Itâs contrary to the philosophy of Effective Altruism to be relying on or supporting peopleâs âgut levelâ vibes.
I can think of many examples of ineffective charities that you could justify in the same way because they âcapture in a nutshell the low intrinsic moral value that [people] are assigning to...â some neglected group:
The risk with playing into peopleâs gut feelings is that down the line when they find out that youâre actually talking about fewer shrimp than would feed a whale for a week, theyâre going to feel duped, trust is lost, reputation ruined. So on.
I think itâs quite important to remember the difference between a charity focusing on something because of gut level vibes and a charity using gut level vibes to inspire action. Most people are not EAs. If only EAs were inspired by my careful analytical report of which things cause the most suffering in farmed shrimp, my report would not achieve anything. But if I know that X is the most important thing, and Y gets people to care, I can use Y to get people in the door in order to solve X.
Also, because most people are not EAs, I actually think youâre wrong that most people will feel duped if they find out itâs not many shrimp. My parents, for example, are not vegan but were horrified by the eyestalk ablation thing. I told them honestly that it didnât involve many shrimp, but they arenât utilitarians: the number of individuals affected doesnât have as much of a visceral impact to them as that it is happening at all. Despite my father knowing full well how many chickens die in horrible conditions, he still eats chicken, and yet the eyestalk ablation thing got him to stop eating shrimp. Remembering that people are broadly motivated by different things, and being able to speak to different kinds of motivation, seems to me to be a critical aspect of effective advocacy.
My vibe is that you arenât genuinely interested in exploring the right messaging strategy for animal advocacy; if Iâm wrong feel free to message me.
A separate nitpick of your post: it doesnât seem fair to say that âShrimp Welfare Project focuses onâ ablation, if by that you meant âprimarily works on.â Perhaps thatâs not what you meant, but since other people might interpret it the same way I did, Iâll just share a few points in the interest of spreading an accurate impression of what the shrimp welfare movement is up to:
SWP primarily works on changing how shrimp are killed, not ablation. Their Humane Slaughter Initiative is listed first on their list of interventions.
In fact, they donât list anything related to eyestalk ablation on their interventions list at all; it appears they just write up a profile when a company reports phasing out eyestalk ablation, but it doesnât seem like they are actively campaigning on it.
In support of that theory, SWPâs guesstimate model on their impact doesnât include eyestalk ablation reforms; it only counts their shrimp stunning work.
Recent campaign wins in the UK were for eyestalk ablation and stunning (e.g., item 4 on the Tesco welfare policy), not just ablation, and that the Mercy For Animals announcement on it is clear that ablation only happens to breeding females. As far as I am aware, all shrimp welfare campaigning that includes eyestalk ablation also includes other higher-impact reforms in their ask.
The right messaging strategy long-term is to be transparent, honest and rational. Shortcutting this is risky, through the three mechanisms I mentioned in last comment.
SWP doesnât primarily focus on ablation. Where they do, they should keep in mind and make it clear that theyâre talking about <0.1% of farmed shrimp.
This is why I thought your idea was an interesting hypothesis to investigate, as it applies to areas beyond shrimp (e.g., do people sympathetic to pig welfare initiatives think that all pigs are raised in gestation crates? do they have understand that most pigs are not sows?, etc.). If there is widespread misunderstanding, then I agree it would be worth being more proactive to preempt misconceptions. I say âproactiveâ because I donât there think is an intentional effort to deceive people (I am one of the authors of the report you cited about how eyestalk ablation probably causes the least aggregate pain of the welfare issues that are commonly talked about). Given the highly abbreviated nature of most moral and political communication, it seems like one message, âbreeders are ablated,â and another, âthere are a lot of farmed shrimp,â could be integrated together in a naive way without there being any conspiracy to confuse people.
Itâs contrary to the philosophy of Effective Altruism to be relying on or supporting peopleâs âgut levelâ vibes.
At least for me, it wonât feel productive to litigate what is and isnât consistent with EA in this thread, so Iâll personally refrain. Iâll instead comment from two other perspectives below, one more intellectual and one more personal. You/âothers can have the last word.
As a psychologist, my read of the literature is that eliciting sympathy is often the critical ingredient to endorsing and consistently applying broader moral principles based in reason (e.g., Martin Hoffmanâs work). If thatâs true, then starting with a more relatable issue seems consistent with a broader goal of getting people to think about whether the moral revulsion they experience has implications for the principles that underlie their moral compass. I personally see this goal of facilitating âmoral circle expansionâ as distinct from the goal to get people to be more scope-sensitive (even though there are unique implications of both endorsing scope-sensitivity and granting moral consideration to shrimp), and call for different communication strategies.
By analogy, I initially got interested in animal issues from working at a seafood counter and handling live lobsters. After personally feeling uncomfortable with it for a while but having mostly inchoate thoughts about it, I read David Foster Wallaceâs piece Consider the Lobster. I canât prove it, but it seems to me that the personal experience with what was being described in the essay had a major impact in opening my mind to its arguments. When I later learned about scope-sensitivity, it was less counterintuitive for me to extend it to animals because of these aforementioned experiences. Even though Iâve never thought that prioritizing lobsters is cost-effective (not that I have well-developed thoughts on the topic either way), the highly personal nature of seeing them languish in crowded tanks and boiled alive was formative to the trajectory of my moral sensibilities.
Itâs contrary to the philosophy of Effective Altruism to be relying on or supporting peopleâs âgut levelâ vibes.
I can think of many examples of ineffective charities that you could justify in the same way because they âcapture in a nutshell the low intrinsic moral value that [people] are assigning to...â some neglected group:
Soccer balls for village kids in rural Uganda
GoFundMes for peoplesâ sick and injured pets
Knitted vests for penguins
Free iPads for kids in low-performing schools
Drama therapy for prisoners
The risk with playing into peopleâs gut feelings is that down the line when they find out that youâre actually talking about fewer shrimp than would feed a whale for a week, theyâre going to feel duped, trust is lost, reputation ruined. So on.
I think itâs quite important to remember the difference between a charity focusing on something because of gut level vibes and a charity using gut level vibes to inspire action. Most people are not EAs. If only EAs were inspired by my careful analytical report of which things cause the most suffering in farmed shrimp, my report would not achieve anything. But if I know that X is the most important thing, and Y gets people to care, I can use Y to get people in the door in order to solve X.
Also, because most people are not EAs, I actually think youâre wrong that most people will feel duped if they find out itâs not many shrimp. My parents, for example, are not vegan but were horrified by the eyestalk ablation thing. I told them honestly that it didnât involve many shrimp, but they arenât utilitarians: the number of individuals affected doesnât have as much of a visceral impact to them as that it is happening at all. Despite my father knowing full well how many chickens die in horrible conditions, he still eats chicken, and yet the eyestalk ablation thing got him to stop eating shrimp. Remembering that people are broadly motivated by different things, and being able to speak to different kinds of motivation, seems to me to be a critical aspect of effective advocacy.
Sounds like a recipe for:
Reinforcing the stereotype of vegans/âvegetarians as âbleeding heartsâ who donât think about practicalities.
Misguided regulations/âlegislation in the style of bee bricks that contribute to societyâs red tape fatigue without having positive impact.
Reduced trust in the effective animal welfare movement (Iâll now be more skeptical, less trusting that Iâm being told all relevant info)
My vibe is that you arenât genuinely interested in exploring the right messaging strategy for animal advocacy; if Iâm wrong feel free to message me.
A separate nitpick of your post: it doesnât seem fair to say that âShrimp Welfare Project focuses onâ ablation, if by that you meant âprimarily works on.â Perhaps thatâs not what you meant, but since other people might interpret it the same way I did, Iâll just share a few points in the interest of spreading an accurate impression of what the shrimp welfare movement is up to:
SWP primarily works on changing how shrimp are killed, not ablation. Their Humane Slaughter Initiative is listed first on their list of interventions.
In fact, they donât list anything related to eyestalk ablation on their interventions list at all; it appears they just write up a profile when a company reports phasing out eyestalk ablation, but it doesnât seem like they are actively campaigning on it.
In support of that theory, SWPâs guesstimate model on their impact doesnât include eyestalk ablation reforms; it only counts their shrimp stunning work.
Recent campaign wins in the UK were for eyestalk ablation and stunning (e.g., item 4 on the Tesco welfare policy), not just ablation, and that the Mercy For Animals announcement on it is clear that ablation only happens to breeding females. As far as I am aware, all shrimp welfare campaigning that includes eyestalk ablation also includes other higher-impact reforms in their ask.
The right messaging strategy long-term is to be transparent, honest and rational. Shortcutting this is risky, through the three mechanisms I mentioned in last comment.
SWP doesnât primarily focus on ablation. Where they do, they should keep in mind and make it clear that theyâre talking about <0.1% of farmed shrimp.
This is why I thought your idea was an interesting hypothesis to investigate, as it applies to areas beyond shrimp (e.g., do people sympathetic to pig welfare initiatives think that all pigs are raised in gestation crates? do they have understand that most pigs are not sows?, etc.). If there is widespread misunderstanding, then I agree it would be worth being more proactive to preempt misconceptions. I say âproactiveâ because I donât there think is an intentional effort to deceive people (I am one of the authors of the report you cited about how eyestalk ablation probably causes the least aggregate pain of the welfare issues that are commonly talked about). Given the highly abbreviated nature of most moral and political communication, it seems like one message, âbreeders are ablated,â and another, âthere are a lot of farmed shrimp,â could be integrated together in a naive way without there being any conspiracy to confuse people.
At least for me, it wonât feel productive to litigate what is and isnât consistent with EA in this thread, so Iâll personally refrain. Iâll instead comment from two other perspectives below, one more intellectual and one more personal. You/âothers can have the last word.
As a psychologist, my read of the literature is that eliciting sympathy is often the critical ingredient to endorsing and consistently applying broader moral principles based in reason (e.g., Martin Hoffmanâs work). If thatâs true, then starting with a more relatable issue seems consistent with a broader goal of getting people to think about whether the moral revulsion they experience has implications for the principles that underlie their moral compass. I personally see this goal of facilitating âmoral circle expansionâ as distinct from the goal to get people to be more scope-sensitive (even though there are unique implications of both endorsing scope-sensitivity and granting moral consideration to shrimp), and call for different communication strategies.
By analogy, I initially got interested in animal issues from working at a seafood counter and handling live lobsters. After personally feeling uncomfortable with it for a while but having mostly inchoate thoughts about it, I read David Foster Wallaceâs piece Consider the Lobster. I canât prove it, but it seems to me that the personal experience with what was being described in the essay had a major impact in opening my mind to its arguments. When I later learned about scope-sensitivity, it was less counterintuitive for me to extend it to animals because of these aforementioned experiences. Even though Iâve never thought that prioritizing lobsters is cost-effective (not that I have well-developed thoughts on the topic either way), the highly personal nature of seeing them languish in crowded tanks and boiled alive was formative to the trajectory of my moral sensibilities.