It’s hard to have a discussion about this in the open because many EAs (and presumably some non-EAs) with biosecurity expertise strongly believe that this is too dangerous a topic to talk about in detail in the open, because of information hazards and related issues.
Speaking for myself, I briefly looked into the theory of information hazards, as well as thought through some of the empirical consequences, and my personal view is that while the costs of having public dialogue about various xrisk stuff (including biorisk) are likely underestimated, the benefits are also likely underestimated as well, and on balance more things should be shared rather than less. I thinkWill Bradshaw and (I’m less confident) Anders Sandberg share* this view.
Unfortunately, it’s hard to have a conversation about frank open conversation about biorisk before having a frank meta-conversation about the value of open conversations about biorisk, so here we are.
(EDIT: Note however that I am likely personally not aware of many of the empirical considerations that pro-secrecy biorisk people are aware of, which makes this conversation somewhat skewed)
*both of whom, unlike me, did nontrivial work in advancing the theory of infohazards, in addition to having biosecurity expertise.
Thanks, Linch. I didn’t realize I might be treading near information hazards. It’s good to know and an interesting point about the pros and cons of having such conversations openly.
It’s hard to have a discussion about this in the open because many EAs (and presumably some non-EAs) with biosecurity expertise strongly believe that this is too dangerous a topic to talk about in detail in the open, because of information hazards and related issues.
Speaking for myself, I briefly looked into the theory of information hazards, as well as thought through some of the empirical consequences, and my personal view is that while the costs of having public dialogue about various xrisk stuff (including biorisk) are likely underestimated, the benefits are also likely underestimated as well, and on balance more things should be shared rather than less. I think Will Bradshaw and (I’m less confident) Anders Sandberg share* this view.
Unfortunately, it’s hard to have a conversation about frank open conversation about biorisk before having a frank meta-conversation about the value of open conversations about biorisk, so here we are.
(EDIT: Note however that I am likely personally not aware of many of the empirical considerations that pro-secrecy biorisk people are aware of, which makes this conversation somewhat skewed)
*both of whom, unlike me, did nontrivial work in advancing the theory of infohazards, in addition to having biosecurity expertise.
Thanks, Linch. I didn’t realize I might be treading near information hazards. It’s good to know and an interesting point about the pros and cons of having such conversations openly.