Similar to Ollie and Larks, I’m slightly uncomfortable with
“(i) Those who live at future times matter just as much, morally, as those who live today;”
I’m pretty longtermist (I work on existential risk) but I’m not sure whether I think that those who live at future times matter “just as much, morally”. I have some sympathy with the view that people nearer to us in space or time can matter more morally than those very distant—seperately from the question of how much we can do to effect those people.
I also don’t think its necessary for the definition. A less strong definition would work as well. Something like:
“(i) Those who live at future times matter morally”.
Similar to Ollie and Larks, I’m slightly uncomfortable with
“(i) Those who live at future times matter just as much, morally, as those who live today;”
I’m pretty longtermist (I work on existential risk) but I’m not sure whether I think that those who live at future times matter “just as much, morally”. I have some sympathy with the view that people nearer to us in space or time can matter more morally than those very distant—seperately from the question of how much we can do to effect those people.
I also don’t think its necessary for the definition. A less strong definition would work as well. Something like:
“(i) Those who live at future times matter morally”.