Whether creating a person with a positive quality of life is bestowing a benefit on them (which is controversial)
Whether affecting the welfare of someone in the future matters morally (not really controversial)
The minimal definition should probably include something like 2, but not 1. I think the current definition leaves it somewhat ambiguous, although I’m inclined to interpret it as my 2). I’d be surprised if you think 2 is controversial.
It is not that easy to distinguish between these two theories! Consider three worlds:
Sam exists with welfare 20
Sam does not exist
Sam exists with welfare 30
If you don’t value creating positive people, you end up being indifferent between the first and second worlds, and between the second and third worlds… But then by 2), you want to prefer the third to the first, suggesting a violation of transitivity.
The (normal) person-affecting response here is to say that options 1 and 3 and incomparable in value to 2 - existence is neither better than, worse than, or equally good as, non-existence for someone. However, if Sam exists necessarily, then 2 isn’t a option, so then we say 3 is better than 1. Hence, no issues with transitivity.
Well that doesn’t show it’s hard to distinguish between the views, it just shows a major problem for person-affecting views that want to hold 2) but not 1).
Well, we should probably distinguish between:
Whether creating a person with a positive quality of life is bestowing a benefit on them (which is controversial)
Whether affecting the welfare of someone in the future matters morally (not really controversial)
The minimal definition should probably include something like 2, but not 1. I think the current definition leaves it somewhat ambiguous, although I’m inclined to interpret it as my 2). I’d be surprised if you think 2 is controversial.
It is not that easy to distinguish between these two theories! Consider three worlds:
Sam exists with welfare 20
Sam does not exist
Sam exists with welfare 30
If you don’t value creating positive people, you end up being indifferent between the first and second worlds, and between the second and third worlds… But then by 2), you want to prefer the third to the first, suggesting a violation of transitivity.
The (normal) person-affecting response here is to say that options 1 and 3 and incomparable in value to 2 - existence is neither better than, worse than, or equally good as, non-existence for someone. However, if Sam exists necessarily, then 2 isn’t a option, so then we say 3 is better than 1. Hence, no issues with transitivity.
Well that doesn’t show it’s hard to distinguish between the views, it just shows a major problem for person-affecting views that want to hold 2) but not 1).
You mean, shows a major finding, no? :)