I encourage readers to read the post in full, as I anticipated and covered many of these objections, and reading will give you a full perspective on what claims Johannes is responding to. I reached out to GG but not FP for feedback before publication for reasons I do not think are appropriate to discuss in this public forum.
Some specific asks to Johannes in the post where I think a response would benefit forum readers:
Create a mistakes page and include errors made in the 2018 CATF cost-effectiveness calculation.
Retract or otherwise discourage others from using or citing the 2018 CATF cost-effectiveness calculation.
Refrain from claiming a value at or below $1/ton CO2e in expected emissions reduction, or at least committing to not making claims on cost-effectiveness without a specific, clear, and verifiable explanation of how that calculation was done.
Specific responses:
a) I first drafted this post 2-3 years ago when nuclear power was a clearer target of EA climate philanthropy, but didn’t get to publishing it until now, and now nuclear is less of a priority for both FP and GG.
The lower threshold (17%) is for nuclear-specific grants. The adjacency includes work for clean firm power generally, which for the typical funded non-profits in the space is for nuclear and geothermal only, or with CSS too. In the post, I discuss several other technologies for resource adequacy that are not covered or included by organizations that FP and GG give to for their clean firm power work. FP and GG could choose to fund other strategies for resource adequacy, but they largely do not.
Regardless, the main contention is that nuclear power advocacy has historically been the most or one of the most funded interventions in the EA climate space. GG does not contest this, and I think the evidence is clear on this point.
b1) Cost is a primary driver of technology selection in all countries. Solar and wind are cheaper than nuclear in the U.S., and the relative difference is similar in other countries. In 2020, China set a goal of 1.2 TW of renewables by 2030. It met that target in 2024, 6 years ahead of schedule Source. Last year it added over 430 GW of renewables, including 300 GW of solar PV [Source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renewable_energy_in_China. For comparison, China had set a goal for nuclear power of 58 GW by 2020 and 70 GW by 2025. It met the 2020 target in 2024 and will meet the 2025 target several years late. It has a goal of 110 GW by 2030, and 335 GW by 2050. Source. Last year, China added 2 GW of new nuclear capacity, though typically adds 3 GW per year (Source, Source). 430 GW/yr vs. 3 GW/yr.
b2) I don’t contest the need for clean firm power, I question the size of the need for new clean firm power resources, especially in the form of baseload resources given other technology solutions for resource adequacy. I covered this in a section in my post discussing the U.S. case and the European case Source. The grid needs resource adequacy. Nuclear is a baseload source. Baseload sources are a subset of clean firm resources. Clean firm resources are a subset of resource adequacy. Conflating these as one thing is source of great confusion and misdirection. Dispatchable, low CAPEX clean firm resources are the ideal fit for firming a largely VRE fit; nuclear power is not that.
b3) I cover the economics of nuclear power extensively in the piece and discuss the pathways to cost reduction in the U.S. nuclear industry. Labor costs are largely set by what other work opportunities are available; engineers and construction workers can get high pay in many industries, which sets the high labor price for nuclear plants.
b4) The responsibility is on funders to make a positive case for how their specific grants can reduce costs enough to make nuclear viable as a clean firm power option, and furthermore why such an intervention is among the best options for climate philanthropy in an ITN framework. It is not possible to prove a negative. The highlighted philanthropic contributions, including “bipartisan ADVANCE Act streamlining NRC licensing, to the COP28 declaration to triple nuclear capacity signed by over 20 countries, to shifting public opinion”, have done little to address the economic challenge. I do think the nuclear advocacy work done by EA philanthropy has and will do little to change the economics.
c) If the core case is nuclear could be cheap, philanthropy needs to make an affirmative, specific case for how they think that can happen. The most optimistic cases from National Academies and DOE reports set targets of around $5-8/W and $80/MWh that are above the cost for other firm resources, including geothermal and especially fossil gas, and above many other resource adequacy options. For new nuclear power to compete and displace other sources, there ultimately will need to be some carbon cost through regulation or clean requirements. Otherwise, there is no market incentive to build nuclear power vs. other fossil-based dispatchable options. And even if there is a carbon requirement, nuclear power must compete against other resource adequacy options that are either demonstrated, established tech, or are seeing much faster cost declines and market uptake.
Thanks for engaging with this. Obviously, we still disagree and don’t really feel your responses address the heart of our disagreement or the misrepresentations we think your piece contains. I’m not sure why you didn’t feel that it was fruitful to reach out to discuss beforehand, but for the sake of our team’s time I’ve asked Johannes not to engage further.
I encourage readers to read the post in full, as I anticipated and covered many of these objections, and reading will give you a full perspective on what claims Johannes is responding to. I reached out to GG but not FP for feedback before publication for reasons I do not think are appropriate to discuss in this public forum.
Some specific asks to Johannes in the post where I think a response would benefit forum readers:
Create a mistakes page and include errors made in the 2018 CATF cost-effectiveness calculation.
Retract or otherwise discourage others from using or citing the 2018 CATF cost-effectiveness calculation.
Refrain from claiming a value at or below $1/ton CO2e in expected emissions reduction, or at least committing to not making claims on cost-effectiveness without a specific, clear, and verifiable explanation of how that calculation was done.
Specific responses:
a) I first drafted this post 2-3 years ago when nuclear power was a clearer target of EA climate philanthropy, but didn’t get to publishing it until now, and now nuclear is less of a priority for both FP and GG. The lower threshold (17%) is for nuclear-specific grants. The adjacency includes work for clean firm power generally, which for the typical funded non-profits in the space is for nuclear and geothermal only, or with CSS too. In the post, I discuss several other technologies for resource adequacy that are not covered or included by organizations that FP and GG give to for their clean firm power work. FP and GG could choose to fund other strategies for resource adequacy, but they largely do not.
Regardless, the main contention is that nuclear power advocacy has historically been the most or one of the most funded interventions in the EA climate space. GG does not contest this, and I think the evidence is clear on this point.
b1) Cost is a primary driver of technology selection in all countries. Solar and wind are cheaper than nuclear in the U.S., and the relative difference is similar in other countries. In 2020, China set a goal of 1.2 TW of renewables by 2030. It met that target in 2024, 6 years ahead of schedule Source. Last year it added over 430 GW of renewables, including 300 GW of solar PV [Source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renewable_energy_in_China. For comparison, China had set a goal for nuclear power of 58 GW by 2020 and 70 GW by 2025. It met the 2020 target in 2024 and will meet the 2025 target several years late. It has a goal of 110 GW by 2030, and 335 GW by 2050. Source. Last year, China added 2 GW of new nuclear capacity, though typically adds 3 GW per year (Source, Source). 430 GW/yr vs. 3 GW/yr.
b2) I don’t contest the need for clean firm power, I question the size of the need for new clean firm power resources, especially in the form of baseload resources given other technology solutions for resource adequacy. I covered this in a section in my post discussing the U.S. case and the European case Source. The grid needs resource adequacy. Nuclear is a baseload source. Baseload sources are a subset of clean firm resources. Clean firm resources are a subset of resource adequacy. Conflating these as one thing is source of great confusion and misdirection. Dispatchable, low CAPEX clean firm resources are the ideal fit for firming a largely VRE fit; nuclear power is not that.
b3) I cover the economics of nuclear power extensively in the piece and discuss the pathways to cost reduction in the U.S. nuclear industry. Labor costs are largely set by what other work opportunities are available; engineers and construction workers can get high pay in many industries, which sets the high labor price for nuclear plants.
b4) The responsibility is on funders to make a positive case for how their specific grants can reduce costs enough to make nuclear viable as a clean firm power option, and furthermore why such an intervention is among the best options for climate philanthropy in an ITN framework. It is not possible to prove a negative. The highlighted philanthropic contributions, including “bipartisan ADVANCE Act streamlining NRC licensing, to the COP28 declaration to triple nuclear capacity signed by over 20 countries, to shifting public opinion”, have done little to address the economic challenge. I do think the nuclear advocacy work done by EA philanthropy has and will do little to change the economics.
c) If the core case is nuclear could be cheap, philanthropy needs to make an affirmative, specific case for how they think that can happen. The most optimistic cases from National Academies and DOE reports set targets of around $5-8/W and $80/MWh that are above the cost for other firm resources, including geothermal and especially fossil gas, and above many other resource adequacy options. For new nuclear power to compete and displace other sources, there ultimately will need to be some carbon cost through regulation or clean requirements. Otherwise, there is no market incentive to build nuclear power vs. other fossil-based dispatchable options. And even if there is a carbon requirement, nuclear power must compete against other resource adequacy options that are either demonstrated, established tech, or are seeing much faster cost declines and market uptake.
Hi Matthew, I run the research team at FP.
Thanks for engaging with this. Obviously, we still disagree and don’t really feel your responses address the heart of our disagreement or the misrepresentations we think your piece contains. I’m not sure why you didn’t feel that it was fruitful to reach out to discuss beforehand, but for the sake of our team’s time I’ve asked Johannes not to engage further.