I reject axiological hedonism. I donāt think anything has intrinsic value or intrinsic disvalue. On my preferred view, all value is projected subjectively onto the world, and pleasure is just one way, among multiple, to find something āgoodā. Conscious approval is another way to find something good, for example. Things are only (dis)valuable if they are (dis)valued. I describe this view in this piece, and some more implications here.
The disvalue of suffering is self-evident from introspection, i.e. from observing how suffering feels.
Could you elaborate? FWIW, I donāt really think anything is self-evident, maybe other than direct logical deductions and applications of definitions.
The disvalue is inherent in the experience; it is not a matter of an evaluation done by me, or a desire for the suffering to stop felt by me (even though there is a strong correlation), or me having a certain attitude towards suffering.
I would say suffering actually is an evaluation done by you (disliking) and a desire (wanting). The evaluations and desires inherent to suffering are kind of hardwired in, not reason-based. They are not the kind where you decide by reasoning that something is bad and to be avoided. They are forced onto you. These are empirical claims for which I think there is some evidence from cognitive neuroscience. I discuss this more in this piece and this piece.
When you perceive a color, is it not self-evident that the color ālooksā a certain way? There is no one doing the looking; it just looks. Color and disvalue are properties of conscious experience, and they are real parts of the world. I would say our subjective experience is in fact the ārealestā part of the world because there can be no doubt about its existence, whereas we cannot ever be sure what is really āout thereā that we are interpreting.
If no property of (dis)value existed and couldnāt ever exist, then I think it would make no difference at all which outcome is brought about. I could just go chop my arm off and it wouldnāt matter. The fact that I wouldnāt want to do this would be irrelevant, because the wanting wouldnāt by itself translate into any value. āIā am just a flow or sequence of experiences, and wanting is just a kind of experience with no intrinsic value.
The motivational salience you speak of in one of your posts may be a necessary condition for suffering (in humans), but the disvalue is exclusively in the distinct way the experience feels.
When you perceive a color, is it not self-evident that the color ālooksā a certain way? There is no one doing the looking; it just looks. Color and disvalue are properties of conscious experience, and they are real parts of the world. I would say our subjective experience is in fact the ārealestā part of the world because there can be no doubt about its existence, whereas we cannot ever be sure what is really āout thereā that we are interpreting.
Iām sympathetic to illusionism about phenomenal properties (illusionism about phenomenal consciousness), i.e. I donāt believe consciousness is phenomenal, ineffable, intrinsic, qualitative, etc.. People often mean phenomenal properties or qualia when they talk about things just looking a certain way. This might cut against your claims here.
However, I suspect there are ways to interpret your statements that are compatible with illusionism. Maybe something like your brain is undergoing specific patterns of reactions and discriminations to inputs, and these are distinctive for distinctive colours. What it means to ālookā or āfeelā a certain way is to just undergo particular patterns of reactions. And itās wired in or cognitively impenetrable: you donāt have direct introspective access to the processes responsible for these patterns of reactions, only their effects on you.
Furthermore, everything we respond to and are aware of is filtered through these processes, so āwe cannot ever be sure what is really āout thereā that we are interpretingā.
there can be no doubt about its existence
Iām not sure about this. Iād probably want to see a deductive argument for this.
If no property of (dis)value existed and couldnāt ever exist, then I think it would make no difference at all which outcome is brought about.
Iām not saying values donāt exist, I just think they are projected, rather than intrinsic. It can still matter to whateverās doing the projection.
The motivational salience you speak of in one of your posts may be a necessary condition for suffering (in humans), but the disvalue is exclusively in the distinct way the experience feels.
This seems to me to be separating the apparent disvalue from one of the crucial mechanisms responsible for (a large share of) the apparent disvalue. Motivational salience is what gives suffering its apparent urgency, and (I think) a big part of what makes suffering feel the way it does. If you got rid of its motivational salience, it would feel very different.
I donāt think I properly understand your position. You are not sure that you are currently having an experience? Because if you are having an experience, then the experience necessarily exists, otherwise you canāt be having it.
Iād add that to the extent conscious experience can be considered āself evidentā only oneās own experience of pain and pleasure can be āself evidentā via conscious experience.
If Nunikās contention is that only things which achieve that experiential level of validation can be assigned intrinsic value with intuitions carrying zero evidential weight, it seems we would have to disregard our intuitions that other people or creatures might have similar experiences, and attach zero value to their possible pain/āpleasure.
I mean, hedonic egoism is a philosophical position, but perhaps not a well-regarded one on a forum for people trying to be altruistic...
What I meant is that the disvalue of suffering becomes evident at the moment of experiencing it. Once you know what disvalue is, the next step is figuring out who can experience this disvalue. Given that you and I e.g. have a very similar nervous system, and that we behave similarly in response to noxious stimuli, my subjective probability that you are capable of suffering will be much higher than the probability that a rock can suffer.
I reject axiological hedonism. I donāt think anything has intrinsic value or intrinsic disvalue. On my preferred view, all value is projected subjectively onto the world, and pleasure is just one way, among multiple, to find something āgoodā. Conscious approval is another way to find something good, for example. Things are only (dis)valuable if they are (dis)valued. I describe this view in this piece, and some more implications here.
Could you elaborate? FWIW, I donāt really think anything is self-evident, maybe other than direct logical deductions and applications of definitions.
I would say suffering actually is an evaluation done by you (disliking) and a desire (wanting). The evaluations and desires inherent to suffering are kind of hardwired in, not reason-based. They are not the kind where you decide by reasoning that something is bad and to be avoided. They are forced onto you. These are empirical claims for which I think there is some evidence from cognitive neuroscience. I discuss this more in this piece and this piece.
When you perceive a color, is it not self-evident that the color ālooksā a certain way? There is no one doing the looking; it just looks. Color and disvalue are properties of conscious experience, and they are real parts of the world. I would say our subjective experience is in fact the ārealestā part of the world because there can be no doubt about its existence, whereas we cannot ever be sure what is really āout thereā that we are interpreting.
If no property of (dis)value existed and couldnāt ever exist, then I think it would make no difference at all which outcome is brought about. I could just go chop my arm off and it wouldnāt matter. The fact that I wouldnāt want to do this would be irrelevant, because the wanting wouldnāt by itself translate into any value. āIā am just a flow or sequence of experiences, and wanting is just a kind of experience with no intrinsic value.
The motivational salience you speak of in one of your posts may be a necessary condition for suffering (in humans), but the disvalue is exclusively in the distinct way the experience feels.
Iām sympathetic to illusionism about phenomenal properties (illusionism about phenomenal consciousness), i.e. I donāt believe consciousness is phenomenal, ineffable, intrinsic, qualitative, etc.. People often mean phenomenal properties or qualia when they talk about things just looking a certain way. This might cut against your claims here.
However, I suspect there are ways to interpret your statements that are compatible with illusionism. Maybe something like your brain is undergoing specific patterns of reactions and discriminations to inputs, and these are distinctive for distinctive colours. What it means to ālookā or āfeelā a certain way is to just undergo particular patterns of reactions. And itās wired in or cognitively impenetrable: you donāt have direct introspective access to the processes responsible for these patterns of reactions, only their effects on you.
Furthermore, everything we respond to and are aware of is filtered through these processes, so āwe cannot ever be sure what is really āout thereā that we are interpretingā.
Iām not sure about this. Iād probably want to see a deductive argument for this.
Iām not saying values donāt exist, I just think they are projected, rather than intrinsic. It can still matter to whateverās doing the projection.
This seems to me to be separating the apparent disvalue from one of the crucial mechanisms responsible for (a large share of) the apparent disvalue. Motivational salience is what gives suffering its apparent urgency, and (I think) a big part of what makes suffering feel the way it does. If you got rid of its motivational salience, it would feel very different.
I donāt think I properly understand your position. You are not sure that you are currently having an experience? Because if you are having an experience, then the experience necessarily exists, otherwise you canāt be having it.
Iād add that to the extent conscious experience can be considered āself evidentā only oneās own experience of pain and pleasure can be āself evidentā via conscious experience.
If Nunikās contention is that only things which achieve that experiential level of validation can be assigned intrinsic value with intuitions carrying zero evidential weight, it seems we would have to disregard our intuitions that other people or creatures might have similar experiences, and attach zero value to their possible pain/āpleasure.
I mean, hedonic egoism is a philosophical position, but perhaps not a well-regarded one on a forum for people trying to be altruistic...
What I meant is that the disvalue of suffering becomes evident at the moment of experiencing it. Once you know what disvalue is, the next step is figuring out who can experience this disvalue. Given that you and I e.g. have a very similar nervous system, and that we behave similarly in response to noxious stimuli, my subjective probability that you are capable of suffering will be much higher than the probability that a rock can suffer.