I take moral uncertainty extremely seriously, but my most preferred theory is classical hedonic utilitarianism. My most prominent uncertainties are about non-utilitarian consequentialisms which would include non-experiential goods (not preference utilitarian) and downside focused views.
I’m almost entirely uncertain about prescriptive metaethics. As someone who’s pretty Wittgensteinian, I’m inclined to see much debate between metaethical theories as confused. The metaethical views which (fwiw) strike me as most appealing don’t have too much to differentiate them in practice, i.e. versions of softer realism or anti-realism which give a central role to what would actually be rationally endorseable by humans in certain conditions.
My descriptive metaethical views, however, are that folk metaethical discourse and judgement is almost entirely indeterminate with regards to philosophers’ metaethical theories. i.e. there is no determinate fact of the matter as to whether folk views best fit realism/anti-realism, objectivism/relativism etc., and that the folk evince a contextually and inter-personally variable mix of conflicting metaethical commitments or proto-commitments. (e.g. Gill, 2009, Don Loeb (2008) and their exchanges).
Although I think the view that there are no ethical obligations should be taken seriously, I certainly (inside view) view altruism as an obligation and I think if I were convinced of anti-realism and/or moral nihilism, I think I would likely continue to view it in a very obligation-like way.
I take moral uncertainty extremely seriously, but my most preferred theory is classical hedonic utilitarianism. My most prominent uncertainties are about non-utilitarian consequentialisms which would include non-experiential goods (not preference utilitarian) and downside focused views.
I’m almost entirely uncertain about prescriptive metaethics. As someone who’s pretty Wittgensteinian, I’m inclined to see much debate between metaethical theories as confused. The metaethical views which (fwiw) strike me as most appealing don’t have too much to differentiate them in practice, i.e. versions of softer realism or anti-realism which give a central role to what would actually be rationally endorseable by humans in certain conditions.
My descriptive metaethical views, however, are that folk metaethical discourse and judgement is almost entirely indeterminate with regards to philosophers’ metaethical theories. i.e. there is no determinate fact of the matter as to whether folk views best fit realism/anti-realism, objectivism/relativism etc., and that the folk evince a contextually and inter-personally variable mix of conflicting metaethical commitments or proto-commitments. (e.g. Gill, 2009, Don Loeb (2008) and their exchanges).
Although I think the view that there are no ethical obligations should be taken seriously, I certainly (inside view) view altruism as an obligation and I think if I were convinced of anti-realism and/or moral nihilism, I think I would likely continue to view it in a very obligation-like way.