RL, avoiding negative rewards, and seeking positive rewards is probably much simpler than qualia, and we certainly understand this concept better. We can make RL agents and understand what it is that they’re doing. We don’t understand qualia on a similar level.
But I think I failed at communicating the argument because this comment completely missed it.
The point is that your circuits having an explanation ready doesn’t allow you to just always use it no matter what; you need actual reasons to expect this behaviour is better explained by the existence of qualia than simply by RL; you need actual evidence to be able to match something external to a specific thing happening inside you.
There are things functionally outside qualia circuits. If your hand is on fire, the hand doesn’t experience that, something in the brain does. Our pain and decision-making don’t function entirely within our qualia. The updates away from pain and towards pleasure, all the reinforcement learning mechanisms provided by evolution, certainly exist outside the qualia circuits. There’s a lot happening in our brains outside of qualia; I cited studies showing we make decisions seconds before we feel that we’re making decisions.
(If I understood what you meant by solving problems correctly- maybe you meant not solving problems as behaviour, but solving the problem of explaining, though?) If there are problems we solve through qualia, and animals also solve these problems, this would be valid evidence! Please explain what are the problems we solve using qualia, and which animals also solve these problems.
You seem to think that we should only posit qualia if it’s strictly necessary to observe a behaviour. I was pushing back by saying that, given evolutionary relatedness and observed similarities, I don’t believe that should be the criteria.
For example, you could try to explain a baby’s pain behaviour without reference to qualia as not being strictly necessary, but given that we know that they are just developing versions of us, that’s not the most likely explanation. With other animals obviously the inference there is weaker, but still that’s a factor that should be considered.
As for specific problems. You can make plausible arguments for lots of different features. I don’t think it’s too useful to hyperfocus on specific ones. Protective behaviour (limping/wound garden) is one candidate that the Rethink Priorities reports discuss that I think is stronger evidence, since it’s non-reflexive, long-term and involves motivational trade-offs.
(Won’t reply in enough detail, sorry.)
RL, avoiding negative rewards, and seeking positive rewards is probably much simpler than qualia, and we certainly understand this concept better. We can make RL agents and understand what it is that they’re doing. We don’t understand qualia on a similar level.
But I think I failed at communicating the argument because this comment completely missed it.
The point is that your circuits having an explanation ready doesn’t allow you to just always use it no matter what; you need actual reasons to expect this behaviour is better explained by the existence of qualia than simply by RL; you need actual evidence to be able to match something external to a specific thing happening inside you.
There are things functionally outside qualia circuits. If your hand is on fire, the hand doesn’t experience that, something in the brain does. Our pain and decision-making don’t function entirely within our qualia. The updates away from pain and towards pleasure, all the reinforcement learning mechanisms provided by evolution, certainly exist outside the qualia circuits. There’s a lot happening in our brains outside of qualia; I cited studies showing we make decisions seconds before we feel that we’re making decisions.
(If I understood what you meant by solving problems correctly- maybe you meant not solving problems as behaviour, but solving the problem of explaining, though?) If there are problems we solve through qualia, and animals also solve these problems, this would be valid evidence! Please explain what are the problems we solve using qualia, and which animals also solve these problems.
I’m not sure that really responds to my point.
You seem to think that we should only posit qualia if it’s strictly necessary to observe a behaviour. I was pushing back by saying that, given evolutionary relatedness and observed similarities, I don’t believe that should be the criteria.
For example, you could try to explain a baby’s pain behaviour without reference to qualia as not being strictly necessary, but given that we know that they are just developing versions of us, that’s not the most likely explanation. With other animals obviously the inference there is weaker, but still that’s a factor that should be considered.
As for specific problems. You can make plausible arguments for lots of different features. I don’t think it’s too useful to hyperfocus on specific ones. Protective behaviour (limping/wound garden) is one candidate that the Rethink Priorities reports discuss that I think is stronger evidence, since it’s non-reflexive, long-term and involves motivational trade-offs.