Some people have suggested that one way to have a major, long-term influence on the world is for an intellectual movement to develop a body of ideas and have adherents to those ideas in respected positions (e.g., university professorships, high-level civil service or political staffer roles), with these ideas likely lying dormant for a while, but then potentially being taken up when there are major societal disruptions of some sort. Iāve heard these described as making sure there are good ideas ālying aroundā when an unexpected crisis occurs.
As an example, Kerry Vaughan describes how stagflation āhelped to set the stage for alternatives to Keynesian theories to take center stage.ā He also quotes Milton Freedman as saying: āthe role of thinkers, I believe, is primarily to keep options open, to have available alternatives, so when the brute force of events make a change inevitable, there is an alternative available to change it.ā
What evidence did COVID-19, reactions to it, and reactions that seem likely to occur in future, provide for or against these ideas? For example:
Was there a major appetite in governments for lasting changes that EA-aligned (or just very sensible and forward-thinking) civil servants were able to seize upon?
Were orgs like FHI, CSER, and GCRI, or other aligned academics, called upon by governments, media, etc., in a way that (a) seemed to depend on them having spent years developing rigorous versions of ideas about GCRs, x-risks, etc., and (b) seems likely to shift narratives, decisions, etc. in a lasting way?
And to more precisely inform future decisions, itād be good to get some sense of:
How likely is it that similar benefits couldāve been seized by people āswitching intoā those pathways, roles, etc. during the crisis, without having built up the credibility, connections, research, etc. in advance?
If anyone did manage to influence substantial changes that seem likely to last, what precise factors, approaches, etc. seemed to help them do so?
Were there apparent instances where someone was almost able to influence such a change? If so, what seemed to block them? How could we position ourselves in future to avoid such blockages?
If you are in this group whose talents and expertise are outside of these narrow areas, and want to contribute to AI strategy, I recommend you build up your capacity and try to put yourself in an influential position. This will set you up well to guide high-value policy interventions as clearer policy directions emerge. [...]
Depending on how slow these āentangledā research questions are to unjam, and on the timelines of AI development, there might be a very narrow window of time in which it will be necessary to have a massive, sophisticated mobilization of altruistic talent. This makes being prepared to mobilize effectively and take impactful action on short notice extremely valuable in expectation. (emphasis in original)
Some people have suggested that one way to have a major, long-term influence on the world is for an intellectual movement to develop a body of ideas and have adherents to those ideas in respected positions (e.g., university professorships, high-level civil service or political staffer roles), with these ideas likely lying dormant for a while, but then potentially being taken up when there are major societal disruptions of some sort. Iāve heard these described as making sure there are good ideas ālying aroundā when an unexpected crisis occurs.
As an example, Kerry Vaughan describes how stagflation āhelped to set the stage for alternatives to Keynesian theories to take center stage.ā He also quotes Milton Freedman as saying: āthe role of thinkers, I believe, is primarily to keep options open, to have available alternatives, so when the brute force of events make a change inevitable, there is an alternative available to change it.ā
What evidence did COVID-19, reactions to it, and reactions that seem likely to occur in future, provide for or against these ideas? For example:
Was there a major appetite in governments for lasting changes that EA-aligned (or just very sensible and forward-thinking) civil servants were able to seize upon?
Were orgs like FHI, CSER, and GCRI, or other aligned academics, called upon by governments, media, etc., in a way that (a) seemed to depend on them having spent years developing rigorous versions of ideas about GCRs, x-risks, etc., and (b) seems likely to shift narratives, decisions, etc. in a lasting way?
And to more precisely inform future decisions, itād be good to get some sense of:
How likely is it that similar benefits couldāve been seized by people āswitching intoā those pathways, roles, etc. during the crisis, without having built up the credibility, connections, research, etc. in advance?
If anyone did manage to influence substantial changes that seem likely to last, what precise factors, approaches, etc. seemed to help them do so?
Were there apparent instances where someone was almost able to influence such a change? If so, what seemed to block them? How could we position ourselves in future to avoid such blockages?
Hereās another example of a prior statement of something like the idea Iām proposing should be investigated. This is from Carrick Flynn talking about AI policy and strategy careers:
And Richard Ngo discusses similar ideas, again in relation to AI policy.