It is honestly striking that caring about such a massive scale of suffering is often seen as ‘weird.’ As I began researching the topic, I was particularly surprised to discover that even within the EA community, this remains a largely overlooked area.
It at least doesn’t seem obvious to me that when insects are writhing around in agony, behaving like you or I would if we were in intense pain, they’re experiencing something on the level of a stubbed toe.
Actually, I also previously found myself leaning toward the idea that certain species might not have ‘invested’ in deep subjective experiences, primarily due to their shorter lifespans and r-selection reproductive strategies. Because of this, I also didn’t prioritize them as much (despite their staggering numbers) assuming their experiences lacked the depth of more biologically complex animals.
However, after more thought and research, I’ve realized that lifespan or reproductive speed isn’t a solid foundation for judging the intensity of an experience. A pivotal argument in the post Differences in the Intensity of Valenced Experience across Species resonates strongly here: “…subjective experiences that were so faint as to be almost imperceptible would appear to do a poor job motivating behavior.”
This perspective is far more compelling. If the stimulus is vital, the experience must be intense enough to drive action, regardless of how long that organism is expected to live. The intensity of pain is fundamentally linked to its ability to hijack an organism’s attention in life-threatening situations and the ‘decibel level’ of the signal must be sufficiently high to ensure survival. This makes me think that their ‘now’ can be as urgent and undeniable as our own in similar situations.
Furthermore, as you mentioned in the post, the mounting empirical evidence regarding states like behavioral despair or pessimistic decision-making after stress also suggests a profoundly valenced internal world.
This realization has significantly shifted how I view the urgency and priority of their welfare. Also, I feel a heightened sense of moral responsibility toward the species that face the most prejudice. When our empathy fails to reach a certain group due to bias, it becomes an even greater ethical duty to advocate for them and ensure their suffering is not ignored.
It is honestly striking that caring about such a massive scale of suffering is often seen as ‘weird.’ As I began researching the topic, I was particularly surprised to discover that even within the EA community, this remains a largely overlooked area.
Actually, I also previously found myself leaning toward the idea that certain species might not have ‘invested’ in deep subjective experiences, primarily due to their shorter lifespans and r-selection reproductive strategies. Because of this, I also didn’t prioritize them as much (despite their staggering numbers) assuming their experiences lacked the depth of more biologically complex animals.
However, after more thought and research, I’ve realized that lifespan or reproductive speed isn’t a solid foundation for judging the intensity of an experience. A pivotal argument in the post Differences in the Intensity of Valenced Experience across Species resonates strongly here: “…subjective experiences that were so faint as to be almost imperceptible would appear to do a poor job motivating behavior.”
This perspective is far more compelling. If the stimulus is vital, the experience must be intense enough to drive action, regardless of how long that organism is expected to live. The intensity of pain is fundamentally linked to its ability to hijack an organism’s attention in life-threatening situations and the ‘decibel level’ of the signal must be sufficiently high to ensure survival. This makes me think that their ‘now’ can be as urgent and undeniable as our own in similar situations.
Furthermore, as you mentioned in the post, the mounting empirical evidence regarding states like behavioral despair or pessimistic decision-making after stress also suggests a profoundly valenced internal world.
This realization has significantly shifted how I view the urgency and priority of their welfare. Also, I feel a heightened sense of moral responsibility toward the species that face the most prejudice. When our empathy fails to reach a certain group due to bias, it becomes an even greater ethical duty to advocate for them and ensure their suffering is not ignored.
You can also check out 48:38 for more on this: Quantifying animal suffering and the impact of welfare interventions | Cynthia Schuck| EAG Boston 23