Itās indisputable that some lives are more instrumentally valuable (to save) than others. So if you hold that all lives are equally intrinsically valuable, it follows that some lives are all-things-considered more valuable to save than others (due to having the same intrinsic value, but more instrumental value).
To avoid that āuncomfortableā-sounding conclusion, you would need to reject the second premise (that all lives are equally intrinsically valuable). That is, you would have to claim that some lives are intrinsically more valuable than others. And that is surely a much more uncomfortable conclusion!
I think we should conclude from this that thereās actually nothing remotely morally objectionably about saying that some lives are more valuable to save for purely instrumental reasons. The thing to avoid is to claim that some lives are intrinsically more important. It āsounds badā to say āsome lives are more valuable to save than othersā because it sounds like youāre claiming that some lives are inherently more valuable than others. So itās important to explicitly cancel the implicature by adding the āfor purely instrumental reasonsā clause.
But once clarified, itās a perfectly innocuous claim. Anyone who still thinks it sounds bad at that point needs to think more clearly.
I agree that some lives will go on to have a higher impact on others. I disagree with OP that you can predict which.
But the point from OP is that itās unacceptable to have favourites in terms of the importance of their lives, for whatever reason. So if you think some lives are predictably instrumentally more valuable, it follows that a good moral theory should ignore (some of) the instrumental value of saving a life.
The OP spoke of evaluative claims (āit is better to...ā and āthe conclusion that some lives are more valuable...ā), so I think itās important to be clear that those axiological claims are not reasonably disputable, and hence not reasonably regarded as ārepugnantā or whatever.
Now, itās a whole ānother question what should be done in light of these evaluative facts. One could argue that itās āunacceptableā to act upon them; that one should ignore or disregard facts about instrumental value for the purposes of deciding which life to save.
The key question then is: why? Most naturally, I think, one may worry that acting upon such differences might reinforce historical and existing social inequalities in a way that is more detrimental on net than the first-order effects of doing more immediate good. If that worry is empirically accurate, then even utilitarians will agree with the verdict that one should āscreen offā considerations of instrumental value in oneās decision procedure for saving lives (just as we ordinary think doctors etc. should). Saving the most (instrumentally) valuable life might not be the best thing to do, if the act itselfāor the process by which it was decidedāhas further negative consequences.
[T]here are many cases in which instrumental favoritism would seem less appropriate. We do not want emergency room doctors to pass judgment on the social value of their patients before deciding who to save, for example. And there are good utilitarian reasons for this: such judgments are apt to be unreliable, distorted by all sorts of biases regarding privilege and social status, and institutionalizing them could send a harmful stigmatizing message that undermines social solidarity. Realistically, it seems unlikely that the minor instrumental benefits to be gained from such a policy would outweigh these significant harms. So utilitarians may endorse standard rules of medical ethics that disallow medical providers from considering social value in triage or when making medical allocation decisions. But this practical point is very different from claiming that, as a matter of principle, utilitarianismās instrumental favoritism treats others as mere means [or is otherwise inherently objectionable]. There seems no good basis for that stronger claim.
Itās indisputable that some lives are more instrumentally valuable (to save) than others. So if you hold that all lives are equally intrinsically valuable, it follows that some lives are all-things-considered more valuable to save than others (due to having the same intrinsic value, but more instrumental value).
To avoid that āuncomfortableā-sounding conclusion, you would need to reject the second premise (that all lives are equally intrinsically valuable). That is, you would have to claim that some lives are intrinsically more valuable than others. And that is surely a much more uncomfortable conclusion!
I think we should conclude from this that thereās actually nothing remotely morally objectionably about saying that some lives are more valuable to save for purely instrumental reasons. The thing to avoid is to claim that some lives are intrinsically more important. It āsounds badā to say āsome lives are more valuable to save than othersā because it sounds like youāre claiming that some lives are inherently more valuable than others. So itās important to explicitly cancel the implicature by adding the āfor purely instrumental reasonsā clause.
But once clarified, itās a perfectly innocuous claim. Anyone who still thinks it sounds bad at that point needs to think more clearly.
I agree that some lives will go on to have a higher impact on others. I disagree with OP that you can predict which.
But the point from OP is that itās unacceptable to have favourites in terms of the importance of their lives, for whatever reason. So if you think some lives are predictably instrumentally more valuable, it follows that a good moral theory should ignore (some of) the instrumental value of saving a life.
The OP spoke of evaluative claims (āit is better to...ā and āthe conclusion that some lives are more valuable...ā), so I think itās important to be clear that those axiological claims are not reasonably disputable, and hence not reasonably regarded as ārepugnantā or whatever.
Now, itās a whole ānother question what should be done in light of these evaluative facts. One could argue that itās āunacceptableā to act upon them; that one should ignore or disregard facts about instrumental value for the purposes of deciding which life to save.
The key question then is: why? Most naturally, I think, one may worry that acting upon such differences might reinforce historical and existing social inequalities in a way that is more detrimental on net than the first-order effects of doing more immediate good. If that worry is empirically accurate, then even utilitarians will agree with the verdict that one should āscreen offā considerations of instrumental value in oneās decision procedure for saving lives (just as we ordinary think doctors etc. should). Saving the most (instrumentally) valuable life might not be the best thing to do, if the act itselfāor the process by which it was decidedāhas further negative consequences.
Again, per utilitarianism.net:
I like a lot the last paragraph pointing out to the risk of perpetuating a privileged situation based on bias. Thanks for sharing it.
(For related discussion, see the āInstrumental Favoritismā section of the āMere Meansā objection on utilitarianism.net)