Doesn’t this depend on assuming negative utilitarianism, and suffering-focused ethic, or a particular set of assumptions about the net pleasure vs pain in the life of an ‘average’ animal?
I don’t think it depends on those things, what they meant by species not being inherently valuable is that each individual of a species is inherently valuable. It’s a claim that the species’ value comes from the value of the individuals (not taking into account value from stuff like possibly making ecological collapse less likely etc).
(I only read the beginning of your comment, sorry for not responding to the rest!)
I don’t think it depends on those things, what they meant by species not being inherently valuable is that each individual of a species is inherently valuable. It’s a claim that the species’ value comes from the value of the individuals (not taking into account value from stuff like possibly making ecological collapse less likely etc).
(I only read the beginning of your comment, sorry for not responding to the rest!)