I’m still confused by this. The more impartial someone’s standards, if anything, the more important you should feel if they still choose to prioritize you.
It’s more circumstantial if they prioritize you based on impartial concern; it just happened to be the best thing they could do.
Also, for an impartial consequentialist, I think “the belief that helping them is the best thing you could be doing with your time” won’t normally be based primarily on their welfare, because that’s pretty small compared to the impartial stakes we face. So, most of the reason comes from instrumental reasons, e.g. helping your friend because it does more good for others besides your friend, or because the seemingly better alternatives aren’t actually sustainable in the long term, or you’re actually doing something wrong by helping your friend instead of doing something else.
So, for an impartial consequentialist, you shouldn’t normally help a friend primarily for their own sake. You can’t say “I did this primarily out of my concern for you.” without lying (actually the instrumental reasons are more important) or failing in your impartial obligations to others. Concern for them is part of it, but it isn’t enough to beat your other obligations.
It’s more circumstantial if they prioritize you based on impartial concern; it just happened to be the best thing they could do.
Hm, to my ear, prioritizing a friend just because you happen to be biased towards them is more circumstantial. It’s based on accidents of geography and life events that led you to be friends with that person to a greater degree than with other people you’ve never met.
that’s pretty small compared to the impartial stakes we face
I agree, though that’s a separate argument. I was addressing the claim that conditional on a consequentialist choosing to help their friend, their reasons are alienating, which I don’t find convincing. My point was precisely that because the standard is so high for a consequentialist, it’s all the more flattering if your friend prioritizes you in light of that standard. It’s quite difficult to reconcile with my revealed priorities as someone who definitely doesn’t live up to my own consequentialism, yes, but I bite the bullet that this is really just a failure on my part (or, as you mention, the “instrumental” reasons to be a good friend also win over anyway).
Hm, to my ear, prioritizing a friend just because you happen to be biased towards them is more circumstantial. It’s based on accidents of geography and life events that led you to be friends with that person to a greater degree than with other people you’ve never met.
That’s a good point. I think one plausible-sounding response is that while the friendship itself was started largely circumstantially, the reason you maintain and continue to value the relationship is not so circumstantial, and has more to do with your actual relationship with that other person.
It’s quite difficult to reconcile with my revealed priorities as someone who definitely doesn’t live up to my own consequentialism, yes, but I bite the bullet that this is really just a failure on my part (or, as you mention, the “instrumental” reasons to be a good friend also win over anyway).
If you do think it is a failure on your part, then belief that it’s the best thing you could be doing isn’t the reason, and isn’t one reason actually special concern for your friend or your relationship with them? I suppose the point is that you don’t recognize that reason as an ethical one; it’s just something that happens to explain your behaviour in practice, not what you think is right.
the reason you maintain and continue to value the relationship is not so circumstantial, and has more to do with your actual relationship with that other person
Right, but even so it seems like a friend who cares for you because they believe caring for you is good, and better than the alternatives, is “warmer” than one who doesn’t think this but merely follows some partiality (or again, bias) toward you.
I suppose it comes down to conflicting intuitions on something like “unconditional love.” Several people, not just hardcore consequentialists, find that concept hollow and cheap, because loving someone unconditionally implies you don’t really care who they are, in any sense other than the physical continuity of their identity. Conditional love identifies the aspects of the person actually worth loving, and that seems more genuine to me, though less comforting to someone who wants (selfishly) to be loved no matter what they do.
I suppose the point is that you don’t recognize that reason as an ethical one; it’s just something that happens to explain your behaviour in practice, not what you think is right.
Yeah, exactly. It would be an extremely convenient coincidence if our feelings for partial friendship etc., which evolved in small communities where these feelings were largely sufficient for social cohesion, just happened to be the ethically best things for us to follow - when we now live in a world where it’s feasible for someone to do a lot more good by being impartial.
Edit: seems based on one of your other comments that we actually agree more than I thought.
I’m still confused by this. The more impartial someone’s standards, if anything, the more important you should feel if they still choose to prioritize you.
It’s more circumstantial if they prioritize you based on impartial concern; it just happened to be the best thing they could do.
Also, for an impartial consequentialist, I think “the belief that helping them is the best thing you could be doing with your time” won’t normally be based primarily on their welfare, because that’s pretty small compared to the impartial stakes we face. So, most of the reason comes from instrumental reasons, e.g. helping your friend because it does more good for others besides your friend, or because the seemingly better alternatives aren’t actually sustainable in the long term, or you’re actually doing something wrong by helping your friend instead of doing something else.
So, for an impartial consequentialist, you shouldn’t normally help a friend primarily for their own sake. You can’t say “I did this primarily out of my concern for you.” without lying (actually the instrumental reasons are more important) or failing in your impartial obligations to others. Concern for them is part of it, but it isn’t enough to beat your other obligations.
Hm, to my ear, prioritizing a friend just because you happen to be biased towards them is more circumstantial. It’s based on accidents of geography and life events that led you to be friends with that person to a greater degree than with other people you’ve never met.
I agree, though that’s a separate argument. I was addressing the claim that conditional on a consequentialist choosing to help their friend, their reasons are alienating, which I don’t find convincing. My point was precisely that because the standard is so high for a consequentialist, it’s all the more flattering if your friend prioritizes you in light of that standard. It’s quite difficult to reconcile with my revealed priorities as someone who definitely doesn’t live up to my own consequentialism, yes, but I bite the bullet that this is really just a failure on my part (or, as you mention, the “instrumental” reasons to be a good friend also win over anyway).
That’s a good point. I think one plausible-sounding response is that while the friendship itself was started largely circumstantially, the reason you maintain and continue to value the relationship is not so circumstantial, and has more to do with your actual relationship with that other person.
If you do think it is a failure on your part, then belief that it’s the best thing you could be doing isn’t the reason, and isn’t one reason actually special concern for your friend or your relationship with them? I suppose the point is that you don’t recognize that reason as an ethical one; it’s just something that happens to explain your behaviour in practice, not what you think is right.
Right, but even so it seems like a friend who cares for you because they believe caring for you is good, and better than the alternatives, is “warmer” than one who doesn’t think this but merely follows some partiality (or again, bias) toward you.
I suppose it comes down to conflicting intuitions on something like “unconditional love.” Several people, not just hardcore consequentialists, find that concept hollow and cheap, because loving someone unconditionally implies you don’t really care who they are, in any sense other than the physical continuity of their identity. Conditional love identifies the aspects of the person actually worth loving, and that seems more genuine to me, though less comforting to someone who wants (selfishly) to be loved no matter what they do.
Yeah, exactly. It would be an extremely convenient coincidence if our feelings for partial friendship etc., which evolved in small communities where these feelings were largely sufficient for social cohesion, just happened to be the ethically best things for us to follow - when we now live in a world where it’s feasible for someone to do a lot more good by being impartial.
Edit: seems based on one of your other comments that we actually agree more than I thought.