It’s an interesting result, but I don’t see it as really getting to the heart of the problem. I suppose it is relevant to the practical claim that even if we are skeptical of infinities we should assign non-zero probability of them existing, but not so much to the theoretical issue of how these infinities should be handled as we can construct scenarios with all probabilities being significant (or without probability altogether).
not so much to the theoretical issue of how these infinities should be handled as we can construct scenarios with...
Well, I agree that you can construct scenarios where this approach doesn’t help, but I think it is a good step which still allows for making decisions when comparing infinities of the same cardinality. I also think that the original paper has some additional interesting result, e.g., some sort of dominance in the present of “deep uncertainty” ends up being equivalent to expected value.
I suppose it is relevant to the practical claim that even if we are skeptical of infinities we should assign non-zero probability of them existing
Not sure, I think that we should assign non-zero probability if they have nonzero probability, which they do. Assigning probability 0 to things is pretty wild.
This post of mine: Infinite Ethics 101: Stochastic and Statewise Dominance as a Backup Decision Theory when Expected Values Fail, which does some exegesis on this paper, might be of interest.
It’s an interesting result, but I don’t see it as really getting to the heart of the problem. I suppose it is relevant to the practical claim that even if we are skeptical of infinities we should assign non-zero probability of them existing, but not so much to the theoretical issue of how these infinities should be handled as we can construct scenarios with all probabilities being significant (or without probability altogether).
Well, I agree that you can construct scenarios where this approach doesn’t help, but I think it is a good step which still allows for making decisions when comparing infinities of the same cardinality. I also think that the original paper has some additional interesting result, e.g., some sort of dominance in the present of “deep uncertainty” ends up being equivalent to expected value.
Not sure, I think that we should assign non-zero probability if they have nonzero probability, which they do. Assigning probability 0 to things is pretty wild.
More specifically, infinity seems like it does meaningfully exist as a limit. E.g., the expected amount of total time is infinite.