment
Catherine: However a small number of specific funders are starting to think about existential bio risks a bit more
Megan: We have not seen a noticeable uptick in donations because of COVID but have tried not to be opportunistic.
Megan: To a certain extent this is also a function of us spending time talking to senior politicians and others in government and the commercial sector on immediate response and not having the time to broadcast this value to the outside world.
Megan: Many of our colleagues working in adjacent areas have seen some donor interest on secondary effects (e.g. the impact of COVID-19 on geopolitics).
Megan: This may also be another example of over-indexing—everyone is focused on the immediate response efforts (contact tracing etc) but not a lot of what will happen if a worse biological risk hits us in the future. We’ve been focused on this longer term strategy.
Anita: Have seen some modest uptick in donors who want to give to covid response. Not sure that that will translate to a longer term interest or commitment to the health space going forward. We are so used to the panic neglect cycle. Uptick mostly (but not entirely) from people in the Effective Altruism community.