My thoughts are pretty similar to those already expressed by ryancbriggs and MichaelStJules, and some others.
What does it mean to accept Pascal’s Wager?
I understand Pascal’s Wager to argue that it’s more rational to believe in God than not because you end up in Heaven if you believe in God and not if you don’t, and heaven is infinitely more valuable than any alternative. So even if your rational credence in God existing is very very low, it’s still more rational to believe in God than otherwise.
I take the correct core of the argument to be that sometimes it can be prudential to believe in something you think is likely false (such as the existence of God and Heaven), or pursue some outcome you think is very unlikely (getting into heaven), because the value of the reward is high enough.
The general form of this argument is generally accepted and acted upon. People do similar sorts of things all the time when they pursue success in competitive or challenging environments with high rewards to the biggest winners, like high level professional sports, startups, tenure track academia, etc etc.
I’m don’t know if Pascal’s Wager has any implications beyond this?
In real life, there is no binary choice between ‘Believe in God and have a chance of getting into heaven’ and ‘Don’t believe in God and have no chance of getting into heaven’. There are several different major world religions, some very different sects inside the same religions, your own individual interpretation, the possibility of infinite utility from technological sources, etc. And this is without getting into how one actually achieves going to heaven in religions—sometimes it’s not ‘belief in our god and you’ll get into heaven’, but rather something involving structuring your life around the religion. And of course, many of these directly or indirectly oppose each other even apart from the opportunity cost.
Perhaps Pascal’s Wager could be an argument to set one’s life up to deliberately pursue even one source of infinite utility rather than none. I don’t think this is the worst argument in the world and it could work as part of a cluster of arguments, but it’s a pretty weak one in a vacuum since it’s completely silent about crucial matters such as how to choose between any of these possible infinite utilities or how to pursue them.
sometimes it can be prudential to believe in something you think is likely false
But if it were belief that mattered I’m not sure how I could achieve this. If I “think it is likely false” in what sense do I, or can I, “believe it”?
Maybe I could take a drug and hypnotise myself or something, but then someone might reasonably argue “that’s not real belief, it’s cheating, so it doesn’t count”
I agree that there are difficulties here. However I do think there is a degree of flexibility in choosing beliefs, at both the conscious and subconscious levels, and people often end up believing things that are helpful to believe in some way even if not necessarily completely true. Intentionally trying to believe something you think is likely false and you have no other reason to believe in is probably going to be very hard, but you may easily end up believing weak arguments if other incentives line up in favor of the belief.
I clarified in my edit at the top of my post what I mean by “accept Pascal’s Wager”. To repeat I see it as accepting the idea that way to do the most (expected) good is to prevent as many people as possible from going to hell, and cause as many as possible to go to heaven, regardless of how likely it is that heaven/hell exists (as long as it’s non-zero).
As for what this entails I have no idea. For now I’m just trying to decide whether to pursue this aim or not. The way I would actually do that comes later, if I choose to accept.
My thoughts are pretty similar to those already expressed by ryancbriggs and MichaelStJules, and some others.
What does it mean to accept Pascal’s Wager?
I understand Pascal’s Wager to argue that it’s more rational to believe in God than not because you end up in Heaven if you believe in God and not if you don’t, and heaven is infinitely more valuable than any alternative. So even if your rational credence in God existing is very very low, it’s still more rational to believe in God than otherwise.
I take the correct core of the argument to be that sometimes it can be prudential to believe in something you think is likely false (such as the existence of God and Heaven), or pursue some outcome you think is very unlikely (getting into heaven), because the value of the reward is high enough.
The general form of this argument is generally accepted and acted upon. People do similar sorts of things all the time when they pursue success in competitive or challenging environments with high rewards to the biggest winners, like high level professional sports, startups, tenure track academia, etc etc.
I’m don’t know if Pascal’s Wager has any implications beyond this?
In real life, there is no binary choice between ‘Believe in God and have a chance of getting into heaven’ and ‘Don’t believe in God and have no chance of getting into heaven’. There are several different major world religions, some very different sects inside the same religions, your own individual interpretation, the possibility of infinite utility from technological sources, etc. And this is without getting into how one actually achieves going to heaven in religions—sometimes it’s not ‘belief in our god and you’ll get into heaven’, but rather something involving structuring your life around the religion. And of course, many of these directly or indirectly oppose each other even apart from the opportunity cost.
Perhaps Pascal’s Wager could be an argument to set one’s life up to deliberately pursue even one source of infinite utility rather than none. I don’t think this is the worst argument in the world and it could work as part of a cluster of arguments, but it’s a pretty weak one in a vacuum since it’s completely silent about crucial matters such as how to choose between any of these possible infinite utilities or how to pursue them.
But if it were belief that mattered I’m not sure how I could achieve this. If I “think it is likely false” in what sense do I, or can I, “believe it”?
Maybe I could take a drug and hypnotise myself or something, but then someone might reasonably argue “that’s not real belief, it’s cheating, so it doesn’t count”
I agree that there are difficulties here. However I do think there is a degree of flexibility in choosing beliefs, at both the conscious and subconscious levels, and people often end up believing things that are helpful to believe in some way even if not necessarily completely true. Intentionally trying to believe something you think is likely false and you have no other reason to believe in is probably going to be very hard, but you may easily end up believing weak arguments if other incentives line up in favor of the belief.
I clarified in my edit at the top of my post what I mean by “accept Pascal’s Wager”. To repeat I see it as accepting the idea that way to do the most (expected) good is to prevent as many people as possible from going to hell, and cause as many as possible to go to heaven, regardless of how likely it is that heaven/hell exists (as long as it’s non-zero).
As for what this entails I have no idea. For now I’m just trying to decide whether to pursue this aim or not. The way I would actually do that comes later, if I choose to accept.