This is a simplistic analysis. Humanitarian conditions in Gaza are dire, a ceasefire now would allow for aid to flow in and many lives to be saved.
And while I agree that Palestinians are better off without Hamas, whether or not it is worth the price of thousands of dead civilians will depend on what happens afterwards. Will their homes be rebuilt, and their lives improved, meaningful steps taken to statehood and long term peace? Or will they be left stewing with rage in the rubble, brewing the ground for Hamas 2.0 to come along in a few years and start it all over again?
There is some amount of fighting required to destroy Hamas, and some amount of collateral damage that will result. A ceasefire now, by giving Hamas time to adapt, should be expected to increase the total amount of fighting required, and hence the total amount of collateral damage. It will also facilitate the provision of aid (e.g. fuel), by ensuring it is not stolen by Hamas.
Edited to add: I certainly hope there will be detailed follow-up to prevent the resurgence of Hamas, with a 1946-style denazification program. But that seems not very relevant to the question of a ceasefire here, because a ceasefire is just a pause, not a peace treaty.
There is some amount of fighting required to destroy Hamas, and some amount of collateral damage that will result.
Though pressure from the international community can cause Israel to be more careful about avoiding civilian casualties and to provide more humanitarian aid. Israel has an incentive to cause many civilian casualties for the sake of deterrence (which is an incentive that Israel has acted on in the past[1]), and perhaps in order to cause Palestinians to flee to Egypt at a later point in time.
My best guess is that in the current war ~every deadly attack by IDF is carried out by people who believe that the target they are attacking is definitely/possibly a “legitimate military target”. But it is Netanyahu and other politicians who get to decide how many civilians the IDF is generally willing to kill to achieve a military objective X. If those numbers are sufficiently large, the outcome can be indistinguishable from a genocide.
Disclaimer: I have served in Israel Defense Forces, I live in Israel, I feel horrible about what Israel has done in the past 75+ years to millions of Palestinians and I do not want Israel to end up as a horrible stain on human history. I am probably unusually biased when dealing with this topic.
In its early years, Israel Defence Forces committed massacres of Palestinians as acts of retaliation. This included the Qibya massacre (that was committed in 1953 under the command of Ariel Sharon) in which more than 69 Palestinian villagers where killed, two thirds of which were women and children, according to the extended-protected Wikipedia entry. This was a response to an attack that killed an Israeli woman and her two children. The prime minister Ben-Gurion (the primary national founder of the State of Israel) lied about that massacre and claimed it was done by civilians.
Sure, I agree that international pressure probably makes Israel more concerned about minimizing collateral damage than they otherwise would be. I don’t see what this has to do with ceasefires though. If anything it pushes in the opposite direction: a ceasefire strengthens Hamas, reducing Israel’s control of the situation and hence reducing their ability to minimize collateral damage for a given level of cost. If the international community has a certain amount of moral suasion that can be applied, we should not waste it on counterproductive asks.
I feel like a lot of your comment is not really very relevant to this discussion. For example, in the same way that I don’t think the My Lai massacre provides much evidence about the contemporary US military, I don’t think Qibya, which took place 70 years ago, tells us much about contemporary IDF doctrine.
I’m trying to make a general point about improving Israel’s incentives, not about whether one should press a button that magically makes Israel declare a ceasefire right now.
The way that the international community handles this situation may influence whether states/governments/politicians can expect to benefit from acting on incentives in a way that violates ~universal norms related to justice and human decency.
I feel like a lot of your comment is not really very relevant to this discussion. For example, in the same way that I don’t think the My Lai massacre provides much evidence about the contemporary US military, I don’t think Qibya, which took place 70 years ago, tells us much about contemporary IDF doctrine.
Unlike the My Lai massacre (which seemingly resulted from a command by a captain of infantry in the US Army), the Qibya massacre resulted from an order that was given by the Defense Minister of Israel in coordination with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. The raid was led by Ariel Sharon, who at the time was a Major in the IDF. Sharon personally ordered his troops to achieve “maximal killing and damage to property” (quoting from the extended-protected Wikipedia entry). Later, as Minister of Defense, Sharon bore personal responsibility for the Sabra and Shatila massacre in 1982, according to the official Israeli commission that investigated the cause and circumstances of the massacre. Sharon later served as the prime minister of Israel from 2001 to 2006 (and played a major role in Hamas taking over the Gaza strip).
This is a simplistic analysis. Humanitarian conditions in Gaza are dire, a ceasefire now would allow for aid to flow in and many lives to be saved.
And while I agree that Palestinians are better off without Hamas, whether or not it is worth the price of thousands of dead civilians will depend on what happens afterwards. Will their homes be rebuilt, and their lives improved, meaningful steps taken to statehood and long term peace? Or will they be left stewing with rage in the rubble, brewing the ground for Hamas 2.0 to come along in a few years and start it all over again?
There is some amount of fighting required to destroy Hamas, and some amount of collateral damage that will result. A ceasefire now, by giving Hamas time to adapt, should be expected to increase the total amount of fighting required, and hence the total amount of collateral damage. It will also facilitate the provision of aid (e.g. fuel), by ensuring it is not stolen by Hamas.
Edited to add: I certainly hope there will be detailed follow-up to prevent the resurgence of Hamas, with a 1946-style denazification program. But that seems not very relevant to the question of a ceasefire here, because a ceasefire is just a pause, not a peace treaty.
Though pressure from the international community can cause Israel to be more careful about avoiding civilian casualties and to provide more humanitarian aid. Israel has an incentive to cause many civilian casualties for the sake of deterrence (which is an incentive that Israel has acted on in the past[1]), and perhaps in order to cause Palestinians to flee to Egypt at a later point in time.
My best guess is that in the current war ~every deadly attack by IDF is carried out by people who believe that the target they are attacking is definitely/possibly a “legitimate military target”. But it is Netanyahu and other politicians who get to decide how many civilians the IDF is generally willing to kill to achieve a military objective X. If those numbers are sufficiently large, the outcome can be indistinguishable from a genocide.
Disclaimer: I have served in Israel Defense Forces, I live in Israel, I feel horrible about what Israel has done in the past 75+ years to millions of Palestinians and I do not want Israel to end up as a horrible stain on human history. I am probably unusually biased when dealing with this topic.
In its early years, Israel Defence Forces committed massacres of Palestinians as acts of retaliation. This included the Qibya massacre (that was committed in 1953 under the command of Ariel Sharon) in which more than 69 Palestinian villagers where killed, two thirds of which were women and children, according to the extended-protected Wikipedia entry. This was a response to an attack that killed an Israeli woman and her two children. The prime minister Ben-Gurion (the primary national founder of the State of Israel) lied about that massacre and claimed it was done by civilians.
Sure, I agree that international pressure probably makes Israel more concerned about minimizing collateral damage than they otherwise would be. I don’t see what this has to do with ceasefires though. If anything it pushes in the opposite direction: a ceasefire strengthens Hamas, reducing Israel’s control of the situation and hence reducing their ability to minimize collateral damage for a given level of cost. If the international community has a certain amount of moral suasion that can be applied, we should not waste it on counterproductive asks.
I feel like a lot of your comment is not really very relevant to this discussion. For example, in the same way that I don’t think the My Lai massacre provides much evidence about the contemporary US military, I don’t think Qibya, which took place 70 years ago, tells us much about contemporary IDF doctrine.
I’m trying to make a general point about improving Israel’s incentives, not about whether one should press a button that magically makes Israel declare a ceasefire right now.
The way that the international community handles this situation may influence whether states/governments/politicians can expect to benefit from acting on incentives in a way that violates ~universal norms related to justice and human decency.
Unlike the My Lai massacre (which seemingly resulted from a command by a captain of infantry in the US Army), the Qibya massacre resulted from an order that was given by the Defense Minister of Israel in coordination with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. The raid was led by Ariel Sharon, who at the time was a Major in the IDF. Sharon personally ordered his troops to achieve “maximal killing and damage to property” (quoting from the extended-protected Wikipedia entry). Later, as Minister of Defense, Sharon bore personal responsibility for the Sabra and Shatila massacre in 1982, according to the official Israeli commission that investigated the cause and circumstances of the massacre. Sharon later served as the prime minister of Israel from 2001 to 2006 (and played a major role in Hamas taking over the Gaza strip).