Relatedly, there are the concepts of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘insecurity’. I think there’s a risk that uncertainty as perceived, and perhaps even experienced, as insecurity. Interestingly, both concepts are translated into one and the same word in Dutch! (“onzekerheid”)
However, I think stating epistemic uncertainty in a very precise and confident way (e.g. “I believe X, and I am 60% certain my hypothesis is correct”) can show meta-confidence and strong epistemics. I would rather learn to be convince while still communicating uncertainties, than learning to hide my epistemic uncertainty.
Also, experts in any domain face this challenge, and useful lessons could be drawn from literature on it, such as this paper (I only read the abstract, it seems useful).
Relatedly, there are the concepts of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘insecurity’. I think there’s a risk that uncertainty as perceived, and perhaps even experienced, as insecurity. Interestingly, both concepts are translated into one and the same word in Dutch! (“onzekerheid”)
However, I think stating epistemic uncertainty in a very precise and confident way (e.g. “I believe X, and I am 60% certain my hypothesis is correct”) can show meta-confidence and strong epistemics. I would rather learn to be convince while still communicating uncertainties, than learning to hide my epistemic uncertainty.
Also, experts in any domain face this challenge, and useful lessons could be drawn from literature on it, such as this paper (I only read the abstract, it seems useful).