This post is several orders of magnitude more pessimistic than the views of the Samotsvety forecasters (as of 3 October 2022):
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2nDTrDPZJBEerZGrk/samotsvety-nuclear-risk-update-october-2022
It’s also much more pessimistic than other serious commentators I’ve read (though I’m not following closely). See e.g. Trey Howard (also ~3rd October):
https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2022/10/trey-howard-arguing-nuclear-risk-is-low.html
Critical discussion of this post on LessWrong: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Dod9AWz8Rp4Svdpof#comments
It’s also much more pessimistic than are prediction markets – for instance, Metaculus puts the odds of a nuclear detonation in Ukraine by 2023 at 7%, and a Russian nuclear detonation in the US this year at ≤ 1%.
This post is several orders of magnitude more pessimistic than the views of the Samotsvety forecasters (as of 3 October 2022):
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2nDTrDPZJBEerZGrk/samotsvety-nuclear-risk-update-october-2022
It’s also much more pessimistic than other serious commentators I’ve read (though I’m not following closely). See e.g. Trey Howard (also ~3rd October):
https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2022/10/trey-howard-arguing-nuclear-risk-is-low.html
Critical discussion of this post on LessWrong: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Dod9AWz8Rp4Svdpof#comments
It’s also much more pessimistic than are prediction markets – for instance, Metaculus puts the odds of a nuclear detonation in Ukraine by 2023 at 7%, and a Russian nuclear detonation in the US this year at ≤ 1%.