I think what you are saying is something like: if Iâm certain that itâs the number of neurons which matter morally, but Iâm just uncertain how many neurons this organism has, then a 2 envelope problem doesnât apply.
But why canât I leverage that trick to avoid the 2 envelope problem in general? Iâm confident that utilons are what matter morally, but Iâm uncertain how many utilons an insect has.
The problem to me doesnât seem to be âfactualâ versus âmoralâ, but rather if there are some nonarbitrary units.
I think what you are saying is something like: if Iâm certain that itâs the number of neurons which matter morally, but Iâm just uncertain how many neurons this organism has, then a 2 envelope problem doesnât apply.
Yeah, thatâs a cartoon version of what I was saying.
Iâm confident that utilons are what matter morally, but Iâm uncertain how many utilons an insect has.
The problem is that âNo, Virginia, there really is no such thing as a utilon in any non-arbitrary sense. Happiness and suffering are not actually cardinal numbers that live in the physics of the universe that we can measure. Rather, we use numbers to express how much we care about an experience.â
If moral realism were true and the moral truth were utilitarianism, then I suppose there would be a âright answerâ for how many utilons a given system possessed (up to positive affine transformation). But I donât take moral realism seriously. In the moral-realism case, the two-envelopes problem for moral uncertainty would be analogous to the ordinary two-envelopes problem, where itâs also the case that thereâs a right answer. For moral non-realists, the two-envelopes problem is just a way to describe the paradox that calculations over moral uncertainty depend on oneâs unit of measurement.
Okay, I think I understand now, thanks for the explanation.
For what itâs worth, the âfactualâ versus âmoralâ contrast you are drawing seems to me to be a distinction without a difference. Both the moral realist and the moral non-realist are looking for ânonarbitraryâ units of measurement, and an argument that a certain unit was nonarbitrary seems like it would probably be persuasive to both the realist and the non-realist.
Well, the moral realist just assumes there exist non-arbitrary units by faith, since moral realism implies non-arbitrariness. The non-realist believes no such thing. :)
Iâm a little unclear about what this means.
I think what you are saying is something like: if Iâm certain that itâs the number of neurons which matter morally, but Iâm just uncertain how many neurons this organism has, then a 2 envelope problem doesnât apply.
But why canât I leverage that trick to avoid the 2 envelope problem in general? Iâm confident that utilons are what matter morally, but Iâm uncertain how many utilons an insect has.
The problem to me doesnât seem to be âfactualâ versus âmoralâ, but rather if there are some nonarbitrary units.
Yeah, thatâs a cartoon version of what I was saying.
The problem is that âNo, Virginia, there really is no such thing as a utilon in any non-arbitrary sense. Happiness and suffering are not actually cardinal numbers that live in the physics of the universe that we can measure. Rather, we use numbers to express how much we care about an experience.â
If moral realism were true and the moral truth were utilitarianism, then I suppose there would be a âright answerâ for how many utilons a given system possessed (up to positive affine transformation). But I donât take moral realism seriously. In the moral-realism case, the two-envelopes problem for moral uncertainty would be analogous to the ordinary two-envelopes problem, where itâs also the case that thereâs a right answer. For moral non-realists, the two-envelopes problem is just a way to describe the paradox that calculations over moral uncertainty depend on oneâs unit of measurement.
Okay, I think I understand now, thanks for the explanation.
For what itâs worth, the âfactualâ versus âmoralâ contrast you are drawing seems to me to be a distinction without a difference. Both the moral realist and the moral non-realist are looking for ânonarbitraryâ units of measurement, and an argument that a certain unit was nonarbitrary seems like it would probably be persuasive to both the realist and the non-realist.
Well, the moral realist just assumes there exist non-arbitrary units by faith, since moral realism implies non-arbitrariness. The non-realist believes no such thing. :)