My understanding was that eliminativism (qualia are just a kind of physical process, not a different essence or property existing separate from physical reality) is orthogonal to panpsychism (whether particles have qualia), and thus to whether particles suffer. Or is there some connection I’m missing?
I think there’s a connection that results from how both theories dissolve the concept of qualia. Eliminativism does this by saying qualia is actually physics and panpsychism (in its most expansive forms) does this by saying all physics has qualia. Both theories effectively make the “suffering” label less exclusive—and more processes would have a higher probability of being correctly associated with that label (unclear whether probability is the right word in the case of eliminativism). With panpsychism, processes are conscious and the only remaining question is whether they also suffer. With eliminativism, the distinction between “what we usually take to be suffering processes” and “other processes” is blurred and we’re more permissive of some members of the latter being considered the former, or with a probabilities framing, less certain that some members of the latter is not the former. (Although, I guess alternatively the uncertainty can go the other way and we might be more skeptical of processes being suffering processes. But most people already put zero weight or very little weight on particles suffering so it seems like the uncertainty/blurred distinction should increase it?)
This seems similar to how empty individualism and open individualism are related. They both dissolve the common-sense concept of personal identity featured in closed individualism. Personal identity ceases to be “special”: open individualism merges everyone and empty individualism atomizes everyone into individual-moments.
Tomasik also offers an analogy of how the concept of élan vital was dissolved in another article. As I understand it, the concept was eliminated with advances in knowledge of biochemistry. But alternatively people could have also said “actually everything is pretty similar to stuff we consider alive—let’s just say everything falls under the term ‘alive’ then” (while not making any unscientific claims; it just means expanding the definition of “alive” to include everything) and élan vital would be similarly dissolved. The final result seems similar and the concept doesn’t distinguish processes from one another in a way previously thought as meaningful.
eliminativism (qualia are just a kind of physical process, not a different essence or property existing separate from physical reality)
That sounds like a definition of physicalism in general rather than eliminativism specifically?
I agree with the analogies in Tim’s comment. As he says, the idea is that eliminativism says all physical processes are kind of on the same footing as far as not containing (the philosophically laden version of) consciousness. So it’s more plausible we’d treat all physical processes as in the same boat rather than drawing sharp dividing lines.
My understanding was that eliminativism (qualia are just a kind of physical process, not a different essence or property existing separate from physical reality) is orthogonal to panpsychism (whether particles have qualia), and thus to whether particles suffer. Or is there some connection I’m missing?
I think there’s a connection that results from how both theories dissolve the concept of qualia. Eliminativism does this by saying qualia is actually physics and panpsychism (in its most expansive forms) does this by saying all physics has qualia. Both theories effectively make the “suffering” label less exclusive—and more processes would have a higher probability of being correctly associated with that label (unclear whether probability is the right word in the case of eliminativism). With panpsychism, processes are conscious and the only remaining question is whether they also suffer. With eliminativism, the distinction between “what we usually take to be suffering processes” and “other processes” is blurred and we’re more permissive of some members of the latter being considered the former, or with a probabilities framing, less certain that some members of the latter is not the former. (Although, I guess alternatively the uncertainty can go the other way and we might be more skeptical of processes being suffering processes. But most people already put zero weight or very little weight on particles suffering so it seems like the uncertainty/blurred distinction should increase it?)
This seems similar to how empty individualism and open individualism are related. They both dissolve the common-sense concept of personal identity featured in closed individualism. Personal identity ceases to be “special”: open individualism merges everyone and empty individualism atomizes everyone into individual-moments.
Tomasik also offers an analogy of how the concept of élan vital was dissolved in another article. As I understand it, the concept was eliminated with advances in knowledge of biochemistry. But alternatively people could have also said “actually everything is pretty similar to stuff we consider alive—let’s just say everything falls under the term ‘alive’ then” (while not making any unscientific claims; it just means expanding the definition of “alive” to include everything) and élan vital would be similarly dissolved. The final result seems similar and the concept doesn’t distinguish processes from one another in a way previously thought as meaningful.
Thanks for the question. :)
That sounds like a definition of physicalism in general rather than eliminativism specifically?
I agree with the analogies in Tim’s comment. As he says, the idea is that eliminativism says all physical processes are kind of on the same footing as far as not containing (the philosophically laden version of) consciousness. So it’s more plausible we’d treat all physical processes as in the same boat rather than drawing sharp dividing lines.