A quick guess of something that might be underpinning a worldview difference here is a differing conception of what counts as “harm”. In the original post, the author suggests that a wealthy donor should try and pay reparations to reverse or prevent further harm in the specific sector in which the wealth was generated.
But I think most EAs have an unusual (but philosophically defensible) conception of harm which not only includes direct harm but also indirect harm caused by a failure to act.
So for an EA, if a wealthy donor is faced with a choice between
paying reparations in the specific sector in which their wealth was generated
donating to an intervention which would have a greater benefit than (1)
then choosing (1) over (2) would actually cause more harm. (Which is the point I believe you’re trying to draw attention to in your comment) I think many EAs probably feel quite psychologically guilty about the harm they are causing in failing to do the best thing.
But I would say that most people don’t conceptualise harm in this way. And so for most people a failure to do (2) if its better than (1) wouldn’t be considered a ‘harm’.
A quick guess of something that might be underpinning a worldview difference here is a differing conception of what counts as “harm”. In the original post, the author suggests that a wealthy donor should try and pay reparations to reverse or prevent further harm in the specific sector in which the wealth was generated.
But I think most EAs have an unusual (but philosophically defensible) conception of harm which not only includes direct harm but also indirect harm caused by a failure to act.
So for an EA, if a wealthy donor is faced with a choice between
paying reparations in the specific sector in which their wealth was generated
donating to an intervention which would have a greater benefit than (1)
then choosing (1) over (2) would actually cause more harm. (Which is the point I believe you’re trying to draw attention to in your comment) I think many EAs probably feel quite psychologically guilty about the harm they are causing in failing to do the best thing.
But I would say that most people don’t conceptualise harm in this way. And so for most people a failure to do (2) if its better than (1) wouldn’t be considered a ‘harm’.
Seems plausible.