Thanks for this Magnus, I have complicated thoughts on this point, hence my late reply! To some extent Iāll punt this to a forthcoming Substack post, but FWIW:
As you know, relieving suffering is profoundly important to me. Iād very much like a way to make sense of this moral impulse in our situation (and I intend to reflect on how to do so).
But itās very important that the problem isnāt that we donāt know āthe single best thingā to do. Itās that if I donāt ignore my effects on far-future (etc.) suffering, I have no particular reason to think Iām ārelieving sufferingā overall. Rather, Iām plausibly increasing or decreasing suffering elsewhere, quite drastically, and I canāt say these effects cancel out in expectation. (Maybe youāre thinking of āOption 3ā in this section? If so, Iām curious where you disagree with my response.)
The reason suffering matters so deeply to me is the nature of suffering itself, regardless of where or when it happens ā presumably youād agree. From that perspective, and given the above, Iām not sure I understand the motivation for your view in your second paragraph. (The reasons to do various parochial things, or respect deontological constraints, arenāt like this. They arenāt grounded in something like āthis thing out there in the world is horrible, and should be prevented wherever/āwhenever it is [or whoever causes it]ā.)
Yeah, my basic point was that just as I donāt think we need to ground a value like ācaring for those we loveā in whether it has the best consequences across all time and space, I think the same applies to many other instances of caring for and helping individuals ā not just those we love.
For example, if we walk past a complete stranger who is enduring torment and is in need of urgent help, we would rightly take action to help this person, even if we cannot say whether this action reduces total suffering or otherwise improves the world overall. I think thatās a reasonable practical stance, and I think the spirit of this stance applies to many ways in which we can and do benefit strangers, not just to rare emergencies.
In other words, I was just trying to say that when it comes to reasonable values aimed at helping others, I donāt think itās a case of āit must be grounded in strong impartiality or bustā. Descriptively, I donāt think that reflects virtually anyoneās actual values or revealed preferences, and I donāt think itās reasonable from a prescriptive perspective either (e.g. I donāt think itās reasonable or defensible to abstain from helping a tormented stranger based on cluelessness about the large-scale consequences).
Iāve replied to this in a separate Quick Take. :) (Not sure if youād disagree with any of what I write, but I found it helpful to clarify my position. Thanks for prompting this!)
Thanks for this Magnus, I have complicated thoughts on this point, hence my late reply! To some extent Iāll punt this to a forthcoming Substack post, but FWIW:
As you know, relieving suffering is profoundly important to me. Iād very much like a way to make sense of this moral impulse in our situation (and I intend to reflect on how to do so).
But itās very important that the problem isnāt that we donāt know āthe single best thingā to do. Itās that if I donāt ignore my effects on far-future (etc.) suffering, I have no particular reason to think Iām ārelieving sufferingā overall. Rather, Iām plausibly increasing or decreasing suffering elsewhere, quite drastically, and I canāt say these effects cancel out in expectation. (Maybe youāre thinking of āOption 3ā in this section? If so, Iām curious where you disagree with my response.)
The reason suffering matters so deeply to me is the nature of suffering itself, regardless of where or when it happens ā presumably youād agree. From that perspective, and given the above, Iām not sure I understand the motivation for your view in your second paragraph. (The reasons to do various parochial things, or respect deontological constraints, arenāt like this. They arenāt grounded in something like āthis thing out there in the world is horrible, and should be prevented wherever/āwhenever it is [or whoever causes it]ā.)
Yeah, my basic point was that just as I donāt think we need to ground a value like ācaring for those we loveā in whether it has the best consequences across all time and space, I think the same applies to many other instances of caring for and helping individuals ā not just those we love.
For example, if we walk past a complete stranger who is enduring torment and is in need of urgent help, we would rightly take action to help this person, even if we cannot say whether this action reduces total suffering or otherwise improves the world overall. I think thatās a reasonable practical stance, and I think the spirit of this stance applies to many ways in which we can and do benefit strangers, not just to rare emergencies.
In other words, I was just trying to say that when it comes to reasonable values aimed at helping others, I donāt think itās a case of āit must be grounded in strong impartiality or bustā. Descriptively, I donāt think that reflects virtually anyoneās actual values or revealed preferences, and I donāt think itās reasonable from a prescriptive perspective either (e.g. I donāt think itās reasonable or defensible to abstain from helping a tormented stranger based on cluelessness about the large-scale consequences).
Iāve replied to this in a separate Quick Take. :) (Not sure if youād disagree with any of what I write, but I found it helpful to clarify my position. Thanks for prompting this!)