Summary: I propose a view combining classic utilitarianism with a rule that says not to end streams of consciousness.
Under classic utilitarianism, the only thing that matters is hedonic experiences. People with a person affecting view object to this, but that view comes with issues of its own.
To solve the tension between these two philosophies, I propose a view that adds a rule to classical utilitarianism disallowing directly ending streams of consciousness (SOC)
This is a way to bridge the gap between the person-affecting view and âpersonal identity doesnât existâ view and tries to solve some population ethics issues.
I like the simplicity of classic utilitarianism. But I have a strong intuition that a stream of consciousness is valuable intrinsically, meaning that it shouldnât be stopped/âdestroyed. Creating a new stream of consciousness isnât intrinsically valuable (except for the utility it creates).
A SOC isnât infinitely valuable. Here are some exceptions: 1. When not ending a SOC would result in more SOCs ending (see trolley problem): basically you want to break the rule as little as possible 2. The SOC experiences negative utility and there are no signs it will become positive utility (see euthanasia) 3. Ending the SOC will create at least 10x its utility (or a different critical level)
I believe this is compatible with the non-identity problem (itâs still unclear whoâs you if youâre duplicated or if youâre 20 years older). But Iâve never felt comfortable with the teleportation argument, and this intuition explains why (as a SOC is being ended).
So generally this means: Making current population happier (or making sure few people die) > increasing amount of people
Future people donât have SOCs as they donât exist yet, but itâs still important to make their lives go well.
Say we live in a simulation. If our simulation gets turned off and gets replaced by a different one of equal value (pain/âpleasure wise), there still seems to be something of incredible value lost.
Still, if the simulation gets replaced by a sufficiently more valuable one it could still be good, hence exception number 3. The exception also makes sure you can kill someone to prevent future people never coming into existence (for example: someone is about to spread a virus that makes everyone incapable of reproducing).
I donât think adding this rule changes the EV calculations regarding increasing pain/âpleasure of present and future beings when it doesnât involve ending streams of consciousness (I could be wrong though).
This rule doesnât solve the repugnant conclusion, but I donât think itâs repugnant in the first place. I think my bar for a life worth living seems higher than those of other people.
How I came to this: I really liked this forum post arguing âMaking current population happier > increasing amount of peopleâ. But if I agree it means thereâs something of value besides pure pleasure/âpain. This is my attempt at finding what it is.
One possible major objection: If youâre giving birth youâre essentially causing a new SOC to be ended (as long as aging isnât solved). Perhaps this is solved by saying you canât directly end a stream of consciousness, but you can ignore second/âthird order effects (though Iâm not sure how to make sense of that).
Iâd love to hear your thoughts on these ideas. I donât think these thoughts are good enough or polished enough to deserve a full forum post. I wouldnât be surprised if the first comment under this shortform would completely shatter this idea.
An unpolished attempt at moral philosophy
Summary: I propose a view combining classic utilitarianism with a rule that says not to end streams of consciousness.
Under classic utilitarianism, the only thing that matters is hedonic experiences.
People with a person affecting view object to this, but that view comes with issues of its own.
To solve the tension between these two philosophies, I propose a view that adds a rule to classical utilitarianism disallowing directly ending streams of consciousness (SOC)
This is a way to bridge the gap between the person-affecting view and âpersonal identity doesnât existâ view and tries to solve some population ethics issues.
I like the simplicity of classic utilitarianism. But I have a strong intuition that a stream of consciousness is valuable intrinsically, meaning that it shouldnât be stopped/âdestroyed. Creating a new stream of consciousness isnât intrinsically valuable (except for the utility it creates).
A SOC isnât infinitely valuable. Here are some exceptions:
1. When not ending a SOC would result in more SOCs ending (see trolley problem): basically you want to break the rule as little as possible
2. The SOC experiences negative utility and there are no signs it will become positive utility (see euthanasia)
3. Ending the SOC will create at least 10x its utility (or a different critical level)
I believe this is compatible with the non-identity problem (itâs still unclear whoâs you if youâre duplicated or if youâre 20 years older).
But Iâve never felt comfortable with the teleportation argument, and this intuition explains why (as a SOC is being ended).
So generally this means: Making current population happier (or making sure few people die) > increasing amount of people
Future people donât have SOCs as they donât exist yet, but itâs still important to make their lives go well.
Say we live in a simulation. If our simulation gets turned off and gets replaced by a different one of equal value (pain/âpleasure wise), there still seems to be something of incredible value lost.
Still, if the simulation gets replaced by a sufficiently more valuable one it could still be good, hence exception number 3. The exception also makes sure you can kill someone to prevent future people never coming into existence (for example: someone is about to spread a virus that makes everyone incapable of reproducing).
I donât think adding this rule changes the EV calculations regarding increasing pain/âpleasure of present and future beings when it doesnât involve ending streams of consciousness (I could be wrong though).
This rule doesnât solve the repugnant conclusion, but I donât think itâs repugnant in the first place. I think my bar for a life worth living seems higher than those of other people.
How I came to this: I really liked this forum post arguing âMaking current population happier > increasing amount of peopleâ. But if I agree it means thereâs something of value besides pure pleasure/âpain. This is my attempt at finding what it is.
One possible major objection: If youâre giving birth youâre essentially causing a new SOC to be ended (as long as aging isnât solved). Perhaps this is solved by saying you canât directly end a stream of consciousness, but you can ignore second/âthird order effects (though Iâm not sure how to make sense of that).
Iâd love to hear your thoughts on these ideas. I donât think these thoughts are good enough or polished enough to deserve a full forum post. I wouldnât be surprised if the first comment under this shortform would completely shatter this idea.
Reason why I call it a âstream of consciousnessâ: Streams change over time. Conscious beings do too. They can also split, multiply or grow bigger.
One thing I worry about though: Does your consciousness end when sleeping? Does it end when under anesthesia? These thoughts frighten me.