I see some problems with the claims made in the section named “Human potential starts in current lives”.
“Therefore, losing 99% of humanity today means losing 99% of the total human potential, which would be roughly 99 times worse than losing the remaining 1%.”
Similarly, it seems like you’re making the claim that a 100% loss of all lives is only slightly worse than 99% of lives because each 1% of people today contributes 1% to the final population of humanity.
But I think this claim rests on the assumption that 99% of humans dying would reduce the final population by 99%.
You mentioned that if 99% of humans died, the remaining 1% could repopulate the world by having a higher birth rate but then went on to say that this possibility didn’t affect your point much.
But I think it would have a huge effect. If humanity lasts 1 billion years and 99% of humans died at some point, even if it took 1000 years to repopulate the earth, that would only be 1/1000 of all of history and the population wouldn’t change much in the long term. Although the death of 99% of the population, might affect the genes of future people, I think the effect on the population size would be negligible. Therefore, I think the assumption is false.
If the assumption were correct, 100% of humanity dying would only be slightly worse than 99% dying. But since the 1% would probably rapidly repopulate the world, 99% dying would probably have a negligible impact on the total long-term population. Meanwhile, if 100% died the entire future population would be lost. Therefore 100% is far worse than 99%.
Hi Stephen. I think I should have made this part clearer (I guess a chart would help). Consider the following scenarios:
A) In Universe A nothing catastrophic happens today. You can pick any 1% of the world and trace the cumulative number of humans they produce between today and the end of time.
B) In Universe B, a catastrophe happens today, leaving only 1% alive. You can trace the cumulative number of humans they produce between today and the end of time.
My intuition is that the cumulative number of humans that will ever exist at the end of time is similar in A and B. This applies to any random 1% of humans from Universe A. With this in mind, losing 99% of humanity today is approximately 99% worse than losing any 1% (including the last).
I agree that the total number of humans who will ever live at the end of time is similar in A and B. Therefore I think there is almost no difference between A and B in the long term.
The number of humans who will ever live is similar in scenarios A and B. But keep in mind that in scenario A we have randomly picked only 1% of all existing humans. The catastrophe that takes place in scenario B removes 99% of all humans alive, which in turn removes around 99% of all humans that could have lived at the end of time. That is an enormous difference in the long term. And that is the main point of that section: Saving lives now has an enormous impact in the long term.
“The catastrophe that takes place in scenario B removes 99% of all humans alive, which in turn removes around 99% of all humans that could have lived at the end of time.”
That would only happen if the population never recovered. But since I would expect the world to rapidly repopulate, I therefore would expect the long-term difference to be insignificant.
The survivors in B would eventually catch up with the living population of the world today, yes. However, the survivors in B would never catch up with the cumulative population of the universe where there was no catastrophe. While the survivors in B were recovering, the counterfactual universe has been creating more humans (as well as new pieces of art, scientific discoveries, etc.). It is impossible for B to catch up, regardless of how much you wait. All the human potential of the 99% who died in the catastrophe is lost forever.
It’s true that the universe B might never fully catch up because 99% of a single generation was lost. But over 1 billion years, we would expect about 40 million generations to live. Even if a few generations were lost, if there is a recovery the total loss won’t be high.
Whether and to what extent the survivors could catch up with the counterfactual universe strongly depends on the boundary conditions. Universe A could have expanded to other planets by the time B fully recovers. We are comparing the potential of a full, and fully developed humanity with a small post-apocalyptic fraction of humanity. I agree with you that planet boundaries (and other physical constraints) could reduce the potential of a random 1% in A with respect to B. But I suppose it can also go the other way: The survivors in B could produce less humans than any 1% of A, and keep this trend for many (even all) future generations. My intuition here is very limited.
I see some problems with the claims made in the section named “Human potential starts in current lives”.
Similarly, it seems like you’re making the claim that a 100% loss of all lives is only slightly worse than 99% of lives because each 1% of people today contributes 1% to the final population of humanity.
But I think this claim rests on the assumption that 99% of humans dying would reduce the final population by 99%.
You mentioned that if 99% of humans died, the remaining 1% could repopulate the world by having a higher birth rate but then went on to say that this possibility didn’t affect your point much.
But I think it would have a huge effect. If humanity lasts 1 billion years and 99% of humans died at some point, even if it took 1000 years to repopulate the earth, that would only be 1/1000 of all of history and the population wouldn’t change much in the long term. Although the death of 99% of the population, might affect the genes of future people, I think the effect on the population size would be negligible. Therefore, I think the assumption is false.
If the assumption were correct, 100% of humanity dying would only be slightly worse than 99% dying. But since the 1% would probably rapidly repopulate the world, 99% dying would probably have a negligible impact on the total long-term population. Meanwhile, if 100% died the entire future population would be lost. Therefore 100% is far worse than 99%.
Hi Stephen. I think I should have made this part clearer (I guess a chart would help). Consider the following scenarios:
A) In Universe A nothing catastrophic happens today. You can pick any 1% of the world and trace the cumulative number of humans they produce between today and the end of time.
B) In Universe B, a catastrophe happens today, leaving only 1% alive. You can trace the cumulative number of humans they produce between today and the end of time.
My intuition is that the cumulative number of humans that will ever exist at the end of time is similar in A and B. This applies to any random 1% of humans from Universe A. With this in mind, losing 99% of humanity today is approximately 99% worse than losing any 1% (including the last).
I agree that the total number of humans who will ever live at the end of time is similar in A and B. Therefore I think there is almost no difference between A and B in the long term.
The number of humans who will ever live is similar in scenarios A and B. But keep in mind that in scenario A we have randomly picked only 1% of all existing humans. The catastrophe that takes place in scenario B removes 99% of all humans alive, which in turn removes around 99% of all humans that could have lived at the end of time. That is an enormous difference in the long term. And that is the main point of that section: Saving lives now has an enormous impact in the long term.
That would only happen if the population never recovered. But since I would expect the world to rapidly repopulate, I therefore would expect the long-term difference to be insignificant.
The survivors in B would eventually catch up with the living population of the world today, yes. However, the survivors in B would never catch up with the cumulative population of the universe where there was no catastrophe. While the survivors in B were recovering, the counterfactual universe has been creating more humans (as well as new pieces of art, scientific discoveries, etc.). It is impossible for B to catch up, regardless of how much you wait. All the human potential of the 99% who died in the catastrophe is lost forever.
It’s true that the universe B might never fully catch up because 99% of a single generation was lost. But over 1 billion years, we would expect about 40 million generations to live. Even if a few generations were lost, if there is a recovery the total loss won’t be high.
Whether and to what extent the survivors could catch up with the counterfactual universe strongly depends on the boundary conditions. Universe A could have expanded to other planets by the time B fully recovers. We are comparing the potential of a full, and fully developed humanity with a small post-apocalyptic fraction of humanity. I agree with you that planet boundaries (and other physical constraints) could reduce the potential of a random 1% in A with respect to B. But I suppose it can also go the other way: The survivors in B could produce less humans than any 1% of A, and keep this trend for many (even all) future generations. My intuition here is very limited.