I think there’s a difference between access and phenomenal consciousness. You can have bits of your visual field, for instance, that you’re not introspectively aware of but are part of your consciousness. You also can have access consciousness that you can’t talk about (e.g. if you can’t speak). Not sure why we’d deny that animals have access consciousness.
“You can have bits of your visual field, for instance, that you’re not introspectively aware of but are part of your consciousness” Maybe, but in the current context this is basically begging the question, whereas I’ve at least sketched an argument (albeit one you can probably resist without catastrophic cost).
EDIT: Strictly speaking, I don’t think people with the Dennettian view have to or should deny that there is phenomenally conscious content that isn’t in fact introspectively accessed. What they do/should deny is that there is p-conscious content that you couldn’t access even if you tried.
I think there’s a difference between access and phenomenal consciousness. You can have bits of your visual field, for instance, that you’re not introspectively aware of but are part of your consciousness. You also can have access consciousness that you can’t talk about (e.g. if you can’t speak). Not sure why we’d deny that animals have access consciousness.
“You can have bits of your visual field, for instance, that you’re not introspectively aware of but are part of your consciousness” Maybe, but in the current context this is basically begging the question, whereas I’ve at least sketched an argument (albeit one you can probably resist without catastrophic cost).
EDIT: Strictly speaking, I don’t think people with the Dennettian view have to or should deny that there is phenomenally conscious content that isn’t in fact introspectively accessed. What they do/should deny is that there is p-conscious content that you couldn’t access even if you tried.