âYou can have bits of your visual field, for instance, that youâre not introspectively aware of but are part of your consciousnessâ Maybe, but in the current context this is basically begging the question, whereas Iâve at least sketched an argument (albeit one you can probably resist without catastrophic cost).
EDIT: Strictly speaking, I donât think people with the Dennettian view have to or should deny that there is phenomenally conscious content that isnât in fact introspectively accessed. What they do/âshould deny is that there is p-conscious content that you couldnât access even if you tried.
âYou can have bits of your visual field, for instance, that youâre not introspectively aware of but are part of your consciousnessâ Maybe, but in the current context this is basically begging the question, whereas Iâve at least sketched an argument (albeit one you can probably resist without catastrophic cost).
EDIT: Strictly speaking, I donât think people with the Dennettian view have to or should deny that there is phenomenally conscious content that isnât in fact introspectively accessed. What they do/âshould deny is that there is p-conscious content that you couldnât access even if you tried.