There are some assumptions that go into what counts as âliquidâ, and what valuation your assets have, that may be relevant here. One big thing that I think happened is that FTX /â Alameda were holding a lot of FTT (and other similar assets), whose value was sharply correlated with perceived health of FTX, meaning that while assets may have appeared to exceed liabilities, in the event of an actual bank run, some large fraction of the assets just evaporate and youâre very predictably underwater. So just looking at naive dollar valuations isnât sufficient here.
(Not confident how big of an issue this is or how much your numbers already took it into account)
I could have been clearer about what is being counted as what, but such FTX-related assets are all counted as illiquid in this categorisation /â hypothetical. I agree that assets appearing to exceed liabilities in itself doesnât necessarily mean much, was covered in OP in the first section.
Mostly looking at $200m âUSD in ledger primeâ, $500m âlocked USDTâ, and $500m of HOOD shares.
The $5bn returned to customers during the bank run
Since this was successfully returned, itâs almost liquid-by-definition.
I would assume this was overwhelmingly USD /â stablecoins /â BTC /â ETH, since those collectively made up almost all of the final liabilities (SBF balance sheet over on top left)
The $???bn returned to the lenders in June 2022
I speculated $10bn in prior comment, but again this is very much just a guess.
Anyway, itâs hard to put much weight on any of this because so much is uncertain, including the accuracy of that balance sheet.
There are some assumptions that go into what counts as âliquidâ, and what valuation your assets have, that may be relevant here. One big thing that I think happened is that FTX /â Alameda were holding a lot of FTT (and other similar assets), whose value was sharply correlated with perceived health of FTX, meaning that while assets may have appeared to exceed liabilities, in the event of an actual bank run, some large fraction of the assets just evaporate and youâre very predictably underwater. So just looking at naive dollar valuations isnât sufficient here.
(Not confident how big of an issue this is or how much your numbers already took it into account)
I could have been clearer about what is being counted as what, but such FTX-related assets are all counted as illiquid in this categorisation /â hypothetical. I agree that assets appearing to exceed liabilities in itself doesnât necessarily mean much, was covered in OP in the first section.
All Iâm counting as liquid here is:
Roughly $1bn of the final SBF balance sheet
Mostly looking at $200m âUSD in ledger primeâ, $500m âlocked USDTâ, and $500m of HOOD shares.
The $5bn returned to customers during the bank run
Since this was successfully returned, itâs almost liquid-by-definition.
I would assume this was overwhelmingly USD /â stablecoins /â BTC /â ETH, since those collectively made up almost all of the final liabilities (SBF balance sheet over on top left)
The $???bn returned to the lenders in June 2022
I speculated $10bn in prior comment, but again this is very much just a guess.
Anyway, itâs hard to put much weight on any of this because so much is uncertain, including the accuracy of that balance sheet.