The problem with this in the context of the above post is that appearing unsure of yourself signals low status. The antidote to this is to detach your sure-o-meter from your feeling of confidence, and be able to verbally state your confidence levels without being unsure of yourself.
This is one of the most interesting points Iāve seen on the Forum in a long while. It perfectly captures the distinction I feel between certain people who I consider excellent speakers in the EA movement and people who donāt give me that feeling. At first, I thought this was something like high charisma vs. low charisma, but that wasnāt quite right; you donāt need to be charismatic and charming to speak with confidence about your uncertainty.
Relatedly, there are the concepts of āuncertaintyā and āinsecurityā. I think thereās a risk that uncertainty as perceived, and perhaps even experienced, as insecurity. Interestingly, both concepts are translated into one and the same word in Dutch! (āonzekerheidā)
However, I think stating epistemic uncertainty in a very precise and confident way (e.g. āI believe X, and I am 60% certain my hypothesis is correctā) can show meta-confidence and strong epistemics. I would rather learn to be convince while still communicating uncertainties, than learning to hide my epistemic uncertainty.
Also, experts in any domain face this challenge, and useful lessons could be drawn from literature on it, such as this paper (I only read the abstract, it seems useful).
This is one of the most interesting points Iāve seen on the Forum in a long while. It perfectly captures the distinction I feel between certain people who I consider excellent speakers in the EA movement and people who donāt give me that feeling. At first, I thought this was something like high charisma vs. low charisma, but that wasnāt quite right; you donāt need to be charismatic and charming to speak with confidence about your uncertainty.
Relatedly, there are the concepts of āuncertaintyā and āinsecurityā. I think thereās a risk that uncertainty as perceived, and perhaps even experienced, as insecurity. Interestingly, both concepts are translated into one and the same word in Dutch! (āonzekerheidā)
However, I think stating epistemic uncertainty in a very precise and confident way (e.g. āI believe X, and I am 60% certain my hypothesis is correctā) can show meta-confidence and strong epistemics. I would rather learn to be convince while still communicating uncertainties, than learning to hide my epistemic uncertainty.
Also, experts in any domain face this challenge, and useful lessons could be drawn from literature on it, such as this paper (I only read the abstract, it seems useful).