The norm of not allowing territorial conquest by war does not really exist as stated. The norm is to not allow conquest into the recognized borders of other sovereign states. Conquering unrecognized states and breakaway regions is fully normalized, as shown for instance by the nonexistent international reactions to recent wars in Tigray and Karabakh.
Crimea was a part of Ukraine when it was conquered by Russian troops. Unambiguously. The claims by Russia that it really would have wanted to break away may even be correct—but they don’t get to invade first, then run an election to say they declared independence. It certainly needs to be the other way around for it to be at all similar to those other cases.
Yes, well, I would think that annihilating their military and sweeping them out of mainland Ukraine would be enough to reinforce the norm.
If you only enforce the rules when there is already a military conclusion, you’re not enforcing international law, you’re saying that might makes right. There needs to be continued pressure on Russia about the fact that they are in continuous violation of international law. And at this point, if they want Crimea legally, they would need hand it back to Ukraine and let them vote on succession. (Or they need Ukraine to recognize their claims.)
It is a highly dubious view of norms: that they are so powerful that they govern state behavior, but so fragile that when one country violates them many others will as well.
That’s assuming norms are binary, is reductive, and makes no sense as a response. Yes, norms are degraded by violations, and yes, they are important guides to state behavior in a wide variety of cases. If you don’t think either one of those claims is true, I’d be happy to defend it.
Crimea was a part of Ukraine when it was conquered by Russian troops. Unambiguously.
That’s beside the point, I wasn’t claiming otherwise. The point is that Taiwan is more like those other cases.
If you only enforce the rules when there is already a military conclusion, you’re not enforcing international law, you’re saying that might makes right.
I wasn’t arguing against the use of sanctions to punish countries for violating international law (or some laws, at least).
And enforcing law requires might, and sanctions are might of a different form, so this doesn’t make sense anyway.
That’s assuming norms are binary, is reductive, and makes no sense as a response. Yes, norms are degraded by violations, and yes, they are important guides to state behavior in a wide variety of cases. If you don’t think either one of those claims is true, I’d be happy to defend it.
I don’t think we fundamentally disagree there but I’m saying this stuff is very tenuous as a rationale for foreign policy—one norm violation doesn’t make a great deal of difference.
Crimea was a part of Ukraine when it was conquered by Russian troops. Unambiguously. The claims by Russia that it really would have wanted to break away may even be correct—but they don’t get to invade first, then run an election to say they declared independence. It certainly needs to be the other way around for it to be at all similar to those other cases.
If you only enforce the rules when there is already a military conclusion, you’re not enforcing international law, you’re saying that might makes right. There needs to be continued pressure on Russia about the fact that they are in continuous violation of international law. And at this point, if they want Crimea legally, they would need hand it back to Ukraine and let them vote on succession. (Or they need Ukraine to recognize their claims.)
That’s assuming norms are binary, is reductive, and makes no sense as a response. Yes, norms are degraded by violations, and yes, they are important guides to state behavior in a wide variety of cases. If you don’t think either one of those claims is true, I’d be happy to defend it.
That’s beside the point, I wasn’t claiming otherwise. The point is that Taiwan is more like those other cases.
I wasn’t arguing against the use of sanctions to punish countries for violating international law (or some laws, at least).
And enforcing law requires might, and sanctions are might of a different form, so this doesn’t make sense anyway.
I don’t think we fundamentally disagree there but I’m saying this stuff is very tenuous as a rationale for foreign policy—one norm violation doesn’t make a great deal of difference.