One point on instrumentally valuing life is that this is essentially what happens under triage. I think a large portion of the reason we can value equality is because right now, our societies are stable and prosperous, and hopefully won’t have a crisis. But if we do and the crisis is an GCR or X-risk, then certain people really are more valuable.
I guess it’s on me for putting “repugnant conclusion” in the title, but what does this have to do with my post? My post is not about the Repugnant Conclusion as discussed in population ethics. It is just, in very literal terms, a conclusion which is repugnant.
Edit: I’ve changed the title from “repugnant conclusions” to “uncomfortable conclusions”
On your triage point, I think we can and do triage based on other criteria—namely, how much it costs to save a life. That feels a lot more in the spirit of triage than this specific comparison, which is much closer to a value judgment about what kinds of lives are worth living. Are we really okay with just judging that the lives of other people are less worth living than our own?
On the GCR point, that’s fair enough—it is the argument that Beckstead makes. The post is just to say that I find it uncomfortable, and plausibly an argument that a less WEIRD and more international EA would reject. But I’m afraid that’s just my wild speculation.
One point on instrumentally valuing life is that this is essentially what happens under triage. I think a large portion of the reason we can value equality is because right now, our societies are stable and prosperous, and hopefully won’t have a crisis. But if we do and the crisis is an GCR or X-risk, then certain people really are more valuable.
I guess it’s on me for putting “repugnant conclusion” in the title, but what does this have to do with my post? My post is not about the Repugnant Conclusion as discussed in population ethics. It is just, in very literal terms, a conclusion which is repugnant.
Edit: I’ve changed the title from “repugnant conclusions” to “uncomfortable conclusions”
I’ve edited my comment to include instrumentally valuing life as well. I’ll cut out the repugnant conclusion part of my comment.
On your triage point, I think we can and do triage based on other criteria—namely, how much it costs to save a life. That feels a lot more in the spirit of triage than this specific comparison, which is much closer to a value judgment about what kinds of lives are worth living. Are we really okay with just judging that the lives of other people are less worth living than our own?
On the GCR point, that’s fair enough—it is the argument that Beckstead makes. The post is just to say that I find it uncomfortable, and plausibly an argument that a less WEIRD and more international EA would reject. But I’m afraid that’s just my wild speculation.