How are you thinking about trade as a deterrent? The typical defence here brings up TSMC—but IMHO should also bring up Foxconn, a gigantic employer in China—and that if the Chinese consumer economy collapses, this could cause enough headaches to make an attack unreasonable.
In this case, the two main courses of action would look like:
Use policy and lobbying within the US to reduce tariffs and chip controls (neglected on the margins, ex. chip controls, but probably not broadly)
Find other means of increasing consumer spending on foreign goods within China (seems not neglected as corporations have a direct incentive to pursue it)
I think that Xi has shown himself less sensitive to economic pressure than previous premiers or the leaders of more liberal countries (see zero Covid). I’m concerned that he sees himself in some manner similar to Putin—in that they both have historical missions to fulfill. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in Xi’s case. A lot of his action’s and PRC industrial policy (squeezing certain seemingly decadent sectors like gaming and propping up manufacturing) is probably bad for growth in the long run. But they are consistent with a China that bases its economy on something more material and connected to power (and the ability to win a protracted war).
This is all to say, I don’t see trade as a major detterent even if it was a possible threat. But I think when it comes to trade, I’m concerned that stable authoritarian regimes just have more leverage due to their willingness to replace consumption with patriotism in a way that seems to have no equivalent in modern democracies.
There’s still potentially something here, I just haven’t given it too must time or thought. One of the many good questions I wish we had better answers to.
How are you thinking about trade as a deterrent? The typical defence here brings up TSMC—but IMHO should also bring up Foxconn, a gigantic employer in China—and that if the Chinese consumer economy collapses, this could cause enough headaches to make an attack unreasonable.
In this case, the two main courses of action would look like:
Use policy and lobbying within the US to reduce tariffs and chip controls (neglected on the margins, ex. chip controls, but probably not broadly)
Find other means of increasing consumer spending on foreign goods within China (seems not neglected as corporations have a direct incentive to pursue it)
Howdy Huw,
I think that Xi has shown himself less sensitive to economic pressure than previous premiers or the leaders of more liberal countries (see zero Covid). I’m concerned that he sees himself in some manner similar to Putin—in that they both have historical missions to fulfill. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in Xi’s case. A lot of his action’s and PRC industrial policy (squeezing certain seemingly decadent sectors like gaming and propping up manufacturing) is probably bad for growth in the long run. But they are consistent with a China that bases its economy on something more material and connected to power (and the ability to win a protracted war).
This is all to say, I don’t see trade as a major detterent even if it was a possible threat. But I think when it comes to trade, I’m concerned that stable authoritarian regimes just have more leverage due to their willingness to replace consumption with patriotism in a way that seems to have no equivalent in modern democracies.
There’s still potentially something here, I just haven’t given it too must time or thought. One of the many good questions I wish we had better answers to.