I appreciated your thoughtful critique of EA. I read your original article and this post, but I have not read any responses other than the comment below by EdoArad. I apologize if there is any overlap here.
I understand that you think it’s important for wealthy donors to “engage in direct reparations where possible, or at least commit to contribute a significant amount to prevent further harm in the specific sector where wealth was generated.”
If they can do more good spending their scarce resources in other ways, why wouldn’t you want them to do that?
I can understand that there is a feeling of justice being accomplished if that happens. Is there reason beyond that?
What if a donor can save the equivalent of 1000 lives buying bednets, while only the equivalent of 100 lives by making some kind of reparations? Would you still advocate that they make the reparations? If so, how would you justify those 900 deaths?
A quick guess of something that might be underpinning a worldview difference here is a differing conception of what counts as “harm”. In the original post, the author suggests that a wealthy donor should try and pay reparations to reverse or prevent further harm in the specific sector in which the wealth was generated.
But I think most EAs have an unusual (but philosophically defensible) conception of harm which not only includes direct harm but also indirect harm caused by a failure to act.
So for an EA, if a wealthy donor is faced with a choice between
paying reparations in the specific sector in which their wealth was generated
donating to an intervention which would have a greater benefit than (1)
then choosing (1) over (2) would actually cause more harm. (Which is the point I believe you’re trying to draw attention to in your comment) I think many EAs probably feel quite psychologically guilty about the harm they are causing in failing to do the best thing.
But I would say that most people don’t conceptualise harm in this way. And so for most people a failure to do (2) if its better than (1) wouldn’t be considered a ‘harm’.
I appreciated your thoughtful critique of EA. I read your original article and this post, but I have not read any responses other than the comment below by EdoArad. I apologize if there is any overlap here.
I understand that you think it’s important for wealthy donors to “engage in direct reparations where possible, or at least commit to contribute a significant amount to prevent further harm in the specific sector where wealth was generated.”
If they can do more good spending their scarce resources in other ways, why wouldn’t you want them to do that?
I can understand that there is a feeling of justice being accomplished if that happens. Is there reason beyond that?
What if a donor can save the equivalent of 1000 lives buying bednets, while only the equivalent of 100 lives by making some kind of reparations? Would you still advocate that they make the reparations? If so, how would you justify those 900 deaths?
A quick guess of something that might be underpinning a worldview difference here is a differing conception of what counts as “harm”. In the original post, the author suggests that a wealthy donor should try and pay reparations to reverse or prevent further harm in the specific sector in which the wealth was generated.
But I think most EAs have an unusual (but philosophically defensible) conception of harm which not only includes direct harm but also indirect harm caused by a failure to act.
So for an EA, if a wealthy donor is faced with a choice between
paying reparations in the specific sector in which their wealth was generated
donating to an intervention which would have a greater benefit than (1)
then choosing (1) over (2) would actually cause more harm. (Which is the point I believe you’re trying to draw attention to in your comment) I think many EAs probably feel quite psychologically guilty about the harm they are causing in failing to do the best thing.
But I would say that most people don’t conceptualise harm in this way. And so for most people a failure to do (2) if its better than (1) wouldn’t be considered a ‘harm’.
Seems plausible.