“there’s a difference between hypothetical probability and the actual benefits of the specific bed nets in the specific locations that are funded by your donation.”
I don’t think there really is, from a decision standpoint. According to previous statistics from Givewell, $2,500 is approximately what is needed to save a life via malaria nets (this figure is now outdated. Now it seems very different, but I think that Tom made the claim from when that was the case).
If this is true, than $5,000 would, on average, save 2 statistical lives.
Yes, it is possible that it wouldn’t save anyone. But it’s also possible it would save more than 2. Future unpredictable outcomes don’t matter for decision making outside their probabilities at the time.
It’s possible that any intervention wouldn’t help anyone, even the GiveDirectly donations (though it is quite unlikely). That said, when making decisions it really seems like it’s best to go on the best estimates, especially if benefits scale linearly (which they should do at this level of spending).
That said, I would definitely agree that the other benefits of giving to AMF are quite considerable and may be greater than the ‘saving a life’ part. ‘Saving a life’ in itself is a pretty poor metric for many reasons.
Oh, no, I’m definitely not making that argument. Most decisions have to be made in the face of some uncertainty (uncertainty is a key element of risk: without uncertainty there is no risk and thus no decision to make). I was arguing that we shouldn’t jump to the comfortable conclusion that we’ve saved lives by giving to organisation X based on some statistical probability. And if you evaluate both of your charity choices with that caveat in mind, the differences might be less clear.
Effective altruism focuses on doing the most good with your donation, but there can be a disconnect between the most hypothetical good and the most actual good that gets done with your donation in the end. I don’t think this should affect decision making, but I do think it should affect our confidence in how much good we may actually have done. Tom wrote in his post “If they’re even roughly correct, I’d save several lives if I donated £5,000 to AMF this year.” I was just pointing out that it would be more accurate to say “I might save several lives” or “there’s a strong statistical probability that I could save several lives” rather than “I would save several lives,” because that sense of certainty seemed to play a role in his decision.
You’re right, I didn’t actually mean that I’d certainly save several lives, in the same way that I would if I funded 2 life-saving operations which wouldn’t otherwise have happened. Instead I meant that I’d save several lives in expectation—i.e. that part of the expected value of my donation is the saving of those lives. I didn’t spell that out to avoid being too verbose. (And you’re right that this these lives saved are only part of the value of donations to AMF—as you say, they also spare large numbers of people the miseries of malaria, whether or not they would have died without bednets.)
“there’s a difference between hypothetical probability and the actual benefits of the specific bed nets in the specific locations that are funded by your donation.”
I don’t think there really is, from a decision standpoint. According to previous statistics from Givewell, $2,500 is approximately what is needed to save a life via malaria nets (this figure is now outdated. Now it seems very different, but I think that Tom made the claim from when that was the case).
If this is true, than $5,000 would, on average, save 2 statistical lives.
Yes, it is possible that it wouldn’t save anyone. But it’s also possible it would save more than 2. Future unpredictable outcomes don’t matter for decision making outside their probabilities at the time.
It’s possible that any intervention wouldn’t help anyone, even the GiveDirectly donations (though it is quite unlikely). That said, when making decisions it really seems like it’s best to go on the best estimates, especially if benefits scale linearly (which they should do at this level of spending).
That said, I would definitely agree that the other benefits of giving to AMF are quite considerable and may be greater than the ‘saving a life’ part. ‘Saving a life’ in itself is a pretty poor metric for many reasons.
* I may be misunderstanding what you said, but to me it sounded as an argument of ‘we can’t make decisions on things we can’t know for sure, because what if X happens?’ This kind of argument is incredibly common and incredibly frustrating. Douglas Hubbard wrote a nice summary of this argument coming from who are supposed to be ‘risk managers’ in his book ‘The Failure of Risk Management’ here: http://www.amazon.com/Failure-Risk-Management-Why-Broken-ebook/dp/B0026LTMAU/ref=la_B001JSJHIS_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1390915736&sr=1-2
Oh, no, I’m definitely not making that argument. Most decisions have to be made in the face of some uncertainty (uncertainty is a key element of risk: without uncertainty there is no risk and thus no decision to make). I was arguing that we shouldn’t jump to the comfortable conclusion that we’ve saved lives by giving to organisation X based on some statistical probability. And if you evaluate both of your charity choices with that caveat in mind, the differences might be less clear.
Effective altruism focuses on doing the most good with your donation, but there can be a disconnect between the most hypothetical good and the most actual good that gets done with your donation in the end. I don’t think this should affect decision making, but I do think it should affect our confidence in how much good we may actually have done. Tom wrote in his post “If they’re even roughly correct, I’d save several lives if I donated £5,000 to AMF this year.” I was just pointing out that it would be more accurate to say “I might save several lives” or “there’s a strong statistical probability that I could save several lives” rather than “I would save several lives,” because that sense of certainty seemed to play a role in his decision.
You’re right, I didn’t actually mean that I’d certainly save several lives, in the same way that I would if I funded 2 life-saving operations which wouldn’t otherwise have happened. Instead I meant that I’d save several lives in expectation—i.e. that part of the expected value of my donation is the saving of those lives. I didn’t spell that out to avoid being too verbose. (And you’re right that this these lives saved are only part of the value of donations to AMF—as you say, they also spare large numbers of people the miseries of malaria, whether or not they would have died without bednets.)
I think we’re all basically agreeing with each other here now. Language is indeed a difficult tool.