I think your estimate for how an invasion of Taiwan affects catastrophic/existential risks fails to account for the most important effects, in particular, how an invasion would affect the chip supply. AI risk seems to me like the dominant source of catastrophic/existential risk (at least over the relevant period) and large changes in the chip supply from a Taiwan invasion would substantially change the situation.
I also think it’s complex whether a more aggressive and adversarial stance from the US on AI would actually be helpful rather than counterproductive (as you suggest in the post). And whether an invasion of Taiwan actually makes a deal related to AI more likely (via a number of factors) rather than less.
This isn’t to make any specific claim about what the right estimate is, I’m just claiming that your estimate doesn’t seem to me to cover the key factors.
I would love to hear someone make a more detailed argument about how this would affect things.
Naively, invasion --> Taiwan fabs destroyed --> timelines pushed back a couple of years.
Longer timelines typically considered good because it means more time to do safety work.
But my gut says that when the supply chain is rebuilt this would mean China has a relatively larger share of high end chips (but very, very unclear) --> race dynamic is tighter --> world more dangerous.
Strong upvoted but I figured I should comment as well. I agree with Ryan that the effect on chip supply and AI timelines is one of the most important dynamics, perhaps the most important. It’s a bit unclear which direction it points, but I think it probably swamps everything else in its magnitude, and I was sad to see that this post doesn’t discuss it.
I think your estimate for how an invasion of Taiwan affects catastrophic/existential risks fails to account for the most important effects, in particular, how an invasion would affect the chip supply. AI risk seems to me like the dominant source of catastrophic/existential risk (at least over the relevant period) and large changes in the chip supply from a Taiwan invasion would substantially change the situation.
I also think it’s complex whether a more aggressive and adversarial stance from the US on AI would actually be helpful rather than counterproductive (as you suggest in the post). And whether an invasion of Taiwan actually makes a deal related to AI more likely (via a number of factors) rather than less.
This isn’t to make any specific claim about what the right estimate is, I’m just claiming that your estimate doesn’t seem to me to cover the key factors.
I would love to hear someone make a more detailed argument about how this would affect things.
Naively, invasion --> Taiwan fabs destroyed --> timelines pushed back a couple of years.
Longer timelines typically considered good because it means more time to do safety work.
But my gut says that when the supply chain is rebuilt this would mean China has a relatively larger share of high end chips (but very, very unclear) --> race dynamic is tighter --> world more dangerous.
Net effect --> ???
Strong upvoted but I figured I should comment as well. I agree with Ryan that the effect on chip supply and AI timelines is one of the most important dynamics, perhaps the most important. It’s a bit unclear which direction it points, but I think it probably swamps everything else in its magnitude, and I was sad to see that this post doesn’t discuss it.