It looks like the Cambridge Declaration is saying something like âwe have no scientific reason to suspect that nonhuman animals are less conscious than humansâ, rather than âanimals are consciousâ.
This is the full declaration:
The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.[149]
You seem to be saying that the arguments given here donât make scientific sense. Is this because you think that current neuroscientific approaches to sentience are too far away from (something like) the hard question of consciousness, or is it something more concrete (like Lukeâs remark about the neocortexâs potential role in consciousness)?
It looks like the Cambridge Declaration is saying something like âwe have no scientific reason to suspect that nonhuman animals are less conscious than humansâ, rather than âanimals are consciousâ.
Yes, there is indeed a big mismatch between what the Cambridge declaration states and how it has been cited since! But it really is very hard to summarize what the declaration is stating. If your summary is correct, then I think it would be easy to argue that the declaration is false. The (scientific) claim that the cortex plays a role in âconsciousnessâ should at least count as some evidence that animals without a cortex are less conscious. The declaration is not actually able to explain this away (this is related to Lukeâs point #3):
To make matters worse the Declaration seems to come close to a clunking logical error, along the lines of: other areas than the neocortex are involved in having feelings; animals have those other areas, therefore animals have feelings. That wouldnât work: you could as well argue that: other organs than the eye are involved in seeing; people whose eyes have been gouged out have those other organs; therefore people whose eyes have been gouged out can see. You canât really dismiss the neocortex that easily. (source)
This is one of the concrete issues I have with the declaration. I also really dislike that they donât cite any references and that they donât provide any definition for what they mean by the term consciousness (even though the term is notoriously overloaded). The report by Luke Muehlhauser does not fall into any of these traps and is just superior to the declaration in every aspect. This is the point that I should have made more clearly in the post: the declaration is flawed and should not be used when making a case for/âagainst animal consciousness. My âdeclaration on a declarationâ is just me satirizing arguments from authority.
I also have more general issues with âconsciousnessâ. My position here is a form of eliminative materialism and is very similar to the one explored by Brian Tomasek here and Dan Dennet here. I want to give this a full blog-length treatment at some point, but if youâre interested we can have a chat about this next week at EAG! Would be very interested to hear your thoughts!
It looks like the Cambridge Declaration is saying something like âwe have no scientific reason to suspect that nonhuman animals are less conscious than humansâ, rather than âanimals are consciousâ.
This is the full declaration:
You seem to be saying that the arguments given here donât make scientific sense. Is this because you think that current neuroscientific approaches to sentience are too far away from (something like) the hard question of consciousness, or is it something more concrete (like Lukeâs remark about the neocortexâs potential role in consciousness)?
Hi Edo :) Thank you for your message!
Yes, there is indeed a big mismatch between what the Cambridge declaration states and how it has been cited since! But it really is very hard to summarize what the declaration is stating. If your summary is correct, then I think it would be easy to argue that the declaration is false. The (scientific) claim that the cortex plays a role in âconsciousnessâ should at least count as some evidence that animals without a cortex are less conscious. The declaration is not actually able to explain this away (this is related to Lukeâs point #3):
This is one of the concrete issues I have with the declaration. I also really dislike that they donât cite any references and that they donât provide any definition for what they mean by the term consciousness (even though the term is notoriously overloaded). The report by Luke Muehlhauser does not fall into any of these traps and is just superior to the declaration in every aspect. This is the point that I should have made more clearly in the post: the declaration is flawed and should not be used when making a case for/âagainst animal consciousness. My âdeclaration on a declarationâ is just me satirizing arguments from authority.
I also have more general issues with âconsciousnessâ. My position here is a form of eliminative materialism and is very similar to the one explored by Brian Tomasek here and Dan Dennet here. I want to give this a full blog-length treatment at some point, but if youâre interested we can have a chat about this next week at EAG! Would be very interested to hear your thoughts!
Definitely interested! :)