Unfortunately, I’m not aware of something like that.
Max_Carpendale
Karma: 889
Thank you!
Yes, they get people to buy shares through their platform and then do shareholder activism based on all the shares their members have. Would be an interesting model to consider for animal advocacy groups focused on shareholder activism.
Oh, that’s an interesting case that I hadn’t heard of! Nice, it seems to have been successful as well. Thanks for your comment, Andrew.
For others who are curious, this paper discusses the case: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1467949
Shareholder Activism
Animal advocacy: Lobbying through public consultation
Humane slaughter in Mediterranean sea bass and bream aquaculture
I’m not sure that really responds to my point.
You seem to think that we should only posit qualia if it’s strictly necessary to observe a behaviour. I was pushing back by saying that, given evolutionary relatedness and observed similarities, I don’t believe that should be the criteria.
For example, you could try to explain a baby’s pain behaviour without reference to qualia as not being strictly necessary, but given that we know that they are just developing versions of us, that’s not the most likely explanation. With other animals obviously the inference there is weaker, but still that’s a factor that should be considered.
As for specific problems. You can make plausible arguments for lots of different features. I don’t think it’s too useful to hyperfocus on specific ones. Protective behaviour (limping/wound garden) is one candidate that the Rethink Priorities reports discuss that I think is stronger evidence, since it’s non-reflexive, long-term and involves motivational trade-offs.
I wasn’t talking about the specific emotional state either. I think this example here casts some doubt on the idea that verbal report is the principal or only way that we come to believe that other humans have qualia.
The question is not whether these behaviours could strictly be explainable without qualia. The question as what’s the most likely explanation given that these animals are related to us and we solve a lot of these problems through qualia (while showing similar external signs).
For example, yeah, a dog could just look like she is in pain. But then we have to invent this new concept of ersatz pain that looks and functions a lot like our pain, but is actually unconscious, in order to describe the dogs mental state in this case. To the extent it looks similar to our pain in a given animal, this looks like a ad hoc move.
Seems to me like the case for the importance of verbal report as evidence may be overstated. If my friend looks and behaves like they are suffering (cringing, recoiling away, etc.), but says they are not, I would assume that they actually are suffering. I assume you would agree? That suggests that other forms of evidence are actually more important than talking about qualia.
I don’t think the scale or expected value affects this strategy question directly. You still just use a strategy that is going to be most likely to achieve the goal.
If the goal is something you have really widespread agreement on, that probably leans you towards an uncompromising, radical ask approach. Seems like things might be going pretty well for AI safety in that respect, though I don’t know if it’s been established that people are buying into the high probability of doom arguments that much. I suspect that we are much less far along than the climate change movement in that respect, for example. And even if support were much greater, I wouldn’t agree with a lot of this post.
Oh, my expertise is in animal advocacy, not AI safety FYI
I think this is tantamount to saying that we shouldn’t engage within the political system, compromise, or meet people where they are coming from in our advocacy. I don’t think other social movements would have got anywhere with this kind of attitude, and this seems especially tricky with something very detail orientated like a AI safety.
Inside game approaches (versus outside game approaches like this is describing) are going to require engaging in things this post says that no one should do. Boldly stating exactly the ideal situation you are after could have its role, but I’d need to see and much more detailed argument about why that should be the only game in town when it comes to AI.
I think that as AI safety turns more into an advocacy project it needs engage more with the existing literature on the subject including what has worked for past social movements.
Also, importantly, this isn’t lying (as Daniel’s comment explains).
What incredible altruism, despite the very difficult circumstances. They are truly a hero.
I teared up when I read this initially, and when I reread it. Thank you so much for sharing.
Does Sentience Legislation help animals?
Thanks for your engagement with the report!
One way to go is for animal protection to start advocating for a right bans at some point, yes. Another possibility is that the industry is simply run into the ground through costly welfare reforms and competition through alternatives. Maybe this wouldn’t remove all animal exploitation, and some animal products would still be demanded as a luxury good, but it would seem pretty significant if the reform path way could bring us that far, would you agree? A agree there is more of a natural flow towards ending all animal exploitation through abolitionist messaging.
I’m not too sure about historical parallels of social movements that for welfare reforms. That’s an important question, think about that.
By and large, I think a lot of animal protectionism probably doesn’t overall reinforce continued animal use (though some parts of it might do so to some extent). It seems like the evidence that I describe points to momentum rather than complacency here. I guess if mental picture of animal protectionism is someone like Temple Grandin or other people working in animal welfare science, this is less clear, but I’m including groups that are working on and asking for welfare reforms, even if they ultimately have abolitionist goals.
Ultimately, I’m not arguing against running some abolitionist campaigns, but I am arguing against views that this is the only way to go, and that other approaches are harmful.
Thanks for your thoughts on this!
I think there’s a pretty good argument that animal protectionism demands the nonuse of animals in all cases when that use necessarily involves a significant amount of suffering, which represent almost all cases, and makes the remaining cases prohibitively expensive. I describe his pathway in the piece.
You could argue that this stronger animal protection view is not implied by current rhetoric, but the idea is that you build momentum and work up to stronger asks.
Pathways to victory: How can we end animal agriculture?
Maximising impact: the case for research to support animal advocacy efforts
Hi Enginar,
This is a very interesting post, thank you for writing it! It fits very well into the idea of megaprojects for animals, or ways of using additional funding, which may become increasingly relevant as more funding comes into EA.
I’ve been working on a report on improving wild caught fish welfare at Animal Ask and the report should be relatively soon. I certainly share your thoughts that smaller fish should be the priority.
I have some (not necessarily decisive) worries about how this fits into the long-term strategy of animal advocacy. As you say, it is not exactly moral advocacy (though we should acknowledge that sometimes changing attitudes follows as a result of welfare improvements). I think moral advocacy is important not just for the current animal welfare ask, but for enabling future asks, so this seems less desirable from the perspective.
The small animal replacement problem and other cases where a reduction in consumption of one animal product leads to an increase in another, more harmful animal product.
Other less relevant examples in my work:
Wild animal welfare CCs can also complicates things at both the near term and the long term because of food web effects.
Whether welfare reforms cause momentum vs. complacency is another example, but I feel fairly confident in my conclusion on that.